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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of food aid in 
recipient countries on agricultural and economic development. The 
central question is: Under what conditions and through what mechanisms 
are the effects of food aid positive or negative? This study examines 
(a) the theoretical conditions that result in food aid having positive 
or negative effects and (b) some empirical evidence of actual impacts 
of past utilization of food aid. The study draws together theoretical 
concepts of consumption and production to explain the inq>act of food 
aid programs and utilization. 
The study analyzes effects of food aid on development in recipient 
countries with particular attention to the following: 
1. The humanitarian aspect of raising real income and nutritional 
levels of consumers who are at or below subsistence levels; 
2. The consumption aspect of increases in real income levels, 
shifts in demand for consumer goods, allocation of marginal 
demand between food and nonfood items, changes in quantity 
demands resulting from relative price changes, and changes 
through demand on the total economic system; 
3. The production aspect of price changes, supply response of 
domestic producers, and the extent to \Aiich these responses 
reduce the potential inçact of food aid on development; 
4. The general development aspect of increased eiq>loyment, 
multiplier effects of increased income, substitutability of 
food aid for capital loans,shifts in foreign trade, foreign 
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exchange balances, and inflation. 
Conclusions drawn from the analysis are translated into principles 
and policy guidelines for effective use of food aid to promote agricul­
tural and economic development. 
Problem Setting: Food Balances 
For the past several years production of major food and fiber crops 
in the U.S. has consistently exceeded domestic disappearance. For the 
last decade the annual excess has been 15.8 - 26.3 million tons of wheat 
and rye, 4.9 - 34.2 million tons of feed grains,^ and 24.7 - 69.6 million 
hundredweight of rice. With the exception of 1967, cotton production 
has exceeded domestic disappearance each year of the last decade with 
the excess ranging as high as 6.7 million bales in 1963. 
Production and disappearance data are not perfect measures of excess 
productive capacity since net commercial exports also are a part of 
total demand, but the excess production over domestic disappearance 
does suggest effective capability of U.S. agriculture to outproduce 
domestic demand. Even with government production control policies 
and programs, the excess of wheat and rye has consistently held between 
19 and 26 million tons for the 1964-1968 period. Excess feed grain 
production reached recent lows in 1961 and 1964, but in 1967 exceeded 
the previous high by more than 8.0 million tons. Rice production has 
exceeded domestic disappearance by steadily increasing amounts since 
1961 with the exception of 1964. Not only has U.S. agricultural output 
^Corn, oats, barley, and grain sorghum. 
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Table 1. Production and domestic disappearance of selected agricultural 
commodities in the U.S. 
Year 
Wheat and rye (1,000 tons) Feed grains (1.000 tons) 
Produce Disappear Excess Produce Disappear Excess 
1950 31,180 20,940 10,240 113,131 109,468 3,663 
1951 30,247 20,719 9,528 104,786 109,759 -4,973 
1952 39,647 19,896 19,751 110,958 100,521 10,437 
1953 35,721 19,229 16,492 108,303 101,940 6,363 
1954 30,245 18,644 11,601 114,073 102,162 11,911 
1955 28,928 18,445 10,483 120,846 109,275 11,571 
1956 30,758 17,944 12,814 119,308 106,943 12,365 
1957 29,470 18,092 11,378 132,424 113,417 19,007 
1958 44,653 18,613 26,040 144,121 123,536 20,585 
1959 34,280 18,435 15,845 149,605 130,198 19,407 
1960 41,642 18,627 23,015 155,618 133,216 22,402 
1961 37,812 18,816 18,996 140,626 135,748 4,878 
1962 33,952 17,897 16,055 142,899 132,848 10,051 
1963 35,078 18,254 16,824 156,432 130,472 25,960 
1964 39,652 20,014 19,638 134,200 127,472 6,728 
1965 42,951 21,406 21,545 157,400 141,332 16,068 
1966 40,129 21,087 19,042 157,600 140,760 16,840 
1967 46,350 20,067 26,283 176,000 141,804^ 34,196^ 
1968^ 47,742 23,176 24,566 168,100 — — — — — — 
^Source: (81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89). 
^Preliminary. 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Rice (1,000 cwt) Cotton (1,000 bales) 
Year Produce Disappear Excess Produce Disappear Excess 
1950 38,840 25,752 13,088 9,851 10,536 - 685 
1951 46,122 24,159 21,963 15,028 9,231 5,797 
1952 48,278 25,149 23,129 15,124 9,511 5,613 
1953 52,924 25,312 27,612 16,359 8,651 7,708 
1954 64,254 27,976 36,278 13,545 8,901 4,644 
1955 55,969 27,080 28,889 14,633 9,210 5,423 
1956 49,503 25,993 23,510 12,977 8,608 4,369 
1957 42,954 25,658 17,296 10,863 7,999 2,864 
1958 44,775 25,617 19,158 11,373 8,703 2,670 
1959 53,669 27,750 25,919 14,505 9,017 5,488 
1960 54,623 26,944 27,679 14,353 8,279 6,074 
1961 54,221 29,570 24,651 14,384 8,954 5,430 
1962 66,100 28,000 38,100 14,867 8,419 6,448 
1963 70,300 28,700 41,600 15,334 8,609 6,725 
1964 59,800 28,200 31,600 15,182 9,171 6,011 
1965 76,300 30,900 45,400 14,973 9,497 5,476 
1966 85,100 31,900 53,200 9,575 9,485 90 
1967 89,400 33,600 55,800 7,458 8,982 -1,524 
1968^ 105,300 35,700 69,600 10,948 8,246 2,702 
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exceeded domestic demands in the past, but the data for the most recent 
years indicate a rising trend in production relative to domestic 
disappearance. 
Surplus production capacity is not unique to modern U.S. agriculture. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (93, p. 31) was enacted 
specifically to "establish and maintain a balance between production 
and consumption." Although "surpluses" are not explicitly mentioned 
in the A.A .A. of 1933, they were implicitly recognized as a contributing 
factor when Congress was prompted to pass legislation for the specific 
purpose of expanding consumption while promoting production adjustment 
of selected basic commodities.^ The following year "surpluses" were 
explicitly mentioned in legislation when the A.A.A. of 1933 was 
amended "to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to finance...surplus 
2 
reductions" of basic commodities. Surpluses were further acknowledged 
by the establishment of the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation in 
October of 1933 under the authority of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of June 1933 (94, p. 195). In the first annual Report of Federal 
Surplus Relief Corporation covering October 1933 to December 1934, 
the operations of the Corporation were cited as having "resulted in a 
substantial movement of price-depressing surplus agricultural commodities 
from the farmers to consumers on relief, to the benefit of both" (69, p. 1). 
Basic commodities specified in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933 included wheat, cotton, field corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk 
and milk products (93, p. 38). 
2 Cattle, rye, flax, barley and grain sorghums were added to the 
list of basic commodities in 1934 (95, p. 528). 
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Creation of the Commodity Credit Corporation (C.C.C.) in October 
1933 by Presidential Executive Order (79, p. 73) represents the beginning 
of the second concept of surpluses. Surpluses referred to in the A.A.A. 
of 1933 represented surplus production held by the farmers or offered 
on the market for unusually low prices. Although closely related, 
the second concept is distinctly different and relates to stocks of 
commodities held by the C.C.C. 
During the early stages of C.C.C. price support programs, stocks 
were accumulated but at levels that were considered reasonable to 
protect against emergencies and to carry out price stabilization 
policies of the government. By the early 1950*s C.C.C. stocks had 
accumulated, as Egbert stated, "to a level far above conceivable emergency 
requirements" (26, p. 1), and the second concept of surpluses came into 
use. The U.S. entered a state where not only did U.S. farmers outproduce 
commercial demand, but the government often accumulated stocks far above 
estimated emergency reserves. 
In May 1955 Congress passed Public Law 540 which, in Section 201(b), 
instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to report annually on disposal 
of C.C.C. stocks. The report is required to show "(a) the quantity of 
surplus commodities on hand, (b) the method of disposition utilized and 
the quantities disposed of during the preceding twelve months, and (c) 
the method of disposition to be utilized and the estimated quantities 
that can be disposed of during the succeeding twelve months" (84, p. 1). 
A summary of the surplus commodities and the estimated quantities which 
the U.S. had available for disposition during Fiscal Year 1969 is listed 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Surplus commodities available during fiscal year 1969* 
Commodities Units Quantity 
Wheat and rye (tons) 8,429,115 
Feed grains (tons) 17,861,952 
Rice (cwt) 11,181,878 
Cotton (bales) 709,695 
Tobacco (tons) 17,500 
Fats and oils (tons) 281,441 
Oilseeds and meal (tons) 1,786,121 
Dairy products (tons) 719,753 
Fruits and vegetables (cwt) 300,000 
Honey (tons) 4,822 
^Source: (84, pp. 17-28). 
At the same time that U.S. agriculture is outproducing commercial 
demand and the U.S. government is holding excess stocks of food and 
fiber commodities, many of the developing nations of the world are 
experiencing food deficits. F.A.O. reports the average annual deficit 
of all grains^ for the 1961-1963 period was 5.3 million tons in Latin 
America, 1.3 million tons in Africa, 2.9 million tons in the Near East, 
and 7.6 million tons in the Far East (32, p. 86). F.A.O. projects the 
annual deficits to grow to 7.5, 6.2, 5.5, and 17.5 million tons respec­
tively for the four regions by 1975 if past area and yield trends continue. 
eat, rye, barley, oats, maize, sorghums, millets, and mixed 
grains. 
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In 1964 the Foreign Regional Analysis Division of U.S.D.A. projected 
1970 grain deficits of 4.7 million tons in Latin America, 7.6 million 
tons in Africa, 11.4 million tons in the Near East, and 11.9 million 
tons in the Far East (90, pp. 97-98). Abel and Rojko, in their 1967 
analysis of the world food situation, estimated 1970 grain deficits 
of 10.0 million tons for India, 3.4 million tons for Pakistan, and 
25.2 million tons for the remaining less developed countries^ using 
the 1954-66 trends for the projections (2, p. 12). Modifying the 
historical trends by assessing the likely impact of agricultural policies 
and development plans had little effect on their 1970 trend projections. 
The modified projections affected their projections only for India 
and Pakistan, lowering projected deficits in these countries to 6.7 
and 2.5 million tons respectively. 
Using a combination of F.A.O. and U.S.D.A. trend assumptions and 
modifications for population growth, production increases, and demand 
growth rate, Blakeslee (11) and Framingham (37) projected "most 
probable" 1970 food grain deficits of 8.1 million tons in Latin 
America, 13.5 million tons in the Middle East, 8.0 million tons in 
2 
Africa, and 8.2 million tons in India and Pakistan. Although there 
are some differences in the magnitude of estimates of future food 
deficits in the developing countries, each of the studies projected 
deficits of approximately 35-40 million tons per year, for the 1970's. 
In addition, food deficits may be even greater in the developing 
^Excluding those which are projected to be net exporters. 
2 
Excluding South Africa. 
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countries than the above projections, since they are basically projections 
of effective demand. For example, F.A.O. statistics indicate that 
effective demand was providing an average daily calorie intake of 2,210 
in Africa, 2,190 in the Near East; and 2,080 in Asia and the Far East 
in 1962 when an adequate nutritional diet would have required 2,250 
in Africa, 2,330 in the Near East, and 2,230 in Asia and the Far East^ 
(32, p. 36). Abel and Rojko estimated 1959-1961 daily calorie deficits 
of 240 for India, 180 for Pakistan, and 160 for the other less-
developed countries (2, p. 7). These food deficits arise from two 
sources in the developing countries—the inability of domestic agriculture 
to satisfy effective demand and the absence of adequate purchasing 
power among a segment of the population to provide minimum nutritional 
requirements. 
Solutions to the projected food deficits in the developing countries 
are divided into two categories. Satisfying effective demand requires 
expansion of domestic agriculture or development of export earnings which 
can finance food imports. Although numerous countries are attempting 
to become self-sufficient through expanded domestic production, a 
combination of production and imports may be the long-run economic 
solution. As Beringer points out, "On the basis of long-run comparative 
cost considerations it may well turn out that at least a certain portion 
of total food-grain needs should be met through imports from abroad in 
exchange for goods which can be produced more advantageously at home" 
(9, p. 321). Narrowing the gap between effective demand and adequate 
^Estimated requirements vary according to climate, age of popula­
tion, and weight of individuals. 
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nutritional requirements, according to Blau, "depends essentially on 
progress made in raising the efficiency of production and distribution 
systems to the mutual benefit of consumers and producers, and, on the 
other hand, raising the levels of both general and external purchasing 
power" (12, p. 1). Essentially the solution to food deficits and 
malnutrition in the developing countries lies in the development of 
domestic agriculture or expanded foreign trade to satisfy effective 
demand. The latter course implies an expansion of the general economic 
and effective demand for land. 
The basic question is whether or not the abundant productive 
capacity and food surpluses of the U.S. can be used effectively to 
meet immediate food deficits in the short run and to promote agricultural 
and economic development in the long run. Khatkhate strongly supports 
the use of surplus commodities from developed nations to meet food 
deficits in developing nations. He states that "commodity imports 
under the foreign aid program should be a boon to underdeveloped 
countries" (57, p. 192). In a similar statement, Ezekiel proposes 
the use of U.S. surpluses to both satisfy food deficits in the developing 
nations and to bring about economic development. "Heavy surplus 
disposals to these areas over long periods, if accompanied by correspond­
ing speeding up of their general economic and industrial development, 
might help advance the day when they could begin to depend on industry 
as well as agriculture as substantial factors in both production and 
trade" (27, pp. 1075-1076). In a later statement Ezekiel pointed out 
that the use of surplus commodities "in helping to finance economic 
development can be an important contribution to the more rapid development 
11 
of underdeveloped countries, except for any countervailing influence 
on retarding their agricultural development" (27, p. 1077). Schultz 
has called attention specifically to the "potentially serious long-run 
adverse effects" of surplus commodity disposal upon agriculture of 
the recipient countries (71, pp. 1027-1029). Writing on the P.L. 
480 program in Colombia, Goering stated that "Surplus farm stocks 
are viewed as potential assets in the war against hunger and poverty" 
(39, p. 992). 
Benedict and Bauer summarized the essence of the food problem in 
their study of U.S. surpluses. "To many, it seems obvious that both 
of these problems could be solved by an enlightened policy of sharing 
our abundance with the needy peoples of other countries" (8, Forward). 
Reporting his analysis of P.L. 480 to the Senate Agriculture and 
Forestry Committee, Humphrey wrote "America's abundance of food and 
fiber is a tremendous asset in the world's struggle for peace and 
freedom—an asset still awaiting to be fully utilized with greater 
boldness and compassion" (48, p. 1). Cochrane suggested a general 
solution to the food problem in his President-Elect Address to the 
American Farm Economics Association. "The transfer of surplus food 
and fiber supplies from the United States and their conversion into 
development supplies in underdeveloped countries becomes the policy 
bridge whereby the pressure of food and fiber supplies on population 
in the United States is moderated and the pressure of population on 
food and fiber supplies in the underdeveloped countries is moderated. 
By this policy bridge we buy the kind of adjustment time required in 
each social complex; and its construction would constitute political 
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action at its best" (20, p. 896). These are only a few statements 
representative of the widely held belief that surplus commodities from 
the U.S. can be useful in aiding developing nations to meet both short-
and long-run food problems, but that caution must be exercised to avoid 
adverse effects on the recipient economy. Presently the world food 
problem is one of excess stocks in the U.S. and other developed countries 
while chronic shortages occur in many of the developing nations. 
Clearly defined, the problem is one of disposing of U.S. surpluses, 
and at the same time satisfying current food deficits in developing 
nations in a manner consistent with achieving long-run food balances 
as well. Although "the people of the United States have demonstrated 
repeatedly that they can be very generous to those in temporary distress, 
...they will not be satisfied with any program that does not look to 
eventual termination of demands on them, except in times of emergency 
or widespread disaster" (8, p. 5). In his analysis of Food for Peace, 
Toma cites Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, as "warning the under­
developed nations not to expect continuous unlimited food assistance 
from the United States " (75, p. 138). 
If the U.S. is unwilling to supply perpetual food donations, even 
of surplus commodities, the solution to the problem apparently lies 
in the realm of at least a quasi-commercial agreement for supplying 
the surpluses combined with effective utilization of the commodities 
to promote economic development and generate proceeds to meet the 
obligation of additional imports until production can be brought into 
balance with demand. One innovation in that direction was the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) of 1954. 
13 
Through 1968, $17.6 billion of surplus U.S. farm commodities had been 
shipped to recipient countries under P.L. 480 agreements. The magnitude 
of the P.L. 480 program indicates a significant potential to produce 
beneficial or harmful effects on recipient countries, depending on its 
use. To achieve efficient and beneficial effects from P.L. 480, 
theoretical aspects and past experiences need to be examined and 
analyzed carefully in order to develop or modify administrative guide­
lines which direct the program. 
Review of Related Studies 
F.A.O. pilot study of India 
In 1955 F.A.O. published a comprehensive study conducted by a 
team of economists under the leadership of Dr. Mordecai Ezekiel to 
evaluate the alternative uses of surplus commodities to finance economic 
development (34). The pilot study was conducted in India to determine 
how surplus farm commodities could be used to finance additional 
investment without competing with sales of domestic products or usual 
exports from other countries. 
The study outlines four classes of projects in which surplus 
commodities could be used. Type I projects distribute food as wages-in-
kind with all additional food being consumed by those receiving the 
food or their families. Type II projects provide for sale of surplus 
food on the open market with the proceeds being used to employ additional 
labor on various development projects. Type III projects are similar 
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to Type II except that they have opportunities for rapid return^ so that 
proceeds from the project could make it self-supporting, or at least 
cover nonfood expenditures on the project. Type IV projects are groups 
of projects which are referred to as the program approach. A Type IV 
program includes the integration of two or more projects as a part of 
a comprehensive development plan. 
Based on a set of assumptions and coefficients for the Indian 
economy, the study proceeds to estimate the total need for surplus food 
as a portion of the total increase in investment through the alternative 
projects. It concludes that if provisions are made to prevent resale 
of the surplus commodities, or substitution of the commodities for 
domestic purchases, Type I projects could utilize surplus commodities 
up to the amount of the total labor cost of the project without 
depressing food prices (34, p. 7). 
Based on a Type II project which requires 70 percent of the total 
cost as direct labor, and given a marginal propensity to consume food 
of 0.40 and marketing and transportation costs of surplus food equal 
to 15 percent of the value, direct demand for food equal to only 24 
percent of the project investment would be generated. 
However, further assuming that 10 percent of the investment is for 
imported materials and equipment and 20 percent is for domestic products, 
additional food demand is generated from the increased income for 
^Projects which fall into this class are generally those which 
tap reserves of natural resources such as ore or timber. 
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domestic producers.^ Assuming that allocation of marginal income will 
be 9 percent for savings, 9 percent for taxes, 8 percent for consumption 
of imports, and 35 percent for food purchases of which 25 percent is 
marketing and transportation costs, the 49 units of derived income 
generate 13 additional units of food demand. Tracing the process 
through three years, the total demand for additional food reaches only 
52 percent of the initial investment even though direct labor represented 
70 percent of the project costs. 
Type III projects, as discussed in the study, are a special case 
of Type II projects where the project actually finances itself in 
part or total after a short initial period of operation. If the project 
is capable of producing part of its own financing, it reduces the 
amount of capital investment needed to support the project. 
Using a Type IV program example requiring 50 percent of the costs 
as direct labor, the potential demand for surplus food (assuming the 
same estimated coefficients as with the Type II project) was estimated 
to equal 48 percent of the program investment in the first three years. 
The second part of Ezekiel's study was devoted to discussion of 
specific projects which could be undertaken in India. Projects 
appropriate for Type I financing include educational food scholarships 
(particularly for the rural youth and children from low income 
families), food scholarships to special groups (i.e., displaced persons 
^The study points out that additional income can be spent in three 
ways—more goods sold at the same price, the same amount of goods sold 
at a higher price, or increased imports (34, p. 9). 
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and the backward classes),^ internships for educated individuals to 
obtain work experience, village or community development projects 
(i.e., building schools, wells, village tanks, gutters, dams, access 
roads, irrigation canals, warehouses, and conservation terraces), and 
financing milk marketing schemes (i.e., arrangements for collection, 
chilling, processing, and shipment of milk, movement of families and 
their milk animals out of the cities, and supplementing milk supplies 
with imported milk). Type II examples include road construction, new 
irrigation projects, reforestation, erosion control, and other 
development projects which employ unskilled labor. A Type III project 
which was suggested involved extension of a road into a virgin 
forest area and the development of integrated forest industries. 
Michigan State study of Colombia 
In a study published in 1963 (40), Goering and Witt analyzed the 
impact of the P.L. 480 program on the agricultural economy of Colombia. 
The study considered the potential impact of P.L. 480 imports on four 
areas of the economy: (a) farm prices, production, and income, 
(b) economic development and internal resource use, (c) level of 
consumption of agricultural products, and (d) changes in Colombian 
foreign exchange expenditures. Comparing domestic prices and production 
in 1954-55 and 1959-60 of commodities supplied under P.L. 480 agreements 
with the prices and production of agricultural and nonagricultural 
commodities not in the program, they concluded that production of wheat 
backward classes include two groups given special legal recognition. 
One of these is the primative and traditional tribes, and the other is 
religious or social groups affected by prejudices. 
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increased only slightly over the five year period while cotton production 
increased over 25 percent per year. As with cotton, sesame production 
increased substantially even though P.L. 480 imports of edible oils, 
a close substitute for sesame oi ; were large relative to domestic 
production. The authors concluded that there is a strong indication 
that the national food procurement agency (I.N.A.) used P.L. 480 
wheat imports to satisfy domestic demand at reduced prices rather than 
to undertake a costly price support program which would have stimulated 
production. At the same time an active price support program was carried 
on for barley with the apparent impact of shifting domestic production 
from wheat to barley. 
Goering and Witt point out that local currency use can only 
contribute to economic development if the 'appropriate' environment 
exists, i.e., that resources are available but unemployed because of 
monetary and fiscal rigidities (40, p. 22). They conclude that it is 
generally agreed that 'appropriate * conditions have prevailed in 
Colombia--the labor force is increasing faster than the new employment 
opportunities, thus creating unemployed resources which have been put 
to work on development projects financed with P.L. 460 loans—and that 
the use of local currency has not created undue inflationary pressures 
on the economy.^ The study concludes that availability of local 
currency loans probably was instrumental in stimulating expansion of 
^The Colombia authorities have been uneasy about an annual increase 
in the price level of under 10 percent, but this compares favorably with 
the 400 percent in Brazil, 439 percent in Argentina, and 1,110 percent 
in Chile for the period from 1954 to 1960 (40, p. 23). 
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the total development program in view of the conservative fiscal policy 
demonstrated in the past. 
While the general level of food prices increased by 64 percent, 
6 percent more than general price levels, retail bread price increased 
40 percent, vegetable shortening price increased 117 percent, and 
cotton cloth price increased 36 percent. At the same time P.L. 480 
imports of wheat, edible oils, and cotton represented 20, 11, and 9 
percent respectively. Although P.L. 480 imports may have helped to 
hold down retail prices, the effect was difficult to measure because 
of the concurrent influence of domestic price support programs. High 
support prices may have had an equally significant effect by increasing 
production and contributing to increased processing efficiency and 
lower marketing spread through higher volume processing. 
The impact of P.L. 480 donation programs was more difficult to 
evaluate. It was observed that child consultation at health centers 
decreased by 50 percent due to CARE school and family feeding activities. 
School attendance was maintained at unusually high levels by distributing 
milk, cheese, and rolls. 
Observation of market sales before and during large donation programs 
led the authors to conclude that delivery of surplus commodities to 
those with nominal purchasing power resulted almost exclusively in 
expanded consumption and not displacement of regular purchases. Consumer 
purchases in areas with large surplus food programs did not decline in 
any of the markets after the programs went into effect. 
The study points out that an important side effect to the voluntary 
agency programs may be the development of greater sensitivity by the 
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government to the needs of the destitute and refugee groups. Another 
side effect may be a shift in tastes and preferences as the result of 
promotional programs associated with surplus commodity distribution to 
promote more nutritional diets. 
Aggregatively, the authors found that P.L. 480 programs have 
contributed 52 calories per day to per capita consumption in Colombia. 
On the average this amounted to a 2.4 percent increase, but many 
families were certainly affected much more significantly. 
The final area examined was impact of P.L. 480 shipments on 
competing third country trade. The authors conclude that there are 
strong implications that P.L. 480 has had a negative impact on 
commercial trade. Peru experienced a fall in cotton exports to 
Colombia. Since total cotton imports fell, the absolute fall is not 
proof of negative impact, but Peru's share of the market fell as well. 
Canadian wheat shipments have fallen significantly also. Their shipments 
to Colombia fell to only 32 percent of the preprogram levels, giving 
a strong indication that the P.L. 480 program did have a negative 
effect. The authors suggest that this might be viewed as Canada's 
contribution to the development program in Colombia. 
U.S.D.A. study of U.A.R. 
In a study of P.L. 480 in the U.A.R., Umstott concluded that P.L. 
480 shipments to the U.A.R. were closely related to a shift from a 7 
percent cost of living increase between 1955 and 1961 to a 5 percent 
decrease between 1961 and 1962 (76, p. 11). The U.A.R. was producing 
about 54 percent of its estimated wheat consumption in 1958 when the 
daily per capita food consumption averaged 2,340 calories. Umstott 
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projecLod Lhat domestic production would provide less than 44 percent 
of the 1966 consumption, and that demand for P.L. 480 wheat imports would 
rise considerably. He concluded that since the agricultural resource 
base is quite limited in the U.A.R., the government will be forced to 
look to industrial development as a source of foreign exchange earnings. 
This will lead to increased employment and directly to greater food 
demand. Consequently, projections to 1970 indicate an even greater 
demand for commercial or concessional food imports for the U.A.R. 
The impact of Title II and Title III shipments are summarized in 
terms of program size. Umstott points out that the Title III program 
in the U.A.R. during 1961 to 1963 was the largest of any recipient 
country. School feeding under Title III reached about three million 
children. 
In addition, P.L. 480 shipments, equal to 12 percent of the total 
U.A.R. imports in 1961, eased the serious drain on foreign exchange by 
calling for payment in local currency. Local currency sales allowed 
the U.S. to expand their exports significantly to the U.A.R. by over­
coming two major obstructions to trade: limited foreign exchange and 
lack of U.S. demand for U.A.R. commodities. Acceptance of soft 
currency reduced the need for U.A.R. exchange commodities to supplement 
foreign exchange purchases. 
Using a simple demand prediction equation where change in demand 
(d) equals the annual rate of population change (p) plus the product 
of the per capita increase in income (g) and the income elasticity of 
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the demand for food (n),^ Umstott projects a growth in food demand of 
almost five percent per year. Assuming agricultural output continues to 
increase at 1 percent per year, he projected an annual food deficit of 
4 percent. 
U.S.D.A. sponsored study of Turkey 
The team study of Turkey (4), directed by Dr. Resat Aktan, 
concentrated on the evaluation of the economic impact of P.L. 480 
Title I programs through 1962. Two commodity groups constitute the 
majority of the program with wheat making up 63 percent, fats and 
oils 25 percent, and various other commodities providing the other 
12 percent. 
The study characterizes Turkish agriculture as having traditional 
production patterns which are hampered by fractionalization of land 
2 holdings through inheritance. Lack of social overhead structures 
such as credit, transportation, schools, advisory service, and 
marketing facilities further hinder the transition to a dynamic 
agriculture. The farmers most involved in the money market are those 
producing fruits, vegetable, and industrial raw materials such as cotton, 
tobacco, and oilseeds. 
On the basis of price index comparisons, the study concludes that 
farm prices rose at about the same rate as general prices during the 
^Parameters used for the U.A.R. were: p = 3.0, g = 2.67, n = 0.7, 
and d = p + gn = 4.87. 
2 Less than 5 percent of the farmers have a farm wholly in one 
piece. 
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P.L. 480 era, and that there is no evidence that P.L. 480 imports had 
an adverse effect on domestic production of imported products. These 
results were observed under conditions where annual imports represented 
the following percentage of domestic production: wheat 1.5 - 13.5, 
corn 1.0 - 6.0, rice 5.0 - 11.0, and vegetable oils 12.0 - 60.0 
It was observed that official attitudes toward agriculture have 
not consistently given it priority and integrated programs needed to 
make it a significant contributor to economic growth. Consequently, 
it was concluded that P.L. 480 commodities helped to prevent a food 
crisis of major proportion. The study examines hypothetical production 
adjustments which might have taken place if P.L. 480 commodities had 
not been available, but discounts them heavily because of the uncertainty 
of the direction which the government would have moved in the absence 
of P.L. 480 assistance. 
Several approaches were taken to analyze the price and income 
effects on consumers. By examining several price indices, the research 
team determined that wheat and vegetable oils constitute about a third 
of the food-price index and 13 to 15 percent of the total cost-of-living 
index. Thus, any price effects due to P.L. 480 imports would have a 
significant effect on consumer cost of living. An examination of 
seasonal price changes indicated that during the period of P.L. 480 
imports, prices at harvest time rose relative to the rest of the year. 
An application of supply elasticities to food deficits, under the 
assumption that all P.L. 480 imports were additional, indicated that the 
price of wheat would have risen by 10 to 60 percent in the absence of 
P.L. 480 imports. Downward adjustments must be made on these price 
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estimates to compensate for the one third to one half of the local 
currency proceeds which were used for U.S. government expenditures. Most 
of these expenditures would have been made anyway so that dollars would 
have been available to purchase wheat and vegetable oils commercially 
and meet part of the food deficit. 
The study concludes that many structural changes in demand can be 
attributed to P.L. 480 imports. The declining price trend for margarine 
was stabilized by expanded demand. Butter price, in contrast, reversed 
its rising trend and fell slightly during the 1955 to 1959 period. 
Agriculture's share of national income declined from 49 percent before 
P.L. 480 imports to 40 - 42 percent in 1961 and 1962 even though the 
gross value of production climbed fairly regularly even when adjusted 
for constant prices. Large imports of cereals would have suggested a 
relative loss by cereal farmers as compared with livestock farmers, 
but no evidence was found in the data to suggest such a conclusion. 
Food expenditures were estimated to range between 40 and 70 percent 
of consumer budgets for the 1948 to 1962 period, when food consumption 
was estimated at 2500 to 2800 calories per day. Wheat supplied under 
P.L. 480 tended to be consumed in the cities and coastal areas while 
corn and vegetable oils (as margarine) were distributed more evenly 
over the country. Together, the wheat and vegetable oil imports 
under P.L. 480 represented 10 to 20 percent of food expenditures. Complex 
mixing rates were used to stretch or contract the wheat supply by 
varying the wheat to rye ratio. 
Economic development also reflected the impact of P.L. 480. Invest­
ment resulting from P.L. 480 has aided in the development of domestic 
24 
consumer good industries which replaced imports of many consumer goods. 
Many of the new industries are still in their infancy, but it appears 
that they will be able to compete effectively and provide import 
substitutes in the future. The study concludes that expenditure of 
local currency increased demand for imports to some degree, but did 
not significantly shift trade patterns. 
It was observed that P.L. 480 shipments assumed a major role in 
balancing international accounts. An average of 34.5 percent of the 
annual deficit was satisfied with P.L. 480 imports. However, because 
of large allocations of local currency for U.S. Government uses, the 
net effect on balance of payments must be adjusted downward to account 
for loss of dollar earnings. 
Arizona study of surplus disposal 
A general study of the impact of P.L. 480 on receiving nations was 
conducted by Menzie, Witt, Eicher, and Hillman (65, Chapter V). The 
early part of the study points out that a development plan is essentially 
an investment plan in recipient countries. The greater the food aid 
program, the more planning that is necessary for a unified investment plan. 
The study notes that India moved toward increased P.L. 480 Title I 
imports because of projected food shortages and lack of foreign exchange 
to transact commercial purchases. It was determined that food would 
become the limiting factor in the Third Five-Year Plan, and that 
domestic resources could only be pushed to the limit of the total food 
supply. Consequently, large food imports were critical to the success 
of the development plan. 
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The case of Title I shipments to Israel differs from many of the 
other developing countries. Israel already had a per capita income of 
almost $600 in 1956, a stage of development considerably advanced from 
India and other recipient countries. Limited arable land and high 
irrigation costs constrained production of wheat and feed grains. 
P.L. 480 imports of wheat and feed grains permitted a rapid expansion 
of the livestock industry and aided in relaxation of rationing on 
eggs, diary products, meat and poultry. Even dollar aid to Israel 
would necessarily have been ured to purchase increased volumes of 
feed grains. Under these conditions, P.L. 480 aid served as a close 
substitute for other forms of financial aid. Although all of the 
imports did not meet the 'additional' condition, consumers benefited 
greatly from P.L. 480 imports at the partial expense of commercial 
exporters in other countries. 
The Colombian experience is summarized as resulting in lower 
wheat prices which caused a shift in production from wheat to barley, 
as mentioned earlier in the summary of the Goering and Witt study (40). 
The shift was made relatively quickly with only slight income effects 
on Colombian agriculture. 
Examples of Title II programs which utilize food as wage payments 
are discussed using Tunisia as an example. Basically, work projects 
have been designed to develop a social overhead structure of roads, 
railroads, schools, power plants, and irrigation facilities in rural 
areas. The work projects originally provided about two thirds of the 
salary in food (wheat) and the other third in cash. Part of the cash 
was spent on additional food and part was used for nonfood items 
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creating additional demand for domestic food and nonfood commodities. 
By November of 1961 nearly 200,000 workers were employed full time 
on various work projects in Tunisia. Success of the work projects is 
attributed primarily to the high quality of local planning and 
administration. Other countries which have conducted major work 
project programs include Morocco, Afghanistan, Korea, Dahomey, Ethiopia, 
Iran, Tanganyika, India, and Libya. 
The Menzie, et study generalizes the P.L. 480 impact by pointing 
out that concessional commodity imports appeared to reduce commercial 
grain imports in Israel and Colombia. The inflow of commodities to 
Colombia coincided with a sharp drop in world coffee prices and 
enabled the Colombian government to avoid difficult decisions relating 
to capital import reductions which would have slowed down development. 
The study concludes that for two basic reasons food aid is not a 
perfect substitute for dollar aid. First, most investment programs do 
not require only wages or labor costs, for which food can be substituted. 
Normally, other supplies and equipment are needed which must be purchased 
with cash. Second, even if labor represented 100 percent of the investment 
costs, marginal preference of the consumer is usually such that additional 
food demand will not exhaust the wages. In this case part of the surplus 
food used to finance a given project would find its way into the market 
system and create a depressing force on domestic prices. Early studies 
indicated that as high as 50 percent of additional development costs could 
be financed with surplus food, but recent studies have indicated that 
the proportion may go as low as 20 percent. 
27 
Lucknow study of India 
The Srivastava study (73) is divided into fiaur major parts. Part 
I establishes the theoretical relationship between food aid and growth 
of the Indian, economy. The theoretical section is followed by a summary 
of composition and magnitude of F.L. 480 shipments to India. Part II 
analyzes the commodity impact on domestic prices, production, and 
consumption. Part III analyzes the local currency impact of the 
program, and Part IV examines the balance of payment aspect of the 
P.L. 480 shipments. 
Srivastava points out, in the theoretical section, that acceleration 
of growth to achieve higher per capita income necessarily requires large 
volumes of investment. A sizable portion of the investments result 
in direct wage increases or increases in derived income. When 
combined with high marginal propensities to consume and high income 
elasticities of demand for food, the rising incomes result in major 
increases in aggregate demand for food. Unless supplementary supplies 
of food are forthcoming, prices will be driven upward in an inflationary 
spiral which seriously reduces any gain in real income levels. In such 
a case, food aid can serve as a temporary buffer between domestic 
supply and demand so that gains in money income can be realized as 
gains in real income levels as well. Consequently, the value of food 
aid relative to dollar aid is closely related to the performance of 
the agricultural sector in the recipient country. 
The impact of P.L. 480 shipments is related to the responsiveness 
of marketed surplus to price changes. Srivastava cites estimates of 
short-run price elasticity by Raj Krishna as 0.1 for wheat and bajra. 
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0.2 to 0.4 for maize, sugarcane, and rice and up to 0.6 to 0.7 for 
cotton. Long-run elasticities for the same commodities range from 
1.5 to 1.6 (73, p. 51). Given the responsiveness of farmers to price 
changes, it is concluded that three aspects of price policy must be 
present to successfully utilize food aid without negative effects 
on domestic production. 
1. A minimum level of price supports must be guaranteed. 
2. Inter-crop price parity must be maintained to achieve 
simultaneous production of all crops at desired level. 
3. Price supports must take account of regional cost advantages 
or regional shifts will result. Use of concessional imports 
can effectively control excessive rises in prices. 
In contrast, price supports may conflict directly with consumer 
oriented objectives to lower retail food costs. In cases where food 
consumption is below recommended minimum requirements, lowering retail 
prices may be an effective means of increasing calorie intake and labor 
productivity. Srivastava cites findings which indicate that on the 
average a one percent increase in calorie intake will produce a 2.27 
percent increase in labor productivity (73, p. 97). The study indicates 
that P.L. 480 imports have had a significant impact on low income groups 
where sizable deficits had existed between actual and recommended 
consumption. 
Turning to the monetary aspects of P.L. 480, the study suggests 
that currency proceeds from P.L. 480 sales have a direct impact on the 
money supply and budget position of the recipient government. The time 
lapse between deposit of rupees in the U.S. Embassy account and their 
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release as loans or grants determines the impact on the money supply. 
It is concluded that P.L. 480 operations in India have had a neutral 
effect on the money supply between 1956-1957 and 1965-1966 when deposits 
and withdrawals are considered simultaneously. However, it is observed 
that termination of P.L. 480 imports could result in an expansion of 
the money supply as accumulated stocks of rupees are spent for U.S. uses 
and Cooley loans. The availability of P.L. 480 funds has reduced the 
budgetary deficit by an average of 4.8 percent per year. If an inflationary 
impact on the money supply is to be avoided in the future, resources will 
have to be mobilized to meet the budget deficit and also to equal the 
U.S. use of impounded soft currency. 
In analyzing the use of P.L. 480 rupees, Srivastava suggests that 
the impact of investments is subject to a multiplier effect. The income-
expenditure lag has a direct impact on the total development impact 
which will occur in the first, second, and subsequent years. The study 
considers expenditure lags of 2.4, 3.0, and 4.0 months for five, four 
and three rounds per year respectively. Srivastava cites Khusro for 
evidence to support 3.0 months as the realistic estimate for India (73, 
p. 165). Likewise, the marginal propensity to consume, estimated at 
0.8 in India, has a direct impact on the total multiplier effect. For 
simplicity, the monetary leakage is neglected on the assumption that 
taxes are instantaneously respent by the government and balance-of-
payment deficits are met by grants or loans. The study concludes that 
even with the extreme assumption of five spending rounds per period, the 
supplies of food under P.L. 480 have far exceeded the additional demand 
for food generated from P.L. 480 investments. 
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Srivastava points out that a paradox surrounds the evaluation of 
foreign exchange or balance-of-payment benefits of P.L. 480. To the 
extent that P.L. 480 commodities replace hard currency purchases, P.L. 
480 commodities are a direct substitute for hard currency and represent 
direct foreign exchange savings. However, P.L. 480 commodities are 
contracted under provisions which prohibit the displacement of commercial 
sales by the P.L. 480 shipments. In theory, then, no balance-of-
payment benefits can be attributed to P.L. 480 shipments, but in practice 
benefits do accrue to recipient countries. The two major sources 
include the interpretation of 'normal' imports and periodic displace­
ment of commercial exports. 
Another area of P.L. 480 impact is the extent of U.S. use of P.L. 
480 soft currency in the recipient country. P.L. 480 authorizes up to 
25 percent of the soft currency to be used for U.S. uses. The extent 
of this negative impact depends upon the total expenditure of soft 
currency for U.S. uses, and more specifically that portion of those 
expenditures which would have been made if the stock of local currency 
had not been available. The study concludes that P.L. 480 aid to India 
has had a significant effect on the foreign exchange constraint, but 
that the real gain did not exceed more than 75 percent of the total aid.^ 
^The study implies that 80 percent (75 percent net gain to foreign 
exchange plus 4.55 percent loss from U.S. uses equals 79.55 percent gross 
gain) were displacements for commercial sales which would have been made 
in the absence of P.L. 480 (73, pp. 192-199). At this rate, practice has 
deviated significantly from theory (or intent) and P.L. 480 has been 
allowed to displace commercial sales to India in the amount of 27.855 
million metric tons over the period from 1956 to 1965 (73, p. 192). 
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SiiTTtmarv 
This review provides examples of the types of studies which have 
been undertaken, major issues which have been examined, and the nature 
of conclusions which have been reached.^ The literature includes 
analytical work ranging from theoretical studies, such as the Ezekiel 
study, which attempt to predict aggregative or macroeconomic impacts of 
P.L. 480 on the recipient economy, to empirical analysis such as the 
Umstott study which tend to summarize quantities and values of commodities 
only to place them in perspective with related consumption and production 
data for the recipient economy. The bulk of studies lie between these 
two points. Most develop theoretical concepts based on bits of 
empirical data from several countries or concentrate on the analysis 
of empirical data from one country (or a few countries) to test hypotheses 
based on established theory. 
The major issues which have been developed in the literature center 
around two aspects of food aid programs—the commodity impact and the 
local currency impact. Analysis of these topics has been subdivided 
further into controversies over consumption (improving minimum diet 
levels, allocation of marginal income, matching commodity aid with 
commodity demand, wages-in-kind, and shifts in consumption patterns), 
^The review is by no means inclusive of all writings on the impact 
of P.L. 480. The author is aware of such additional studies as Adams 
on Colombia (3), Andersen (5) on pricing P.L. 480 commodities, Beringer 
and Ahmad (10) and Falcon (28) on Pakistan, F.A.O. on Japan (35) and 
Pakistan (36), Ginor (38) and Kahn (56) on Israel, Hillman on Brazil 
(45), Rath and Patvardhan (68) and Sen (72) on India plus numerous 
other papers dealing with the use of P.L. 480 commodities and related 
topics. Many of these and other additional writings have or will be 
cited for particular conceptual or empirical contributions at the 
appropriate places throughout this study. 
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prices (responsiveness of consumers and producers, desirable wholesale 
and retail price levels, and control of price fluctuations), production 
(competition with domestic producers, resource allocation, import 
substitution, and productivity of capital), and trade (maintenance of 
normal patterns, balance-of-payments benefits, and potential markets). 
Closely related topics which have been explored within this framework 
include changes in levels of investment, employment, income, inflation, 
tax revenue, and debt accumulation. 
In general it has been concluded that P.L. 480 commodities do 
substitute for a portion of foreign aid to many developing countries 
without serious adverse effects. Estimates of the rate of substitution 
vary considerably between countries, or even within countries under 
alternative assumptions. It has also been concluded that requirements 
for the use of surplus commodities to promote economic development 
without adversely disrupting the recipient economy are; (a) the avail­
ability of idle resources which can be mobilized through the use of 
food aid, (b) the capability of matching commodity aid with derived 
consumer demand, and (c) the availability of supporting capital, domestic 
or foreign, to finance nonfood expenses and satisfy effective nonfood 
demand. 
The Ezekiel study represented a systematic attempt to integrate 
the theoretical concepts of food aid with empirical data to predict the 
impact of P.L. 480 shipments on the recipient economy. The research 
team conducted the analysis with a limited amount of data and knowledge 
of the scope of P.L. 480 operations. As a consequence the study is 
generally limited to predictions based on one set of parameters for 
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consumption and production response. In classifying projects as isolated 
activities, the research team underestimated the total contribution which 
Type I, II, and III projects can make to the growth of the general 
economy by virtually ignoring the investment contribution of the projects 
to domestic production. This aspect was later mentioned when the program 
approach to uses of food aid was discussed. Given the limited time 
available aind the major concentration on predicting the amount of food 
which could be utilized for specific types of projects, the Ezekiel 
study did not analyze project related variables such as the magnitudes 
of supporting capital needs, derived demand for nonfood commodities, tax 
revenue, investment, and employment. 
The Srivastava study followed a similar framework by attempting to 
integrate theory and empirical data, but this study had the advantage 
of an additional decade of P.L. 480 operation. However, instead of 
estimating India's capacity to utilize food aid, the study concentrates 
on estimating expected values of variables such as derived income, 
food demand, employment, and balance-of-payment benefits to compare 
with actual values observed over the life of P.L. 480 contracting in 
India. While informative, this approach only begins to answer the crucial 
questions about P.L. 480 programming—those relating to the impact of 
stimulating rapid economic development in developing countries.^ 
^The active discussion between Kusum Nair (Michigan State), Walter 
Falcon (Harvard), David Hopper (Rockefeller Foundation), and Willard 
Cochrane (Minnesota) of the second generation impacts of the Green 
Revolution and the awareness by the donors and recipients of the 
consequences (at the Â.Â.E.Â. meetings in Columbia, Missouri on August 
10, 1970) was an indication of the urgent need for answers to questions 
about the impact of accelerated economic development. 
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The remaining studies dealt with concepts more within a micro-
economic framework. Emphasis was placed on analysis of producer and 
consumer response to conditions which prevailed during periods of food 
aid imports in an attempt to predict anticipated response under 
alternative conditions. In effect, these studies provide the parameters 
for the broader analysis of impact on the agricultural sector and 
general economy. 
Objectives and Methodology of Present Study 
The primary objective of this study is to describe and analyze the 
role of food aid in agricultural and economic development of recipient 
countries within a partial equilibrium framework. The secondary or 
supporting objectives are: (a) to develop a conceptual framework which 
explains the theoretical impact of food aid utilization on the recipient 
economy, (b) to examine the welfare aspect of raising income and 
nutritional levels of the very poor for humanitarian reasons through 
the use of conmiodity assistance, (c) to determine the impact of food 
aid on levels of income, food consumption, and nonfood expenditures of 
general consumers, (d) to determine the impact of commodity aid on 
agricultural prices and supply in the recipient country and the extent 
to which these responses might reduce the potential developmental 
effects of food aid, (e) to evaluate effects of food aid on national 
income, investment, and inflation and their relationship to development, 
(f) to analyze the extent to which food aid substitutes for alternative 
forms of foreign assistance in promoting economic development, (g) to 
examine the impact of commodity aid on commercial trade and balance 
of payments, (h) to explore methods through which food aid is incorporated 
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into the recipient economy to promote economic development without 
disrupting market conditions, and (i) to develop principles and policy 
guidelines for future food aid programming which will irçprove the 
efficiency of such assistance, make a major contribution to economic 
development, and minimize negative side effects. 
This study attempts to increase our understanding of anticipated 
macroeconomic impacts of P.L. 480 shipments on recipient economies 
by concentrating on: (a) development of theoretical concepts of food 
aid, and (b) integration of empirical evidence from the several years 
of experience with P.L. 480 operations. The study draws on the 
theoretical framework of the Ezekiel study, broadens the analysis 
to include programming of food aid to alternative consumer groups, 
expands on the investment aspects of projects, estimates the magnitude 
of various economic variables under alternative assumptions, and 
analyzes their significance on agricultural and economic development. 
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CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND OF U.S. SURPLUS DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES 
The U.S. government has financed surplus disposal activities for 
selected agricultural commodities through various support and promotional 
programs for nearly four decades. Prior to 1954 surplus disposal 
activities were conducted under a number of independent authorizations, 
but since 1954 most disposal activities have been coordinated under 
P.L. 480. The concepts and experiences with previous disposal activities 
were directly reflected in the provisions of P.L. 480. In fact, several 
provisions of P.L. 480 simply extended authorization and financing of 
certain widely used sections of earlier acts. A brief review of 
several public acts which preceeded P.L. 480, but influenced it greatly, 
is given below. 
P.L. 480 Predecessors 
Section 32 
The history of U.S. action to dispose of surplus agricultural 
commodities basically dates back to 1935 and the enactment of P.L. 74. 
Section 32 of P.L. 74 authorized the use of import tax revenues to 
encourage exports and domestic consumption in an attempt to reestablish 
farmers' purchasing power. The broad language of Section 32 provided 
authority to subsidize exports, to conduct agricultural research, to 
carry out a food stamp plan, and to purchase and donate food to the 
school lunch program as well as other needy and welfare institutions 
(21, p. 63). Since 1949 the main use of Section 32 authority has been 
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to finance a flexible price support program through direct purchases of 
selected commodities. 
Food stamp plans 
The original food stamp program was initiated in 1939 and operated 
until 1943 under the broad authority of Section 32 as a technique to 
expand domestic food markets by expanding the effective demand of needy 
persons. Under the stamp program, coupons or stamps were distributed 
to needy families or sold to them at a discount to be redeemed at 
retail store for food. The retail stores, in turn, presented the 
stamps to the government for redemption or payment in kind. 
After the Korean War, new proposals to reestablish a food stamp 
plan were offered, but Ezra Taft Benson, Secretary of Agriculture, 
recommended against reactivating the plan in 1956 (21, p. 64). A new 
food stamp plan was authorized in 1959 as a part of P.L. 341 extending 
P.L. 480 operations, but the bill did not require Secretary Benson 
to initiate the program, and no plan was put into effect. A pilot 
plan was finally initiated in 1961 under the Kennedy Administration, 
but it operated under the broader provisions of Section 32. The most 
recent Food Stamp Act was enacted in 1964 with provisions for independent 
financing (105, p. 703) and later extended in 1968 to cover the period 
through December 31, 1970 (108, p. 958). 
Subsidized dollar sales 
From the beginning of the federal price support programs, the 
government has had authority to dispose of stocks through subsidized 
dollar sales whenever possible. Such provisions were included in the 
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A.A.A. of 1938 and the C.C.C. Chapter Act of 1948, but more specific 
rules were established for dollar aalss in Section 407 of the Agricultural 
Act of 1949 (100, p. 1055). At that time C.C.C. was required to reduce 
stocks only when market prices were greater than 105 percent of current 
support prices. However, exports were excluded from the minimum price 
requirement which allowed C.C.C. to sell stocks overseas and to conduct 
export subsidy programs in order to dispose of U.S. commodities at the 
world market prices (21, p. 62). An example of special export subsidy 
programs is the International Wheat Agreement which was first approved 
in June 1949. The Agreement provides for the sale of a fixed amount of 
wheat by five exporting nations to thirty-seven importing nations at 
prices below U.S. domestic prices. Consequently, the C.C.C. was required 
to reimburse commerical exporters for the difference between purchase 
and sale price, but the Agreement guaranteed a market for a large 
quantity of wheat below prevailing domestic prices without harming 
international relations. 
C.C.C. Charter 
The Commodity Credit Corporation was transferred to Federal Charter 
by P.L. 806, the C.C.C. Chapter Act of 1948, and the Commodity Credit 
Corporation of Delaware was dissolved as an agency of the U.S. Government. 
Creation of the C.C.C. was "for the purpose of stabilizing, supporting, 
and protecting farm income and prices, of assisting in the maintenance 
of balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities..., and 
of facilitating the orderly distribution of agricultural commodities..." 
(98, p. 1070). Section 2 of the 1949 amendment to the C.C.C. Charter Act, 
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provided for the C.C.C. "to accept strategic and critical materials produced 
abroad in exchange for agricultural commodities acquired by the Corporation" 
(99, p. 155). This provision constituted the first authorization for 
barter agreements to dispose of U.S. surplus commodities. Although the 
authority for barter agreements became a permanent provision for C.C.C. 
operation, the authority was amended and broadened as part of F.L. 480 
in 1954. 
School lunch programs 
Federal aid to school lunch programs began in 1936 with donations 
of surplus commodities financed under Section 32, but no direct financial 
assistance was given until 1943. From 1943 to 1946 cash grants were 
made to schools under Section 32 to allow for local purchases of food 
for school lunch programs. With the passage of the School Lunch Act of 
1946, appropriations designated specifically for cash grants to private 
and public school lunch programs were authorized (96, p. 230). Part of 
the cash was made available to the Department of Agriculture to purchase 
commodities, but 75 percent of the cash was restricted to state use 
for local purchases on a matching basis.^ A special case of the school 
lunch program assistance has been the School Milk Program designed 
specifically to deal with the large diary surpluses since 1954. Authoriza­
tion for use of C.C.C. funds to increase consumption of milk in private 
and public schools was provided in the omnibus farm bill of 1954 
(104, p. 897). Later the School Milk Program was expanded to cover non­
profit camps, homes, and other children's institutions (21, p. 64). 
Hlatching arrangements were on a sliding scale requiring as high 
as three dollars of state money for one dollar of federal money. 
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Marshall Plan 
The Marshall Plan, officially known as the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1948, was enacted to provide materials and financial assistance to 
European countries to aid their economic recovery and protection of 
free institutions (97, pp. 137-159). Although the Marshall Plan was not 
specifically a surplus disposal program. Section 112 established the 
practice of providing foreign assistance in the form of surplus 
commodities. Specifically, the Secretary of Agriculture was directed 
to advise all related departments, agencies and establishments of the 
government when surplus commodities were available, and these administer­
ing agencies were to make maximum use practicable, subject to provisions 
and purposes of the Act and the interest of the recipient country, 
of the surplus agricultural commodities in providing foreign assistance 
to participating countries.^ In addition to establishing commodity 
aid as a means of surplus disposal, commodity grants and loans under 
the Marshall Plan introduced an "almost new...concept" (60, p. 28) of 
counterpart or local currency funds and prompted careful consideration, 
particularly by Congress, of the relatively new concept. The Marshall 
Plan proved to be very successful in the rapid transformation of the war 
striken economies of the European countries into highly productive 
economies capable of sustained growth. 
Participating countries were defined as any country which signed 
the report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation in 1947 and 
any other country wholly or partly in Europe (97, p. 138). 
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Section 416 
Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (100, p. 1058) became 
the primary authority for donation of commodities acquired by the 
C.C.C. to a wide variety of charities and welfare programs. Later 
amendments have broadened the scope of authorized donations to include 
state and federal agencies, public assistance, needy persons, hospitals, 
nonprofit relief organizations such as CARE, and numerous others. 
Likewise, the list of commodités which qualify for distribution under 
Section 416 has expanded from basic commodities to include corn meal, 
wheat, flour, and fats and oils. All donations are subject to a clause 
protecting commercial sales, however. 
Mutual Security Act 
The stated purpose of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was "to 
maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United 
States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to 
friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and 
collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in 
the interest of their security and independence and the national interest 
of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of 
those countries in the United Nations system of collective security" 
(101, p. 373). The Mutual Security Act increased the portion of foreign 
aid allocated for military assistance from an average of about 5 percent 
in 1948 and 1949 to 32 percent in 1951, 53 percent in 1952, and as much 
as 66 to 67 percent of total foreign assistance in 1953 (8, p. 38). 
Only a small volume of surplus commodities were utilized under the 1951 
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and 1952 versions of the Act, but Section 550 of the 1953 Act Increased 
the commodity sales by providing for sale of not less than $100 million 
and not more than $250 million of surplus agricultural commodities in 
exchange for local currency (102, p. 159). This provision is similar 
to the provisions of the Marshall Plan except that the local currency 
was to be deposited to the account of the U.S. Treasury, for subsequent 
use to finance aid projects, rather than the recipient government. 
Specifying a particular amount of foreign aid funds to purchase surplus 
agricultural commodities in Section 550 marked the first time that 
legislation had specifically required a portion of U.S. foreign aid 
to be provided in the form of surplus commodities. All subsequent versions 
of the Mutual Security Act contained a similar restriction.^ 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
Successful experiences with the preceding surplus disposal programs, 
coupled with continuing availability of surplus commodities, resulted in 
the conception and enactment of Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954. P.L, 480 combined several 
different existing programs under one authority, in some cases through 
extensions of previous legislation. It officially united agricultural 
surplus disposal techniques with U.S. foreign policy and drew together 
the export subsidy programs conducted under Section 32, and the commodity 
assistance programs developed under the Marshall Plan and the Mutual 
Security Act. The Act declared it Congressional policy and intent "to 
^Three hundred fifty million dollars in 1954, $300 million in 
1955, $250 million in 1956, and $175 million each year for 1957 through 
1960 (21, p. 66). 
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extend international trade among the United States and friendly nations, 
to facilitate the convertibility of currency, to promote the economic 
stability of American agriculture and the national welfare, to make 
maximum efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance 
of the foreign policy of the United States, and to stimulate and 
facilitate the expansion of foreign trade in agricultural commodities 
produced in the United States by providing a means whereby surplus 
agricultural commodities in excess of the usual marketing of such 
commodities may be sold through private trade channels, and foreign 
currencies accepted in payment therefore" (103, pp. 454-455). 
The logic of P.L. 480 was based on the assumption that countries 
with U.S. dollars, which they preferred to spend to purchase capital 
goods, and countries without U.S. dollars would be willing to purchase 
U.S. surplus agricultural commodities for local currency. As a result, 
the effective demand and market for U.S. agricultural products would be 
expanded significantly. Based on the preamble to the Act, which states 
that it is "An Act to increase the consumption of United States agricul­
tural commodities in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations 
of the United States, and for other purposes" (103, p. 454), it would 
appear, as Toma has pointed out, "that United States domestic interests 
were paramount in the initial idea of Public Law 480" (75, pp. 39-40). 
Davis has commented that "the objective most emphasized by the proponents 
of Public Law 480 in 1954 was the disposal of United States farm surpluses 
..." (23, p. 1484). Schultz quotes the Honorable Harold D. Cooley as 
instructing a representative at the Department of State as follows: 
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'We are primarily interested in getting rid of these surpluses and we 
don't care how you do it and under what authority" (71, p. 1025). 
Provisions of P.L. 480 
When P.L. 480 was enacted, it contained three Titles or major 
provisions (103, pp. 455-459). Title I authorized the C.C.C. to finance 
the sale of $700 million of surplus farm commodities to foreign countries 
for local or "soft" surrency of that country instead of U.S. dollars.^ 
The soft currency section of P.L. 480 drew upon the experiences of the 
Marshall Plan and Mutual Security Act programs and retained the Mutual 
Security Act provision of depositing soft currency to an account for 
the U.S. Treasury. The authorization required, among other things, that 
reasonable precaution be taken to prevent the soft currency sales from 
interferring with usual U.S. marketings and world prices. In addition, 
the handling of commodities was required to operate through private 
trade channels just as under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act 
which preceded it. The soft currency which accrued under the Act was 
set aside for U.S. uses, primarily support of U.S. military and civilian 
development of the recipient country. The only countries excluded from 
the Act were the U.S.S.R. and other nations dominated by the World 
Communist movement. 
^Formulation of an agreement by the U.S. to accept soft currency 
as payment for surplus food commodities was cited by Cochrane as a 
"bright institutional innovation" (20, p. 891). Acceptance of soft 
currency provided relief for foreign exchange pressures of rigid 
commercial contracts in the recipient countries while expanding U.S. 
exports. However, even the drain on local currency is potentially 
competitive with domestic investment programs for economic development. 
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Title II extended C.C.C. authority, as granted under the Mutual 
Security Act of 1953, to donate up to $300 million of surplus agricultural 
commodities from C.C.C. stocks to relieve famine and other food emergencies 
overseas. The donations section of P.L. 480 incorporated the broad con­
cept of famine relief and related to the previous experience in the 
U.S. of attempting to expand effective purchasing power of the needy 
through food stamp and other related plans. Title II provided for the 
donation of food to either friendly nations or to the people even if 
the government of the needy was not friendly. 
Title III drew upon the previous authorization of Section 416 and 
provided for donations to the needy at home and abroad. Likewise, the 
barter provisions from the C.C.C. Charter were incorporated into the 
new Act. In both cases the previous provisions were broadened and 
expanded to provide more extensive coverage. Since both programs under 
Title III were extensions of permanent authorizations previously granted 
to C.C.C., no special financing was necessary. 
P.L. 480 extensions and amendments 
The basic provisions of P.L. 480 have been extended repeatedly 
since their enactment in 1954. Numerous changes have also expanded the 
scope of the program. The 1956 extension (P.L. 540) permitted the C.C.C. 
to pay costs of ocean freight for Title II and III agreements and 
authorized the appointment of a Surplus Disposal Administrator within 
U.S.D.A. to coordinate P.L. 480 activities. The 1957 amendment (P.L. 
128) softened the restriction on "friendly" nations to permit barter 
agreements and voluntary agency programs such as CARE to utilize donations 
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in Soviet satellite nations. The Cooley amendment provided for up to 
25 percent of soft currency acquired under Title I to be provided as 
loans to U.S. or foreign firms to develop expanded markets for American 
products overseas.^ The 1958 extension (P.L. 391) reduced the restrictions 
on barter agreements by abolishing requirements of proof that the agree­
ment was not replacing cash purchases of the commodity involved, and 
provided that barter agreements could be made with any free country 
as long as U.S. dollar sales were not disrupted. 
The 1959 extension (P.L. 341) contained the first structural change 
in the 1954 Act. Title IV was added to provide for long-term, low 
interest credit sales of surplus commodities with repayment being made 
in U.S. dollars over a period up to twenty years. Title IV integrated 
previous authorization under the A.A.A. of 1938, the C.C.C. Charter of 
1948, and Section 407 of the A.A.A. of 1949 into P.L. 480. The 1959 
Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to reestablish a food stamp 
plan utilizing surplus commodities, but as previously mentioned the 
authorization was never used. 
Although numerous amendments and extensions were added to the 
original P.L. 480 Act, the objectives remained basically unchanged 
throughout the 1950's. Despite the fact that the original Act carried 
a "Trade Development and Assistance" title, the purpose continued to be 
disposal of U.S. surpluses. 
During the period from 1957 to 1960 there were indications that the 
objectives or goals of P.L. 480 were beginning to shift away from primary 
^oans under this provision are commonly referred to as Cooley 
loans. 
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emphasis on surplus disposal toward new emphasis on foreign economic 
development. During this period increasing amounts of local currency 
were designated for development loans and grants. Improved consultation 
was carried out with competitors to reduce their criticism of the 
program- In addition, the shift in usual marketing provisions from a 
U.S. to global basis helped to maintain market opportunities for competitors. 
A drastic revision and reduction of barter agreements during this period 
greatly eased the conflict with Canada (65, p. 5). 
By the late 1950's a small group of Senators, led by Hubert H. 
Humphrey, had begun to make noticeable progress with their efforts to 
transform the objectives of P.L. 480 so that they would conform more 
closely with an increased emphasis on economic development. In 1958 
Humphrey submitted a report to the Senate Agriculture and Forestry 
Committee with numerous recommendations for improving P.L. 480 programs 
(48). Two significant recommendations dealt with the appointment of a 
special assistant to the President to coordinate P.L. 480 activities and 
increased emphasis on promoting development in the recipient countries. 
In an apparent attempt to reduce Humphrey's influence on P.L. 480, 
President Eisenhower initiated a Food for Peace program in his special 
farm message to Congress on January 29, 1959 (75, p. 43). Don Paarlberg 
was appointed as the White House coordinator for the program, but his 
responsibilities fell considerably short of those proposed by Humphrey, 
Extensive Congressional debate prompted by Humphrey and his supporters 
on the 1959 P.L. 480 extension resulted in a two-year extension of the 
Act and the provision of long-term dollar credit. Although the inauguration 
of the Food for Peace program did not constitute a substantial modification 
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of P.L. 480 activities, it did signal a shift in attitude concerning 
P.L. 480. Support for more extensive concentration on economic develop­
ment had reached a level which apparently forced a movement in that 
direction. In January of 1961 President Kennedy established the White 
House Office of Food for Peace with his second Executive Order and 
named George S. McGovern as the first director of the new Food for Peace 
program designed from Humphrey's original recommendations. "Although 
many writers and administrators equate Food for Peace with P.L. 480, 
connotative difference should be noted between the two terms. Whereas 
the aims of P.L. 480 were primarily domestic, and thus directed toward 
alleviation of United States agricultural surpluses. Food for Peace 
emphasized the role of food aid as an instrument of American foreign 
policy" (75, p. 45). The major change in policy was implemented through 
a four year contract with India and a granting back of 40 percent of 
the local currency to be used for development (65, p. 54). The 
extended contract periods provided for improved planning and implementation 
of development programs. 
The 1961 extension of P.L. 480 (P.L. 92) included a permanent amendment 
to permit food grants to be used for economic development instead of 
being restricted to famine or emergency relief. Drawing on U.S. experience 
with school lunch programs, the 1962 Food and Agriculture Act (P.L. 703) 
amended Title III to provide for donations to be used in nonprofit school 
lunch programs in recipient countries. Title IV was modified to provide for 
agreements between foreign and U.S. private trade firms under extended dollar 
credit terms.^ 
Previously, 1959 provision, dollar credit agreements were restricted to 
government-to-government contracts. 
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The 1964 extension (P.L. 638) excluded countries from sales agreements 
under Title I which permit their ships and aircraft to travel to Cuba. 
Title I and Title IV sales were also prohibited to any country which is 
determined an aggressor by the President. The C.C.C. was restricted to 
payment of freight equal only to the amount of the differential resulting 
from required transportation on U.S. flag ships.^ With regard to 
accounting procedures, the President was directed to classify expenditures 
for this Act under international affairs rather than agriculture. 
Proposed uses of Title I soft currency for grants or loans were subjected 
to approval of both the House and Senate committees on agriculture. 
The 25 percent limit on funds for Cooley loans was removed. In addition. 
Title III commodities were approved for self-help projects designed to 
alleviate the need for food aid. 
Closely related to the changing role of P.L. 480, the functions of 
the director of the Food for Peace Program was transferred to the State 
Department by Executive Order in October of 1965. This act was prompted 
by the decline of government held stocks of surplus food toward a "normal" 
level (75, p. 133) and the rising speculation that continuation of the 
Food for Peace Program would require the U.S. government to purchase 
nonsurplus commodities on the open market. The domestic situation, 
combined with the continuing deficits in foreign countries, led to the 
transfer of the director's responsibilities to the State Department so 
HJ.S. freight rates have been approximately twice the rate available 
to developing countries on other than U.S. flag ships (37, p. 126). 
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that U.S. food aid could be integrated more closely with U.S. foreign 
policy. 
The 1966 amendment (F.L. 808) officially changed the title of the 
program to Food for Peace and declared the purpose of the Act "to promote 
international trade in agricultural commodities, to combat hunger and 
malnutrition, to further economic development, and for other purposes" 
(106, p. 1526). The noticeable absence of reference to surplus disposal 
reflected the changing attitude which prevailed in the program execution 
during the early 1960*s. Increased emphasis in the new Act centered on 
helping those nations which were working to help themselves. A second 
major change requires the transition to sales for dollars "whenever 
possible" by the end of 1967, and strictly to dollar sales or terms 
allowing for conversion of soft currency to dollars by the end of 
December 1971. North Viet Nam was specifically excluded from the list 
of friendly nations with respect to Title I sales. Likewise, the 
United Arab Republic was excluded from Title 1 sales unless the President 
found such sales in the national interest of the U.S. Another provision 
of the 1966 amendment relaxed the requirement that only surplus commodities 
could be provided under the program. Presumably, this officially placed 
a higher priority on the needs of the developing country than on domestic 
surplus disposal. ' 
The 1968 amendment (P.L. 436) to the Agricultural Trade and Development 
Act extended Title I and Title II activities through December 1970. The 
new amendment authorized expenditures of sales proceeds to finance 
population control programs for the first time. "Not less than 5 percentum 
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of the total sales proceeds received each year shall, if requested by 
the foreign country, be used for voluntary programs to control population 
growth" (107, p. 450). In addition, the amendment established an Advisory 
Committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, 
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 
the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the 
chairman and ranking minority member of both the House Committee on 
Agriculture and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the chairman 
and ranking minority member of both the Senate Committee on Agriculture 
and Forestry and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to survey 
general policies relating to the administration of the Act and to 
advise the President of recommendations related thereto (106, p. 451). 
Adminstration of P.L. 480 programs 
Administratively P.L. 480 is handled primarily under three agencies 
and corresponding delegation of authority—the Department of Agriculture 
with delegation to the C.C.C., the Department of State with delegation 
to A.I.D., and the Director of Food for Peace as a special assistant to 
the President. Formally, the various agencies involved in P.L. 480 
programming interact through the Interagency Staff Committee (I.S.C.) 
to coordinate their activities. The I.S.C. includes representatives 
from the Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, AwI.D., 
Bureau of the Budget, Department of Treasury, Department of Commerce, 
United States Information Agency, the Office of Emergency Planning, and 
the Director of Food for Peace (75, pp. 45-46). 
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Sales under Title I are financed by letters of credit through the 
C.C.C. and commercial trade channels. Although the bulk of the administra­
tive responsibility for Title I programs is handled by Â.I.D., two 
administrative modifications are noteworthy. The Director of Food for 
Peace is charged with responsibility for continuous supervision and 
coordination of the functions of that program, and the Secretary of 
State is responsible for foreign policy aspects of the food aid program. 
Of course, I.S.C. is the main decision body with respect to Title I 
operations since they review all activities in an attempt to coordinate 
the activities of various agencies. 
Expenditures and disbursements of soft currency which accrues to 
the U.S. is handled through numerous agencies, as indicated in Table 3. 
In broad terms nearly half of the local currency is designated for 
U.S. uses or private enterprise (65, p. 43). A lower estimate of U.S. 
uses is obtained if common defense and Cooley loans are not included 
as U.S. uses. 
A majority of the administrative responsibility for Title II 
programs is handled by A.I.D., although the Department of Agriculture 
determines what commodities are in surplus supply and advises the A.I.D. 
personnel that they are available from C.C.C. stocks. A.I.D. supervises 
the implementation of requests, distribution of commodities, and auditing 
procedures for Title II emergency relief and economic development 
operations. 
Responsibilities for Title III programs are divided between A.I.D. 
and the Department of Agriculture. The Department of Agriculture has 
responsibility for determining commodities and quantities which are 
Table 3. Authorized uses of local currency under Section 104, P.L. 480^ 
Currency use 
a. Agricultural market development 
b. Supplemental stockpile 
c. Common defense 
d. Purchase of goods for other countries 
e. Grants for economic development 
f. Loans to private enterprise 
g. Payment of U.S. obligations 
h. Loans to foreign governments 
i. International educational exchange 
j. Translation of books and periodicals 
k. Scientific, medical, cultural, and 
educational activities 
1. Buildings for U.S. Government use 
m. Trade fairs 
n. Acquisition, indexing, and dissemination 
of foreign publications 
o. American educational institutions 
p. Workshops in American studies 
q. Purchase nonfood items for emergency uses 
r. Audio-visual materials 
a. Sales of dollars for U.S. tourists 
Responsible agency 
Dept. of Agriculture 
Office of Civil Defense Mobilization 
Depts. of State (I.C.A.) and Defense 
Dept. of State (I.C.A.) 
Dept. of State (I.C.A.) 
Export-Import Bank of Washington 
Any authorized U.S. Government agency 
Dept. of State (I.C.A.) and Development 
Loan Fund 
Dept. of State 
U.S. Information Agency 
National Science Foundation, Dept. of State 
and other agencies 
Dept. of State 
U.S. Information Agency 
Library of Congress 
Dept. of State 
Dept. of State 
Dept. of State (I.C.A.) 
Dept. of State and U.S. Information Agency 
Not assigned 
^Source; (65, p. 43). 
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available and for approving requests for those commodities. Â.I.D. has 
responsibility for evaluation, coordination, and approval of distributing 
agencies in the foreign countries and for administering U.S. overseas 
activities• 
Title IV programs are administered the same way as Title I programs 
with one exception. The payment period and interest rate are determined 
for each individual Title IV agreement by the National Advisory Council. 
Magnitude of P.L. 480 operations 
From July 1, 1954 through December 31, 1968 almost $17.6 billion 
of commodities have been shipped under various P.L. 480 authorizations. 
Seventy million dollars of commodities were shipped during the first 
six months ending in December of 1954. As the program expanded, the 
volume and value of commodities shipped increased rapidly up to a high 
of over $1.6 billion for 1964. Since then the value of products shipped 
under the program has declined gradually to just under $1.2 billion in 
1968. Title I sales for local currency have accounted for 65.0 percent 
or $11.4 billion of the total shipments. Donations on a government-to-
government basis and to voluntary organizations under Title II have 
accounted for the second largest portion, 18.7 percent or $3.3 billion. 
Title III bartering and Title IV dollar sales have been 9.7 and 6.6 
percent of the total or $1.7 and $1.2 billion respectively. 
On a commodity basis, wheat and rye collectively have overshadowed 
all other commodity shipments by representing $9.1 billion or 51.7 
percent of all commodity shipments through 1968. Feed grains have 
accounted for $1.8 billion (10.1 percent) and rice another $1.1 billion 
Table 4. Value of farm commodities shipped (by commodity) under P.L. 480 from July 1, 1954 
through December 31, 1968 (in thousands of dollars)^ 
Commodity 
Foreign 
currency 
sales (I) 
Long-term 
dollar 
sales (IV) 
Government-to-
government 
donations (II) 
Voluntary 
agency 
donations (II) 
Barter 
(III) Total 
Percent 
of total 
Wheat and rye 6,484,748 679,109 601,229 656,735 649,591 9,071,412 51.7 
Feed grains 795,085 93,381 147,494 178,424 568,187 1,782,571 10.1 
Rice 846,863 113,809 29,695 53,062 15,155 1,058,584 6.0 
Cotton 1,519,938 158,217 15,267 
--- 299,808 1,993,230 11.3 
Tobacco 362,285 27,196 - - - - - - 126,196 515,677 2.9 
Fats and oils 1,161,469 78,968 63,267 222,826 4,876 1,531,406 8.7 
Oilseeds and 
meal ttm m 10,717 — — — mm mm 16,645 27,362 0.2 
Dairy products 165,444 3,141 143,505 1,100,436 20,130 1,432,656 8.1 
Meat and 
poultry 58,915 58 «a — ^  a #» ## 58,973 0.3 
Fruits and 
vegetables 24,608 2,566 6,751 19,594 2,526 56,045 0.3 
Other 4,220 5,330 46,623 7,029 63,202 0.4 
Total 11,423,575 1,167,162 1,012,538 2,277,700 1.710,143 17,591,118 100.0 
Percent of 
total 65.0 6.6 5.8 12.9 9.7 100.0 
^Source: (80, pp. 109-110). 
Table 5. Value of farm commodities shipped (by year) under P.L. 480 from July 1, 1954 through 
December 31, 1968 (in millions of dollars) 
Total P.L. 480 
Foreign Long-term Government-to- Voluntary agri­ as per­
Calendar currency dollar government agency Barter cultural cent of 
year sales (I) sales (IV) donations (II) donations (II) (III) Total exports total 
1954 — m " — — 28 20 22 70 1,585 4 
1955 263 --- 56 186 262 767 3,199 24 
1956 638 - - - 65 187 372 1,262 4,170 30 
1957 760 - - - 39 175 244 1,218 4,506 27 
1958 752 - - - 43 159 65 1,019 3,855 26 
1959 731 - - - 32 111 175 1,049 3,955 27 
1960 1,014 - - - 49 124 117 1,304 4,832 27 
1961 878 1 93 151 181 1,304 5,024 26 
1962 1,007 42 81 178 137 1,445 5,034 29 
1963 1,162 52 99 160 38 1,511 5,584 27 
1964 1,232 97 62 186 35 1,612 6,348 25 
1965 899 152 73 180 5 1,309 6,229 21 
1966 815 239 79 132 41 1,306 6,881 19 
1967 736 201 108 179 13 1,237 6,383 19 
1968 539 385 101 150 3 1,178 6,228 19 
Total 11,426 1,169 1,008 2,278 1,710 17,591 73,813 24 
^Source: (80, p. 97). 
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(6.0 percent). In combination the food and feed grains have represented 
67.8 percent of all shipments under P.L. 480 authorizations. The only 
other classes which have supplied significant amounts are cotton at 
$2.0 billion, fats and oils at $1.5 billion, and dairy products at 
$1.4 billion. 
Shipments of the six major commodity groups have all fit a similar 
pattern of distribution under the various Titles. Soft currency sales 
have accounted for over 70 percent of the shipments for each individual 
group and the remaining Titles have each accounted for 15 percent or 
less with two exceptions. For feed grains, soft currency sales have 
been less than 45 percent of the total while barter agreements have 
been about 32 percent under Title III. Soft currency sales of dairy 
products have been just under 12 percent while donations to voluntary 
agencies for child feeding and related uses under Title II have been 
about 78 percent of the total supplied. 
Several structural changes have taken place in the program and are 
reflected in the financing. Reflecting the criticism from foreign 
competitors in the late 1950's that the U.S. barter program was disrupting 
normal trade, the barter program has declined from a high of $372 
million in 1956 to $3.0 million in 1968. Donations to voluntary agencies 
reached a high of $187 million in 1956 and have fluctuated over a range 
from $111 million in 1959 to $186 million in 1964. The government-to-
government portion of Title II programs is providing approximately $250 
million of commodities annually. Dollar sales under Title IV began 
in 1961 and have increased steadily in line with the transition to sales 
for dollars only after December 1971. Although dollar sales have been 
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increasing, they have not been increasing as fast as soft currency sales 
have been declining. Consequently, total sales hit a high of $1.3 
billion in 1964 and have declined annually to $0.9 billion in 1968. 
Shifts in geographic concentration of the P.L. 480 program have 
also taken place as reflected by the comparison of 1968 contracts with 
totals for the program from its inception. Although the Near East-
South Asia area continues to be a major recipient of sales agreements, 
it no longer dominates the sales as in earlier years when that area 
accounted for 56.1 percent of the total, with Europe and the Far East-
Pacific regions accounting for less than 20 percent each. The 1968 
contracts reflect negligible sales to Europe, a decline to 37.4 percent 
for the Near East-South Asia area, an increase to 39.8 percent for 
the Far East-Pacific area, and increases of about 5 percent each for 
Africa and Latin America. 
Donations appear to have shifted from Africa (23.2 percent). Near 
East-South Asia area (28.3 percent), and Far East-Pacific area (22.3 
percent) to the Far East-Pacific area where almost 58 percent of the 
donations were made in 1968. Donations to the European area fell to 
zero in 1968 while contribution to the World Food Program nearly doubled 
to 13.7 percent. Probably the most noticeable shifts have taken place 
in the barter program. While Europe received 61.7 percent of the barter 
commodities in the past, they are now receiving 7.9 percent of the total. 
The Near East and Far East areas, which previously received 9.5 and 
15.4 percent respectively, account for 28.6 and 60.8 percent of the 
barter agreements in 1968. 
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Table 6. Destination of P.L. 480 commodities by agreement (in millions 
of dollars and percent)^ 
1954 through 1968 1968 
Destination Value Percent Value Percent 
Title I 
Europe 3,101.6 
Africa 602.8 
Near East-South Asia 10,440.8 
Far East-Pacific 2,932.7 
Latin America 1,567.0 
Total 18,644.9 
Title II 
Europe 190.0 
Africa 519.8 
Near East-South Asia 636.7 
Far East-Pacific 500.0 
Latin America 186-1 
World Food Program 183.2 
Other 26.2 
Total 2,242.0 
Title III 
Europe 1,053.2 
Africa 54.9 
Near East-South Asia 163.3 
Far East-Pacific 263.5 
North America 3.5 
Latin America 171.7 
Total 1,710.0 
16.6 2.2 0.3 
3.2 62.7 8.1 
56.1 290.3 37.4 
15.7 309.5 39.8 
8.4 111.5 14.4 
100.0 776.2 100.0 
8.5 0 0 
23.2 14.3 9.2 
28.3 21.1 13.6 
22.3 89.3 57.6 
8.3 9.1 5.9 
8.2 21-3 13.7 
1.2  0  0  
100.0 155.0 100.0 
61.7 0.2 7.0 
3.2 -—^ ^ 
9.5 0.8 28.5 
15.4 1.7 60.8 
0 .2  0  0  
10.0 0.1 3.6 
100.0 2.8 100.0 
^Source: (80, pp. 112-161). 
^C.C.C. cost including ocean transportation. 
^Negligible. 
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Changes in allocation of foreign currency and donated commodities 
also provide an indication of the changing emphasis of the P.L. 480 
program. Since 1954 over 70 percent of the funds resulting from soft 
currency sales have been allocated for foreign government loans and 
U.S. uses. Common defense has utilized almost 11 percent, and a little 
over 14 percent has been released to the recipient governments as grants 
for economic development. In 1968 a third of the soft currency released 
went for foreign government loans. U.S. uses represented less than 17 
percent, and grants for economic development fell to less than 2 
percent of total funds used. Emphasis of 1968 donation programs under 
Title II were similar to the historic patterns of donations. Disaster 
relief accounted for about 50 percent of the donations, economic 
development for about 25 to 30 percent, and refugee and child feeding 
programs around 10 percent each. 
With regard to U.S. farm commodity exports, P.L. 480 has accounted 
for a significant portion of total shipments. In 1956 P.L. 480 shipments 
amounted to 30 percent of all agricultural exports from the U.S. In 
1958 and 1959 both P.L. 480 and commercial exports declined slightly, 
and P.L. 480 shipments represented 26 to 27 percent of the total. When 
commercial exports began to increase during the 1960's, P.L. 480 programs 
were expanded and continued to represent 25 to 27 percent of total 
exports. In 1965 P.L. 480 programs began to decline, and with a rise in 
commercial exports through 1966, P.L. 480 shipments fell to 19 percent 
of the total. In 1967 and 1968 a decline in commercial exports coincided 
with a cut back in the P.L. 480 programs, and P.L. 480 shipments held 
constant at 19 percent of total exports. Over the entire period since 1954, 
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Table 7. Uses of foreign currency or commodities by agreement 
(in millions of dollars and per cent) 
1954 through 1968 1968 
Purpose Value Percent Value Percent 
Title I 
a. Common defense 1,330.6 10.9 85.6 32.6 
b. Loans to private 
enterprise 533.3 4.4 11.4 4.3 
c. Loans to foreign 
government 5,595.8 45.7 91.1 34.7 
d. Grants for economic 
development 1,744.7 14.2 4.9 1.9 
e. Grants for family 
welfare 41.8 0.3 23.3 8.9 
f. Pest control 1.9 b 1.9 0.7 
g. U.S. uses 3,007.4 24.5 44.6 16.9 
Total 12,255.5 100.0 262.8 100.0 
tie II 
a. Disaster relief 1,039.1 46.3 81.4 52.5 
b. Child feeding 273.7 12.2 12.2 7.9 
c. Refugees 217.3 9.7 18.2 11.7 
d. Voluntary agencies 22.6 1.0 0 0 
e. Economic development 662.8 29.6 43.2 27.9 
f. Other 26.5 1.2 0 0 
Total 2,242.0 ' 100.0 155.0 100.0 
.tie III 
a. Voluntary agencies 3,243.6 100.0 152.1 100.0 
^Source: (80, pp. 126-157). 
^Negligible. 
Table 8. Value of farm commodities shipped (by year) under P.L. 480 compared with total exports 
of farm commodities from July 1, 1954 through December 31, 1968 (in millions of dollars)^ 
Calendar Total Mutual Total gov't. Commercial Total P.L. 480 as 
year P.L. 480 security programs sales exports % of total 
1954 70 211 281 1,304 1,585 4 
1955 767 351 1,118 2,081 3,199 24 
1956 1,262 449 1,711 2,459 4,170 30 
1957 1,218 318 1,536 2,970 4,506 27 
1958 1,019 214 1,233 2,622 3,855 26 
1959 1,049 158 1,207 2,748 3,955 27 
1960 1,304 157 1,461 3,371 4,832 27 
1961 1,304 179 1,483 3,541 5,024 26 
1962 1,445 35 1,480 3,554 5,034 29 
1963 1,511 11 1,522 4,062 5,584 27 
1964 1,612 23 1,635 4,713 6,348 25 
1965 1,309 26 1,335 4,894 6,229 21 
1966 1,306 47 1,353 5,528 6,881 19 
1967 1,237 33 1,370 5,113 6,383 19 
1968 1,178 11 1,189 5,039 6,228 19 
Total 17,591 2,223 19,814 53,999 73,813 24 
^Source: (80, p. 97). 
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24 percent of U.S. agricultural exports have been handled under concessional 
terms of P.L. 486. Another 3 percent was exported under special subsidiza­
tion of the Mutual Security Act bringing the total government sponsored 
exports up to 27 percent of all exports. 
At what level the U.S. government will continue to sponsor conces­
sional exports of agricultural commodities is unknown. Presumably the 
level will be closely related to several factors: (a) the rate at which 
agriculture continues to be capable of absorbing new technology and 
manifesting it in expanded production, (b) the effectiveness of supply 
control policies, (c) the prevailing attitude toward foreign assistance, 
(d) the general economic conditions in the U.S., and (e) the magnitude 
of food deficits in other countries. In his evaluation of prospects 
for future P.L. 480 legislation, Toma cities Senators McGovern, Ellender, 
and Fulbright as representing the range of future support (75, pp. 138-
139). McGovern expects food surpluses to prevail ever increasingly in 
the U.S. and feels that food will be a far more effective weapon than 
bombers in competition with other ideologies for influence in the under­
developed countries. Ellender argues that U.S. surplus cannot permanently 
solve the world food problem directly, so food assistance should be 
scaled down and used more intensively to promote agricultural development. 
Fulbright anticipates a decline in U.S. surpluses so that food aid 
would become direct foreign assistance. He advocates a severe reduction 
in the food aid program and a shift to funneling assistance through an 
international institution rather than bilateral agreements. Which of 
these general positions toward food aid will win out depends on numerous 
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political and economic pressures, but future positions very likely will 
be influenced by the impact which present food aid programs are having 
on economic development. 
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CHAPTER III. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF INCOME LEVELS 
AND COMMODITY AID IN FINANCING DEVELOPMENT 
Economic growth in developing countries is designed to increase 
the aggregate national income level of the economy. Although it need 
not, growth is commonly designed to also increase per capita income 
levels.^ Economic growth has been achieved in some countries at the 
expense of the individual consumer, but more commonly growth is planned 
with maintenance of the consumer's current position in mind é On the 
basis of indices such as per capita production, income, investment 
and wealth, various comparisons are made regularly between nations 
as well as between sectors within nations. One major shortcoming of 
these aggregate indices is that they do not expose disproportionate 
distribution within a society. An extensive amount of literature and 
research has been devoted to the problem of distribution, but there 
is not "a single instance where statistical data in terms of aggregates 
and averages have not been treated as providing adequate tests of the 
degree of achievement of economic development" (109, p. 14). 
Conceptual Framework for Analysis of Development 
Basically the essentials for economic development include an adequate 
supply of natural resources, a literate, healthy, and well-fed population, 
and an accumulating supply of capital. Although the absence of natural 
resources is not critical, as verified by Switzerland, it is usually 
^The strongest objection to this approach comes from economists and 
politicians who advocate economic development even if it means sacrificing 
per capita income as has been the practice in several of the centrally 
controlled East European countries (109, p. 13). 
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severely restrictive at best. Without minimum health and education levels 
for the population, the adaptability and capabilities of the labor force 
are severely limited. Given the basic production relationships within 
an econony, some functional relationship exists, explicit or otherwise, 
between investment and output. In the development literature the func­
tional relationship is reduced, for simplification, to the capital-output 
ratio. Inherent is the assumption that a change in output results only 
from a change in investment. Investment within a system is a function 
of savings which in turn is a function of income. Because savings is 
an increasing function of income, it is difficult to accumulate capital 
in low income countries where a majority of the income is spent for 
consumption. For the same reason, the greater the inequity of income 
distribution within a society, the higher the rate of aggregate savings 
and capital accumulation. 
Although not the humanitarian approach to take, ignoring the very 
poor may be an economically expedient approach to development. When 
dealing with food aid, it may be wise development policy to use food to 
increase incomes of groups which already have relatively high incomes 
since less will be consumed and more will be converted into savings and 
investment. From a humanitarian standpoint, the groups which need the 
help most are the ones which lack the, knowledge and incentives to help 
themselves. Those who advocate aggregate growth even if it results in 
disproportionate distribution rationalize by saying that the resources 
will eventually be redistributed to the poor. 
With these relations as a basis, there are at least two primary 
reason? for increasing per capita income. In the low income nations. 
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consumers have high positive marginal utility for consumption, which 
implies that consumer welfare is improved as a consequence of.increased 
incomes and resulting consumption. Secondly, because low income 
consumers do have a very high marginal propensity to consume, they in 
turn, have very low marginal propensities to save and contribute to 
investment, output, and aggregate income. Raising their income level 
may allow them to contribute to the development process. 
If development is measured by any fora of per capita statistics, 
a nation's population and associated growth rate have as great an impact 
on economic growth as any factor. World health and nutrition work has 
had a major impact on increasing child survival during early months 
of life and extending the life expectancy of adults. Both areas of 
improvement have had a significant effect on the short-run welfare of 
population, but may contribute very negatively to the long-run welfare 
if the supply of food an other commodities does not increase correspon­
dingly. 
Population control is a short cut to achieving growth as measured 
by per capita statistics. Most nations have been able to successfully 
achieve some level of absolute growth in aggregate income, but the 
population growth rate has exceeded the income growth rate, resulting 
in a decline in per capita income. If population growth had been at a 
minimal level, many developing countries with stagnant or declining 
levels of per capita income could have realized improved levels of 
welfare. Unfortunately, effective voluntary population control appears 
to depend upon high levels of education which in turn are normally 
associated with high income levels. Yet, as mentioned earlier. 
68 
population pressure probably is the single greatest barrier to achieving 
the necessary levels of income and associated education. Often referred 
to as the "vicious cycle of poverty," the relationship between poverty 
and population pressure has not been easy to break with any type of 
generalized plan or approach. 
Possible alternatives for breaking the "vicious cycle" include 
freer international movement of capital under long-term agreements which 
are compatible with long-term development planning, elimination of 
trade restrictions in order to exploit comparative advantages, universal 
diffusion of technology and management skills, and persistent coordinated 
planning for employment of resources to attack basic problems within 
the developing nations. 
Inflation can also be a significant element of growth. For the 
most part inflation trends to shift income from wage earners and fixed 
asset or fixed income recipients to holders of productive resources. 
Controlled inflation may actually stimulate a shift in income and 
corresponding increase in aggregate savings. On the other hand, 
inflation may hamper growth by contributing to inefficient investments 
which are made primarily to avoid the impact of future inflation. 
Speculative hedging may result in decreased investment for production 
purposes. One method of avoiding speculative hedging is through the 
use of fiscal policy by taxing away the marginal income and investing 
it in high priority projects. There is some evidence that the dis­
incentives of such taxation schemes defeat the overall purpose. More 
effective government involvement may be accomplished by creating 
political and economic atmospheres which stimulate private investment 
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directly in the high priority areas. Government imports of foreign 
capital to supplement private investments is one method of creating a 
desirable atmosphere. The two greatest drawbacks are that low income 
countries are often also low wealth countries with low limits on their 
borrowing power, and the types of social overhead investments necessary 
to create a conducive atmosphere for private investment often have 
very low and/or very long-run payoff periods which are not consistent 
with standard loan terms. In addition the earnings from social over­
head investments seldom accrue directly to the government, posing a 
revenue problem. 
Exports from the developing nations have predominantly consisted 
of primary products such as agricultural commodities while imports 
have consisted of industrial products from the developed nations. If 
one perceives of development being universally possible in the developing 
nations, and agrees that they have a comparative advantage in agriculture, 
then one must conclude that the agricultural output of the developing 
nations will continue to provide their major source of foreign exchange 
earnings. Yet as data for the developed nations are examined, a question 
arises as to where the market for agricultural commodities will be. 
Projections for developed nations indicate they will be capable of 
supplying even greater surpluses of agricultural commodities in the 
future than at present. If production in the developing countries 
continues to lag behind demand, the terms of trade are certain to 
shift against agriculture and have detrimental effects on economic develop­
ment. Price increases will reduce any potential for world exports and 
net contribution by the agricultural sector for foreign exchange earnings. 
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Even if a country does not have a comparative advantage in 
agriculture, forced industrialization is not the answer to all problems. 
Because of the rapid rate of technical change experienced in the 
industrial sector of developed nations, any initial deficit or subsequent 
lags in adoption of new technology which results in inferior or higher 
cost commodities will destroy any continued demand for products from 
developing nations in the competitive international market. Although 
countries like Korea and Taiwan have a distinct production advantage 
with low priced labor, it is quality and quality control which has 
restricted their development of dependable export markets. 
No single plan for development is directly applicable to all nations 
or even all developing nations. Emphasis on the development effort 
depends upon the natural endowments of the particular country, adaptability 
of resources to various products, current stage or level of supply and 
effective consumer demand for various products, source and volume of 
potential investment funds, restrictions attached to importing investment 
funds, extent of scale economies in various industries, comparative 
advantages in world market, and the availability of entrepreneurial 
resources in particular industries (43, p. 29). 
The achievement of rapid economic development has, in the experience 
of most nations, involved extensive planning and high levels of investment. 
As Ezekiel points out (34, p. 3), one form of investment to facilitate 
economic development involves the use of surplus agricultural commodities 
from a donor country to engage unemployed or underemployed workers of 
the recipient country in projects which will increase productivity such 
as building roads, wells, dams, irrigation canals, schools, warehouses. 
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processing plants, etc. In order to secure the services of the excess 
labor, it is necessary to pay wages or similar compensation.^ The 
wages represent a direct increase in national income, but in addition 
they will be used by the workers in part or total to purchase food, 
clothing, housing, and other consumer goods, thus increasing consumer 
demand. In the absence of excess capacity, the increase in demand will 
drive up prices and cause an inflationary trend unless new facilities 
for production are developed or consumer goods can be imported to 
satisfy the increase in demand. 
Economists are in general agreement that rapid inflationary price 
spirals must be avoided to establish and maintain rapid economic growth 
(54, pp. 573-574), but most developing nations face two limiting 
constraints which prevent them from satisfying the increase in demand 
independently. In many productive processes, there is an operational 
lag between investment and expansion of commodity output which, in the 
short run, prevents satisfying the expanded demand through expansion of 
domestic output. Secondly, the developing nations are faced with acute 
balance-of-payments problems which arise from their inability to produce 
sufficient export commodities to balance large imports. Given a supply 
deficit and the lack of foreign exchange to finance commercial imports, 
commodity aid can be an effective means of providing a large part of 
the goods for which increased employment generates effective demand. 
Inflation may thus be controlled. 
^he case of forced labor is ignored as an alternative in economies 
which are not centrally controlled. 
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Food aid has a unique potential for assistance since more than 50 
to 60 percent of expenditure from wages are allocated for food in 
developing nations (54, p. 573). Because a large portion of low income 
budgets is allocated to food, food supplies must expand rapidly during 
development in order to prevent inflation. Since many of the developing 
countries have experienced difficulty in adequately expanding domestic 
agricultural production in the past, it is unlikely that they can 
expand production rapidly enough to meet additional demand from expanded 
development investments. 
In addition to the initial impact of wages on demand, it is usually 
the case that some quantity of goods and services must be purchased 
locally to support development projects. These purchases represent 
increased income to domestic producers, either through expanded sales 
or higher prices. The additional income will, in turn, be used to 
purchase consumer goods for the producer or resources for future 
production. Part of the additional consumer purchases will represent 
demand for food and further expand the quantity of food aid which can 
be utilized without disrupting domestic prices. Purchases of additional 
resources, labor or commodities, represent still further income to 
other workers or producers. They, in turn, will result in additional 
purchases of food and other commodities. The respending of additional 
income received from the sale of domestic goods and services creates 
a multiplier effect which spreads through other sectors of the econony. 
The magnitude of the multiplier depends on leakage from the economy 
(i.e. imports, taxes and savings). Since food aid represents an import 
and leakage from the economy, the multiplier effect on national income 
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is affected by the proportion which food aid represents of the total 
project investment and subsequent derived demand. 
The extent to which food aid can be used to 'finance* development 
without having a negative impact on domestic prices and production, 
depends upon the amount of derived food demand resulting from development 
investments. If food supply is increased more than is necessary to 
satisfy increased food demand, prices will be depressed. As represented 
in Figure 1, if development investments result in a horizontal demand 
shift from D to D', food aid could be supplied in an amount equal to 
without a change in domestic prices and, in turn, domestic production. 
Alternatively, if food aid is supplied in an amount equal to so that 
total supply is represented by S" instead of S', market equilibrium will 
be reached only if price falls to where the new demand and total 
supply (i.e. domestic supply plus food aid imports) intersect. The 
extent of the demand shift depends on the level of income of the 
individuals affected by the development investments and the income 
response of those individuals. This response is defined as the income 
elasticity of demand.^ 
Ohkawa (66, p. 49) defines the rate of increase in food demand (d) 
as the rate of population growth (p) plus the product of the income 
elasticity of demand for food (n) times the rate of growth of per capita 
Income elasticity of demand is defined as the percent change in 
quantity demanded divided by the percent change in income. An alternative 
formulation which follows from the definition is the marginal propensity 
to consume divided by the average propensity to consume or the ratio of 
the change in quantity demanded to change in income divided by the ratio 
of quantity of demand to income. 
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Figure 1. Aggregate food supply and demand equilibrium 
income (g).^ Heady (42, p. 645) and Johnston and Mellor (54, p. 572) 
agree that these are the three most important variables in the determination 
of food demand. If the population term is ignored temporarily as independent 
of investment activities, only the income term is left for consideration 
in estimating demand derived from development investments. 
The importance of elasticity estimates is demonstrated in Figure 2 
where alternative income elasticities are plotted on changes in income 
^In the complete formulation, Ohkawa's equation was d = p + gn + pgn, 
but he dropped the last term because his empirical data indicated that 
it was less than one percent of the sum of the first two terms. This 
formulation assumes constant prices. 
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Figure 2. Food demand as related to income growth and income elasticity 
levels. For the case of a 6 percent change in income, the range in 
rate of change in food demand is from 0.6 percent to 5.4 percent, 
depending whether the elasticity is 0.1 or 0.9. Similarly the absolute 
magnitude of the error when estimating quantities, will increase as the 
level of income increases. 
Much conflict can be found in the literature concerning the magnitude 
of elasticity estimates. For example, Kuznets estimated the income 
elasticity of food demand in the U.S. from 1909-1955 at 0.90 (59, pp. 86-87 
and 74, p. 14). In contrast, Burk estimated the income elasticity of 
demand in the U.S. from 1948-1957 at 0.24 (16, p. 25). From Figure 2 
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it is apparent that for a given change in income, estimates as divergent 
as these would result in considerably different estimates of changes in 
demand for food. 
In order to estimate the total quantity of food aid which can be 
utilized with respect to a particular development project or program, 
the multiplier effect on income, and the derived demand for nonfood 
commodities, it is essential to understand the response of consumer 
groups which will be providing labor for the development projects. 
Income Level as a Variant in 
Determining Demand for Food Aid 
The earliest empirical 'law of consumption' was developed in the 
nineteenth century by Christian Lorenz Ernest Engel. Engel's Law, 
with respect to food consumption patterns, states that the proportion 
of income spent on food declines as income rises (30, p. 87). Thus, 
food expenditures represent a high proportion of budget allocations at 
low budget levels and decrease at higher income levels. At low income 
levels the consumer is surviving on a minimum of all commodities and 
a high percent of the budget is used for food. As the budget increases, 
food consumption expands rapidly at first and then begins to decline 
as an adequate nutritional level is approached. Food expenditures 
continue to increase, but at a decreasing rate as proteins are substituted 
for carbohydrates and the physical limit for individual consumption is 
approached.^ Clark cites both the familiar generalization by Adam Smith 
^The Engel Curve and the food consumption function are closely 
related since they are both measures of the same basic relationship. 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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that "the desire for food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity 
of the human stomach" and his own international consumption study as 
proof of a definite asymptote when analyzing food consumption (18, p. 237). 
Empirical consumption studies 
The validity of Engel's Law was verified by Houthakker in a cross-
sectional study of personal expenditure patterns using international 
data (47, pp. 532-551). Although the Houthakker study reports total 
expenditure instead of income which is used in the strict formulation 
of the law, the results confirm the more rigorous formulation of Engel's 
Law.^ 
Using data published by Houthakker, an attempt was made in this study 
2 
to develop an international Engel Curve for food. Three functional 
forms were considered: (a) the percent of budget spent for food on 
(footnote continued from previous page) Either curve can be derived 
directly from the other. Derivation of the consumption curve from the 
double log Engel Curve: log (Percent Food) = log a+b log (Total 
Expenditure) or log Total^ExpendSSe " (Total Expenditure) 
which can be written log (Food Expenditure) - log (Total Expenditure) = 
a+b log (Total Expenditure) and therefore log (Food Expenditure) = 
log a+(b+l) log (Total Expenditure) which is the double log form of the 
consumption function. 
^Total expenditure differs from disposable income by the amount of 
savings and hoarding. Since income elasticities are normally smaller 
than expenditure elasticities, formulation of the test with income would 
only further emphasize the results obtained from using expenditures for 
the associated income levels. 
2 An Engel Curve is the locus of points developed when plotting the 
percent of the budget spent on a particular commodity or aggregate 
bundle against total budget expenditures. 
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total expenditures, (b) the percent of budget spent for food on the log 
of total expenditures, and (c) the log of percent of budget spent for 
food on the log of total expenditures.^ The semilog function, displayed 
2 in Figure 3 resulted in the best fit. 
Values on the estimated Engel Curve range from a high of 100 percent 
at the very low budget levels down to approximately 35 percent at a 
total annual per capita expenditure of $2,500. At the low budget level 
the proportion spent on food decreases rapidly as expenditure increases 
up to about $750 where the slope of the function begins to stabilize. 
Mellor argues that because tastes and preferences differ so widely 
between countries, comparisons of international data are not likely to 
be useful for detailed studies. However, he agrees that for broad 
aggregates of commodities, the international comparisons provide estimates 
surprisingly close to those from intracountry cross-sectional studies 
Regression of the percent of budget spent for food on total 
expenditure directly fits a linear relationship with a constant slope 
which implies a constant change in food consumption with respect to a 
change in expenditure (i.e., constant marginal propensity to consume 
food) and assumes that the coefficient of elasticity tends toward unity 
as income increases indefinitely. The linear form is inconsistent with 
consumer behavior by precluding the asymptotic approach to a plateau of 
maximum consumption. Regression of the log of the percent of budget 
spent for food on the log of total expenditure fits a double-log 
relationship which implies constant elasticity. The double-log form is 
often rejected on the basis of empirical evidence denying constant 
elasticity of demand for food. This form is probably used more often 
than the functional form merits simply because the elasticity coefficient 
is determined directly as the regression coefficient. The double-log 
form is often satisfactory over a relatively narrow income range and 
particularly when food consumption is expressed in terms of expenditure 
rather than quantity (41, p. 2). The semilog function has neither the 
handicap of constant marginal propensity to consume nor constant 
elasticity and allows the elasticity to vary with level of expenditure. 
^R^ for semi-log = 0.68, R^ for linear = 0.63, and R^ for double-
log = 0.65. 
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Figure 3. Estimated international Engel Curve for food consumption 
based on a semilog function 
(64, p. 62). Similarly, Stevens has stated that "international comparisons 
of Engel Curve data provide more convincing evidence^ on the general 
magnitude of the income elasticity of total food during development" 
(74, p. 18). With the high degree of aggregation used when classifying 
demand into two commodity groups, food and nonfood, the international 
data should provide reasonable estimates for food consumption at various 
income levels. 
wold and Jureen state that budget study elasticities are not the 
same conceptually as time series elasticities, and that they should be 
smaller than the time series estimates (114, p. 56). If Wold and Jureen 
are correct, Stevens points out that budget study elasticities "could not 
be relied upon for estimates of the elasticity of food during development" 
(74, p. 17). For further discussion of the differences between time 
series and budget estimates, see Manderscheid (62). 
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In a recent study of food consumption by the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research of New Delhi (50), the data indicate that the 
average yearly expenditure of an Indian consumer was $67.36 of which 
Table 9. Average per capita expenditure per month and year in India^ 
Per month Per year ^ Percent of 
Commodity group (Rs.) (Rs.) ($) expenditure 
Food 14 .11 169 .32 35 .39 52. 5 
Fuel and light 1. 58 18 .96 3 .96 5. 9 
Clothing 1. 88 22, .56 4 .71 7, .0 
Other 9. 29 111. 48 23 .30 34. .6 
Total 26. ,86 322. 32 67 .36 100. 0 
^Source: (50, p. 49). 
^Official exchange rate for period covered by the study, 1964 and 
1965, averaged 4.785 Rs./$ (52, p. 162). 
52.5 percent was spent on food, 5.9 percent on clothing and 34.6 percent 
on other items. Expenditures ranged from less than Rs. 106.8 (about 
$22) to more than Rs. 672 (about $140) while food expenditures ranged 
from 65 percent down to 30 percent. Income elasticity of demand for 
wheat and rice were estimated at 0.58 and 0.47 respectively, and the 
elasticity for all cereals was estimated at 0.27 with maize, jowar, 
and small millet all having negative coefficients (50, p. 86). 
In a similar study of food consumption in Korea for 1964-1967, 
income elasticity for grain was estimated at 0.55 and for all food at 
0.54 (67, p. 77). Total per capita expenditure in the Korean study 
ranged from about $58 up to about $125 with the average being $80. The 
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Table 10. Monthly per capita food expenditure in India^ 
Income Total Total Total Food 
class expenditure food food percent 
(Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) ($)b expenditure 
Under 8.9 11.57 7.49 1.57 64.8 
9.0 - 11.9 14.64 9.02 1.89 61.6 
12.0 - 13.9 18.52 10.37 2.17 56.0 
14.0 - 15.9 18.08 10.98 2.29 60.8 
16.0 - 18.9 24.55 13.52 2.83 55.1 
19.0 - 21.9 22.45 12.77 2.67 56.9 
22.0 - 24.9 29.50 16.07 3.36 54.6 
25.0 - 28.9 c 
c c c 
29.0 - 34.9 33.80 15.96 3.34 47.3 
35.0 - 43.9 37.01 17.91 3.74 48.4 
44.0 - 55.9 51.30 23.49 4.91 45.8 
Over 56.0 99.84 29.77 6.22 29.8 
Average 26.86 14.11 2.95 52.5 
^Source: (50, pp. 118-119). 
^Official exchange rate = 4.785 Rs./$U.S. (52, p. 162). 
%ata inconsistent due to reporting of unusual wedding expenditures. 
range on percent of expenditure for food was from 79 down to about 54 
with an average of 65.6 percent. 
In summarizing several studies of elasticity by F.A.O., Goreux 
estimates the income elasticity of food demand to be 0.85 at an annual 
per capita income of $50 and 0.25 at $1,500 (41, p. 6). For selected 
commodities his estimates are much higher at low income levels. Milk 
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and milk products reach 2.2 and sugar reaches 1.5 at $50. Coale and 
Hoover cite Palvia as estimating the elasticity of demand for food at 
0.8 in India for the period up to 1971 (19, p. 125). In an analysis 
of international data from 35 countries, Stevens estimated the elasticity 
at about 0.8 at $50 and about 0.6 at $1,000. In a similar analysis of 
data from 13 different countries, Stevens obtained estimates of 0.8 and 
0.56 at low ($75) and high ($600) income levels respectively (74, p. 19). 
Analyzing data published in a study by Kuznets, Stevens estimated the 
elasticity coefficient at 0.75 with a double-log function (74, p. 21 
and 59, p. 24). Using a double-log function to analyze data from a 
study by Brown, Stevens estimated the elasticity coefficient at 
0.73 (74, p. 21 and 15, pp. 42-44). Mellor suggests that the appropriate 
elasticities for developing countries range from 0.9 at low income 
levels down to 0.5 at high income levels (64, p. 78). Elsewhere, Johnston 
and Mellor estimate that the elasticity is 0.6 or higher in developing 
countries (53, p. 339). 
Results of these studies are summarized in Figure 4 by plotting 
the resulting elasticity estimates against consumption expenditure on 
a semilog scale.^ Over the range from $75 to $600 the estimates are 
bounded by data from Houthakker at the upper limit and from Goreux at 
the lower limit. At the low income levels, below $100, the estimates are 
quite close with the spread increasing at high income levels. 
Results of the Indian study were observed to be unusually low 
estimates compared to the other studies and omitted. The low estimates 
may be attributed to the collection of data through budget studies which 
previously have been identified as tending to provide low estimates. 
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Table 11. Food expenditure in Korea by household a 
Income No. per Total Total Total Food 
class (in house­ expenditure food food percent 
1,000 Won) hold CWon)b (Won) ($)c expenditure 
Under 72 4.2 60,767 48,220 189.10 79.3 
72 - 96 5.3 85,022 63,810 250.02 75.0 
96 - 120 5.6 107,235 76,642 300.56 71.5 
120 - 144 6.5 132,528 87,350 342.55 65.0 
144 - 168 7.3 156,193 97,677 383.05 62.6 
168 - 192 6.9 180,221 106,395 417.24 59.0 
Over 192 7.9 249,100 133,916 525.16 53.8 
Average 6.0 123,934 81,307 318.85 65.6 
^Source: (67, p. 81). 
^Unit is 1964 Won. 
^'Official exchange rate 255 Won/$U.S. (52, p. 196). 
To analyze the impact of consumption habits at different income 
levels on the generation of effective demand for food and economic 
development, three income levels were selected as representative of the 
conditions under which food aid is programmed. The three levels of 
annual per capita income examined in detail are $75 as representative 
of low income levels, $250 representing medium income levels and $450 
representing high income levels. While P.L. 480 contracts were 
authorized for thirty-seven countries during calendar year 1968, 
approximately 70 percent of the food was contracted by countries with 
per capita incomes of $50 to $100 per year. Another 21 percent was 
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Source: 1—Palvia by Coale and Hoover (19); 2—Houthakker (47); 
3—Kuznets (59); 4—Brown (15); 5—Stevens with 35 countries (74); 
6—Stevens with 13 countries (74); 7—Pak and Han (67), and 8—Goreux (41). 
Figure 4. Income elasticity estimates 
contracted by countries over $300. In addition, a wide distribution 
of income underlies the average for any given country so that any or 
all of the above income levels might be observed for select groups within 
that country. 
Low income recipients 
The low income group is considered first. Countries receiving food 
aid which have annual per capita incomes close to $75 include the Congo 
($87), Kenya ($100), Niger ($73), Nigeria ($68), Sierra Leone($111), 
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Table 12. Percentage of 1968 food aid contracted—by recipient country 
per capita expenditure level* 
Expenditure Percentage of Cumulative 
in dollars food aid percentage 
50 - 74 18.64 18.64 
75 - 99 50.61 69.25 
100 - 149 10.10 79.35 
150 - 199 8.64 87.99 
200 - 299 2.95 90.99 
300 - 399 2.80 93.74 
400 - 499 0.44 94.18 
Other 5.82 100.00 
^Source: (32 and 80). 
Somali ($62), Afghanistan ($52), India ($73), Pakistan ($108), Indonesia 
($95), Korea ($140), and South Viet Nam ($108) (78, pp. 48-53). In 
addition, most other countries of the world have a segment of the 
population with similar income levels, so that the following discussion 
is applicable to low income strata within countries as well as to 
countries with similar averages. 
The analysis is based on the premise that the recipient country 
finances part of a development project or program through the use of 
food aid. Consider an irrigation project which requires 100 units of 
investment to construct a reservoir and irrigation canals in order to 
increase agricultural production. Assume that the project inputs consist 
of 70 percent direct labor, 20 percent goods and services which can be 
purchased locally, and 10 percent materials and equipment which must be 
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imported. How much of the cost can be financed with food aid, and what 
is the impact on the economy.^ 
The labor needed for the project will increase employment and 
income directly by 70 units. Each worker will, in turn, increase his 
consumption of food and other consumer goods depending on his level 
of income elasticity. On the basis of the studies summarized earlier, 
low income consumers are estimated to have an income elasticity of 
demand for food of approximately 0.8. At $75 the average propensity 
to consume food was estimated at 0.55 for the India data, 0.62 for 
the U.S.D.A. study, 0.73 by the Houthakker data, and 0.78 with Korean 
data for a mean value of about 0.67 to 0.70. Comprehensive estimates 
of the proportion which food represents of total consumer expenditures 
are quite limited. Of the 101 countries of the world for which the 
United Nations has estimated per capita income under $600 (78, pp. 
48-53), they have food consumption estimates for only 17 (77). The 
plot of the 17 country estimates in Figure 5 with the Engel Curve 
2 
estimated by Stevens indicates that the small sample is not sufficient 
to improve on earlier estimates of the Engel Curve. Only half of the 
^Johnston and Mellor (53, pp. 344-349) and Lewis (61, pp. 400-412) 
argue that there is a surplus of labor in the underdeveloped countries 
which can be engaged in productive activities if resources are available 
to compensate them for their labor. In neither case is it argued that 
marginal productivity of labor is zero, but only that productivity can 
be increased. Johnston and Mellor hypothesize that the remaining labor, 
after some is withdrawn for the development project, will simply work 
more intensely or longer hours so that production will not decline (53, 
pp. 346-347). 
2 
Stevens' estimated Engel Curve is F/E = 116.83 - 29.34 log E. 
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countries fall within the area outlined by the broken lines identifying 
points which are 10 percent above or below the estimated Engel Curve 
at each income level. 
For the average low income consumer, part of the income received 
from wages will be saved, part will be used to pay taxes, and part will 
be used to purchase consumer goods. Most of the consumer demand will 
be for goods which are domestically produced, but a small portion of 
demand will be for imported consumer goods. Ezekiel estimates that at 
the margin savings equal about 9 percent of additional income (34, p. 9). 
Deducting the 26 percent for savings (6.3 units), taxes (6.3 units), 
and imports (5.6 units), about 51.8 units of the 70 units paid for wages 
will be left to purchase domestic goods and services. In combination 
an estimated elasticity of 0.8 and an average propensity to consume 
food of 0.67 to 0.70 imply a marginal propensity to consume food of 
about 0.55.^ If 55 percent of the increase in income after savings, 
taxes, and imports is spent on food, the 70 units of investment used 
for wages will generate a demand for 28.5 units of food. Part of the 
food price represents marketing costs, however, so that only part of 
the 28.5 units represent increased demand for actual food commodities. 
Ezekiel estimates that the marketing costs for food are in the neighborhood 
of 15 percent in rural areas where food is sold at retail in about the 
same form it comes from the farmer (34, p. 9). Deducting the 15 percent 
which represents domestic services, the actual food demand would equal 
^Since elasticity is equal to marginal propensity to consume 
divided by average propensity to consume, it follows that marginal 
propensity to consume is equal to average propensity to consume times 
elasticity. 
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Figure 5. International comparison of proportion of consumer budget 
spent on food (77 and 78) 
about 24.2 units. Consequently, if surplus commodities could be matched 
with the native diet, 24.2 units of food could be supplied directly 
to the workers as wages-in-kind or indirectly through a price controlled 
shop without affecting aggregate demand for or supply of domestic food. 
At this level, food aid could only be used to finance one fourth of 
the cost of the project. If in contrast, 100 units of food were sold 
on the market and the income used to finance the project, a net 
increase in demand of 24 units implies that 76 units of the food would 
replace demand for domestic commodities. Before drawing a conclusion, 
it is necessary to consider what happens to the other 30 units of 
expenditure (20 for goods and services, and 10 for imports). 
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The 10 units which are used to import materials and equipment are 
paid to the exporting country and thus leave the economy of the recipient 
country. The remaining 20 units are paid to domestic producers for 
goods and services. If there is excess capacity for supplying nonfood 
goods and services, a larger quantity can be sold at the same price. 
If supply is limited, the price will be bid up. In either case domestic 
producers receive additional income in the amount of 20 units. 
Again, part of the additional income will be saved, part will be 
used to pay taxes, and part will be used to purchase consumer goods or 
additional raw materials for future production. Deducting the 26 
percent for savings (1.8 units), taxes (1.8 units), and imports (1.6 
units), 14.8 units are left as disposable income to be spent on domestic 
consumer goods. 
With a marginal propensity to consume food of 0.55, 8.1 units will 
be spent for food. Deducting the 15 percent for marketing services, 
6.9 units will represent additional demand for food and the remaining 
1.2 units for services. Adding the demand generated from the direct 
purchase of domestic goods and services to the demand generated from 
wages, the first round^ increase in demand would be 31.3 units of food 
and 35.5 units of nonfood goods and services. 
In the second round 26.2 of the 35.5 units of income to domestic 
producers will be available as disposable income after deducting savings 
^One round is defined as the lag between receipt of income and 
its final disposal. The Ezekiel study assumes a lag of four months so 
that three rounds of spending occur per year (34, p. 55). Srivistava 
cites Khusro as considering a lag of three months realistic, resulting 
in four rounds per year (73, p. 165). Specification of the income-
expenditure lag will not affect the estimate of derived income or demand 
for food, but it will affect the magnitude of the estimates per unit of time. 
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(3.2), taxes (3.2) and imports (2.8). 14.4 units will be spent for food 
and 11-8 units for nonfood. Deducting the marketing costs on food, 
12.3 units of food will be demanded in the second round and 14.0 units 
of nonfood and services. Adding the first round to the second round 
brings the total food demand generated by the project to 43.4 units. 
Expanding the analysis through ten rounds exhausts the multiplier 
effect of spending and responding with the assumed coefficients. 
Theoretically the total increase in income reaches 148.5 units and 
derived demand for food reaches 51.4 units as the result of the 
original investment of 100 units.^ Under an assumption of four months 
for the income-expenditure lag, 94 percent of the increase in income 
and food demand would occur during the first year. Under an alternative 
assumption of three months for the income-expenditure lag, over 97.5 
percent of the increase occurs during the first year. In either case 
the increases in income and demand for food occur very rapidly in the 
low income countries due to the high proportion of the budget which is 
allocated to food demand and consequently the rapid leakage from the 
economy when food aid is used to meet increased demands. Under these 
^In the multiplier analysis, total expansion of the spending and 
respending is limited by the "leakage" out of consumers' hands. The 
usual leakage results from savings, taxes and imports. The income multiplier 
is defined as ^ ^  ^  ^ where s, t, and i represent marginal savings, 
taxation, and import rates. The larger the sum of these three variables, 
the greater the leakage during each round and consequently the lower the 
multiplier effect. Using 26 percent as the estimated sum of s, t, and i 
inçlies a Keynesian investment-income multiplier of 3.85 which should 
produce 385 units of income from the 100 units which were originally 
invested. However, at each round it was implicitly assumed that the 
food demand would be satisfied with surplus food aid which also represents 
an import and further reduces the income to domestic producers at each 
round. 
Table 13. Aggregate impact of 100 units investment on selected economic variables in low 
income countries^ 
Gross Derived demand 
Round 
domestic 
income Savings Taxes Imports 
Disposable 
income 
Retail 
food 
Wholesale 
food 
Goods and 
services 
1. (wages 70.00 6.30 6.30 5.60 51.80 28.49 24.22 27.58 
(other 20.00 1.80 1.80 1.60 14.80 8.14 6.92 7.88 
2. 35.46 .19 3.19 2.84 26.24 14.43 12.27 13.97 
3. 13.97 1.26 1.26 1.12 10.34 5.69 4.83 5.50 
4. 5.50 .50 .50 .44 4.07 2.23 1.90 2.17 
5. 2.17 .20 .20 .17 1.61 ,88 .75 .86 
6. .86 .08 .08 .07 .64 .35 .30 .34 
7. .34 .03 .03 .03 .25 .14 .12 .13 
8. .13 .01 .01 .01 .10 .05 .04 .05 
9. .05 0.00 0.00 0.00 .04 .02 .02 .02 
10. .02 0.00 0.00 0.00 .01 .01 .01 0.00 
Total 148.50 13.37 13.37 11.88 109.90 60.43 51.38 58.50 
^Statistics: Savings = 9 percent, taxes = 9 percent, imports = 8 percent, mpc-food = 0.55, 
marketing costs = 15 percent. 
^First round impact of project expenditures directly for wages. 
^First round impact of project expenditures for domestic goods and services. 
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conditions about 50 units or half of the original investment could be 
financed in the first year through the use of food aid without affecting 
the domestic market prices. 
In addition to the multiplier effect on income and food demand, the 
project would generate 12.5 to 13.0 units of savings and a similar amount 
of tax revenue in the first 12 to 15 months. Presumably the increase in 
savings will be channeled into investment and will increase productivity 
in future periods. Using a multiplier of the magnitude determined above, 
1.39 for three rounds, the 13 units of savings would generate 18 units 
of additional income in the second year and another 6.2 units of demand 
for food, bringing the total food demand for two years (six rounds) 
to 57.4 units. To balance supply with demand, 48.2 units of the surplus 
food should be supplied in the first year and the remaining 9.2 units 
supplied in the second year.^ 
If the effective marginal tax rate is 9 percent, government 
revenue generated through increases in income would be about 13 units. 
Assuming food was purchased by the recipient country under Title I 
rather than received as a donation, and used exclusively to meet the 
food demand generated from project wages, the 13 units falls far short 
of covering the full debt which the recipient country would contract 
in purchasing the surplus food. If, however, Schultz is correct in his 
^The method used to pay the workers (cash, coupons, wages-in-kind, 
etc.) for the portion of their income which will be spent on food is 
immaterial if the supply of food aid is matched with the increased demand 
resulting from the investment. Paying wages and then recapturing the 
revenue from food sales is simply a balancing transaction and does not 
generate revenue for the government any more than issuing food coupons 
or wages-in-kind. 
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estimate that return on P.L. 480 contracts only amounts to 10 to 15 cents 
on the dollar (71, p. 1024),^ the revenue collected from additional 
income generated from the investment would be sufficient to liquidate 
the debt. On this basis, to the extent that the recipient country 
could secure matching funds to support the food aid imports, the cost 
to the government would be at or near zero, and the only limiting factor 
on a developing country's use of food aid to finance development would 
be the quantity of excess labor which could be mobilized and the number 
of development projects which could be specified. 
In addition to the cost consideration, a second factor could limit 
the use of food aid to finance development. For the investment under 
consideration, 10 units were required to import equipment and materials 
which were not available locally. Another 12 units of demand for 
imports were generated from the additional income. Together these 
represent over 20 percent of the initial investment. In cases where 
foreign exchange is critically limited, the generation of demand for 
imports would create additional pressure on the system. One alternative 
is to provide a broader group of commodities to the recipient country 
than just surplus food. Including the commodities demanded as imports 
in a P.L. 480 contract would not change the multiplier effect on the 
other variables since imports were already deducted when estimating 
^Schultz's estimate of return on food aid contracts is based on 
an estimate of long-run net payment on contracts by recipient countries. 
Where soft currency sales (not on long-term contract) are involved, the 
required deposit to a U.S. account may be considerably higher than the 
10 to 15 percent figure, but through grants, exchange loss, etc. the net 
return which is realized by the U.S. is much lower than the value of 
the initial contract. Dollar sales and convertible currency sales should 
increase the net return considerably. 
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the generated income and demand for food. Adding the 21.9 units of 
imports to the 57.6 units of food brings the total to 79.5 units of 
the original investment which could be financed with commodity aid 
without affecting the food market in the recipient country. The 
assistance package which would maximize use of commodity aid is, there­
fore, estimated to consist of 57.6 percent food, 21.9 percent nonfood 
and 20.54 percent capital. Once again this conclusion rests on the 
assumption that availability of the commodity aid conforms in timing 
and composition with the demand which is generated. 
Referring to a specific low income country situation, Indonesia 
contracted for $124.3 million of commodities under Title I of P.L. 480 
during 1968 (80, p. 116). Subtracting the $40.9 million of cotton which 
was provided for in the contract leaves $83.4 million of food aid. 
Assuming that the statistics for Indonesia are approximately equal to 
estimates for the low income group as a whole, an investment of $145 
million or an additional $61.6 million of capital will be needed to 
generate sufficient demand to balance the supply of surplus food. 
Alternatively, food aid could substitute for capital assistance up 
to 57.6 percent or $83.4 million of a $145 million investment program 
in Indonesia of the type set forth earlier in this section. 
Based on an investment of $145 million for development, it is 
estimated that $214.6 million of income would be generated in two years 
(six rounds). An increase in income of $107.3 million per year (half 
of the two-year increase) represents slightly over 1 percent of the 
national income in 1967, $10,479 million (78, p. 51). At the average 
annual per capita income level of $95, 70 percent of the original 
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investment of $145 million could provide employment for 1.07 million 
people. In addition to the direct project wages, labor is also marketed 
through and employed to market other goods and services. The maximum 
employment which could be generated from the investment would result 
if the sale of all goods and services represented return to labor and 
no return to other resources. Combining the 58 units of demand for 
foods and services which the original investment is estimated to 
generate with the seven units which reinvestment of savings is estimated 
to generate, brings the total demand for foods and services to 65 
units or $94.25 million dollars. At an annual wage rate of $95, the 
maximum employment which would be generated through sale of goods and 
services would be about 992 thousand man years. Therefore, the estimated 
increase in employment resulting from the development investment ranges 
from a minimum of 1.07 million to a maximum of 2.06 million man years.^ 
The impact on foreign trade and balance of payments can be viewed 
by looking at the increase in import demand. An investment of $145 
million is estimated to generate a demand for imports of 31.67 million 
dollars ($17.17 million from consumer demand and $14.5 million directly 
for project support). The $40.9 million of cotton imported under 
P.L. 480 exceeds the estimated value of total demand for nonfood imports 
which would be generated by a $145 million development investment and 
2 
suggests an apparent contradiction of P.L. 480. If in fact Indonesia has 
^Both minimum and maximum estimates are based on a wage rate of 
$95. In addition the maximum depends on the proportion labor represents 
in the market price of goods and services. 
2 P.L. 480 requires that commodities contracted must be in addition 
to "normal" demand. 
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contracted for more cotton than demand will be generated and, effective 
demand exists for the sale of cotton so that the concessional imports 
are replacing 'normal' trade, Indonesia will derive foreign exchange 
benefits from the cotton portion of the contract. On the basis of 
the estimates, it appears that over $9 million of foreign exchange 
would be freed above the amount necessary to finance imports to 
support the original investment. 
Alternatively, it is possible for Indonesia to satisfy the 
additionality clause if the total planned investment for development 
is larger than the minimum estimated and the $83.4 million of food aid 
contracted is not designed to meet the total increase in food demand. 
In this case domestic agriculture would be called upon to expand output 
considerably, commercial imports would have to increase, or more food 
aid would be needed to satisfy the additional demand and maintain current 
food prices. 
Medium income recipients 
The second group of developing countries considered have an annual 
per capita income level close to $250. These include Honduras ($209), 
Ecuador ($199), Peru ($241), Algeria ($207), Tunisia ($171), Ivory Coast 
($203), Liberia ($154), Rhodesia ($217), Saudi Arabia ($288), Iran ($235), 
Jordan ($235), and Syria ($203) (78, pp. 48-53). Just as most countries 
have some of the very poor from the previous case, one would expect to 
find a segment of the population in low income countries as well as high 
income countries with per capita income of $250. 
Again it is assumed that the recipient country finances part of a 
development project or program with food aid. To compare with the 
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previous analysis where labor was supplied by low income consumers, a 
project will be considered which uses 70 percent labor, 20 percent 
domestic goods and services, and 10 percent imports. On the basis of 
the earlier studies cited, the medium income consumers are estimated 
to have an income elasticity of demand for food of approximately 0.73. 
The Stevens study provides a median value for average propensity to 
consume food of 0.465 at $250 (74, p. 19), implying a marginal propensity 
to consume food of 0.34. 
Seventy units of investment paid as wages to consumers with a 
marginal propensity to save of 0.09, a marginal taxation rate of 0.09, 
a marginal propensity to consume imports of 0.08, and a marginal 
propensity to consume food of 0.34 would generate 17.6 units of demand 
for retail food. As Ezekiel pointed out (34, p. 9), increases in the 
income level and associated food expenditure result in a larger percent 
of the food budget being spent on services. If the marketing costs are 
increased to 20 percent, the derived demand for wholesale food will 
be reduced to 14.1 units. The balance of the 51.8 units of disposable 
income, 37.7 units, will be spent on domestic goods and services. 
The additional 20 units of the investment which are used to purchase 
local equipment, supplies, and services will generate another 4.0 units 
of demand for food at wholesale and 18.0 units of demand for domestic 
goods and services. Under the assumed parameter estimates for the 
medium income consumers, first round impact of 100 units of investment 
would generate a demand for only 18.1 units of food. Tracing the 48.5 
units of income for domestic producers through the second round adds 9.8 
units of food demand. At the end of one year (three rounds) the multiplier 
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effect would generate 164.6 units of domestic income and 33.1 units of 
food demand. At the end of two years, the derived income is up to 
190.3 units and additional food demand up to 38.3 units. After 10 
rounds the total income generated is 194.7 units of which 39.2 is 
converted to food demand. Therefore, 84.5 percent of the total impact 
is generated in the first year and about 97.0 percent is generated 
before the end of the second year. 
If the savings from the first year are assumed to be reinvested 
in the second year and subject to the multiplier of about 1.64,^ the 
14.8 units of savings would generate another 24 units of income and 
4.8 units of demand for food. Taking expenditure for wages, local 
supplies, and investment of savings all in to account, it is estimated 
that about 43 percent of development investments in the medium income 
countries could be financed with food aid without affecting domestic 
food prices, as compared to 57 to 58 percent in the low income countries. 
In addition to the decline in the amount of derived food demand, 
derived demand for imports more than doubled from the low income to the 
medium income case. In the latter case 100 units of investment is 
estimated to generate 15.0 to 15.6 units of import demand which is a 
little over 35 percent of derived food demand. Adding the 10 units 
of imports needed for the original investment, demand for imports 
reaches 25.6 units. With a broad definition of commodity aid, which 
includes nonfood commodities as well as food, the total contract could 
be raised to 69.6 units (44 units of food and 25.6 units of nonfood) or 
^One hundred dollars invested in the first round generated 164.6 
units of income by the end of the third round. 
Table 14. Aggregate Impact of 100 units of Investment on selected economic variables In 
medium income countries* 
Gross Derived demand 
Round 
domestic 
income Savings Taxes Imports 
Disposable 
income 
Retail 
food 
Wholesale 
food 
Goods and 
services 
1. (wages 70.00 6.30 6.30 5.60 51.80 17.61 14.09 37.71 
(other)° 20.00 1.80 1.80 1.60 14.80 5.03 4.03 10.77 
2. 48.48 4.36 4.36 3.88 35.88 12.20 9.76 26.12 
3. 26.12 2.35 2.35 2.09 19.33 6.57 5.26 14.07 
4. 14.07 1.27 1.27 1.13 10.41 3.54 2.83 7.58 
5. 7.58 .68 .68 .61 5.61 1.91 1.53 4.08 
6. 4.08 .37 .37 .33 3.02 1.03 .82 2.20 
7. 2.20 .20 .20 .18 1.63 .55 .44 1.19 
8. 1.19 .11 .11 .10 .88 .30 .24 .64 
9. .64 .06 .06 .05 .47 .16 .13 .34 
10. .34 .03 .03 .03 .25 .08 .07 .18 
Total 194.70 17.53 17.53 15.60 144.08 48.98 39.20 104.88 
^Statistics: Savings = 9%, taxes = 9%, imports = 8%, mpc-food = .34, marketing costs = 20%. 
First round impact of project expenditures directly for wages. 
^Flrat round Impact of project expenditures for domestic goods and services. 
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69.6 percent of the original investment. In total, demand for commodity 
assistance has decreased from the low income case and the composition 
shifts from about 72 percent food and 28 percent nonfood to 63 percent 
food and 37 percent nonfood. An assistance package for the medium 
income countries which would maximize the use of commodity aid is, 
therefore, estimated to include 44.0 percent food, 25.6 percent nonfood, 
and 30.4 i^rcent capital. 
Focusing on a specific country, Tunisia contracted for $16.1 million 
of commodity aid in 1968 under Title 1 of P.L. 480 (80, p. 116). Since 
$2.4 million of the contract was for cotton and tobacco, and these 
commodities were not included as food items when determining consumer 
demand for food, only $13.7 million of the Tunisia contract represents 
additional food for which a balancing demand must be generated. Assuming 
that statistics for the medium income group are rough approximations 
for Tunisia, $13.7 million of food aid would require about $18.2 
million of capital or nonfood commodity for a total investment of $31.9 
million If sufficient demand is to be generated to balance the supply 
of surplus food. An investment of $31.9 million would generate consumer 
demand for imports amounting to $4.8 million plus the $3.2 million, 
10 percent of Investment for direct imports to support the Investment, 
for a total of $8.0 million. Assuming that the $2.4 million of cotton 
and tobacco represented consumer import demand, the balance requiring 
foreign exchange or nonfood commodity assistance is $5.6 million. 
Applying the six round multiplier of 1.9 to the $31.9 million 
Investment, approximately $60.5 million of additional Income would be 
generated in Tunisia over a two-year period. With a national Income of 
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444.0 million Dinars^ or $855 million in 1968 (52, p. 308), an additional 
$30.25 million of income per year (half of the two-year increase) 
represents an annual increase of about 3.5 percent. The minimum 
increase in employment derived from the investment would be 130,000 man 
years if the 70 percent paid directly for wages on the project represented 
total payment for labor at the current per capita level ($171 per 
year). However, a significant portion of income spent on goods and 
services also represents payment to labor. The maximum employment 
increase would be achieved if all of the $33.2 million of income spent 
on goods and services was paid to labor with no return to other factors 
of production. Consequently, the upper bound on annual employment 
resulting from the sale of goods and services would be 195,000 man 
years (at an annual wage rate of $171). The amount of employment 
generated by the investment is estimated between 130,000 and 325,000 
man years, depending on the proportional return to labor and other 
resources which are marketed as goods and services. 
Hleh income recipients 
The third group of countries considered have annual per capita 
income levels around $450. This group includes Mexico ($478), Costa 
Rica ($359), Panama ($477), Argentina ($519), Chile ($465), Uruguay 
($526), and Barbados ($410) (78, pp. 48-53). With stratification of 
income which occurs within countries, many of the other countries would 
be expected to have segments of the population with incomes at this 
level as well. 
^The official exchange rate was 0.52 Dinars per dollar in 1968 
(52, p. 306). 
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For consistency with the two previous sections, an investment which 
requires 70 percent labor, 20 percent local goods and services, and 
10 percent imports will be analyzed. On the basis of the consumption 
studies cited, the high income consumers are estimated to have an 
income elasticity of demand for food of 0.66. Using 0.39 from the 
U.S.D.Â. study (74, p. 19) as an estimate of average propensity to 
consume, a marginal propensity to consume food of 0.26 is implied. De­
ducting the 26 percent for savings, taxes, and imports, leaves 51.8 
units of 70 units paid for wages, available to purchase consumer 
goods. With a marginal propensity to consume food of 0.26, 13.47 units 
will be spent on food. Raising the marketing cost te 25 percent to 
reflect additional services, the net demand for wholesale food would 
be 10.1 units. Similarly the 20 units used to purchase domestic 
goods and services would generate 2.89 units of demand for food at 
wholesale. Traced through 10 rounds of spending, the 100 units of 
investment is estimated to generate 221 units of income and almost 32 
units of demand for food. In contrast to the lower income levels, 
demand for food represents a smaller portion of the budget and consequently 
a slower leak from the economy if food demand is balanced with food aid. 
The resulting impact spreads the respending process over more rounds 
so that only 79.5 percent of the impact is generated in the first year 
(3 rounds), 16.8 percent in the second year, and 3.7 percent in the third 
year. The combination of low marginal propensity to consume food and 
the longer period over which the multiplier effect is applicable Implies 
that not only will less food aid be needed in the high income countries, but 
Table 15. Aggregate impact of 100 units of investment on selected economic variables in 
high income countries* 
Gross Derived demand 
Round 
domestic 
income Savings Taxes Imports 
Disposable 
income 
Retail 
food 
Wholesale 
food 
Goods and 
services 
1. (wages 70.00 6.30 6.30 5.60 51.80 13.47 10.10 41.70 
(other)^ 20.00 1.80 1.80 1.60 14.80 3.85 2.89 11.91 
2. 53.61 4.82 4.82 4.29 39.67 10.31 7.74 31.94 
3. 31.94 2.87 2.87 2.56 23.64 6.15 4.61 19.03 
4. 19.03 1.71 1.71 1.52 14.08 3.66 2.75 11.34 
5. 11.34 1.02 1.02 .91 8.39 2.18 1.64 6.76 
6. 6.76 .61 .61 .54 5.00 1.30 .98 4.03 
7. 4.03 .36 .36 .32 2.98 .77 .58 2.40 
8. 2.40 .22 .22 .19 1.78 .46 .35 1.43 
9. 1.43 .13 .13 .11 1.06 .28 .21 .85 
10. .85 .08 .08 .07 .63 .16 .12 .51 
Total 221.39 19.92 19.92 17.71 163.83 42.59 31.97 131.90 
^Statistics: Savings = 9%, taxes = 9%, imports = 87», mop-food = 0.26, market costs = 25%. 
^First round impact of project expenditures directly for wages. 
°First round impact of project expenditures for domestic goods and services. 
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it will have to be spread over two or three years in order to balance 
the availability of food aid with the derived demand. 
Closely related to the demand for food and leakage from the 
economy is the magnitude of the income multiplier. For the high income 
case the multiplier is estimated at 2.2 over 10 rounds as compared 
with 1.49 and 1.95 with the low and medium income cases. Likewise the 
magnitude of derived savings and tax revenue are estimated to rise 
to about 20 percent of initial investment as compared with 13.4 and 
17.5 percent previously. The increase in savings represents a potential 
for increased private investment and expanded production. Likewise, 
the tax revenue represents a source of increased public investment or 
revenue to retire the debt for food aid contracts. 
At the same time estimates of derived demand for imports increase 
to 17.7 percent of the original investment. Adding the 10 percent for 
direct support of the investment pushes the derived demand for imports 
well over a quarter of the value of the investment plan. Unless 
significant steps can be taken to develop import substitutes or export 
earnings, a country experiencing a shortage of foreign exchange will 
find the balance-of-trade problem more critical. 
Derived food demand is estimated to reach 25.3 percent of the 
investment in one year, 30.7 percent by the end of two years, and 32.0 
percent at the end of three years. Assuming that the savings from the 
first round is reinvested in the second round, the 14.8 units would 
generate 26.0 units of income and 3.7 units of food demand using the 
first year income multiplier of 1.76. In the third round the investment 
from first round savings is estimated to generate another 5.4 units of 
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Income and 0.8 units of demand for food. Total derived food demand for 
the high income group is, therefore, estimated to be 36.5 units or 
36.5 percent of the original investment over 3 years with the distribution 
by year being 25.3, 9.1, and 2.1 percent respectively. 
For the high income group the aggregate composition of the financing 
which is estimated to balance demand with available commodities and 
utilize the maviTmim amount of commodity aid would be 36.5 percent food 
aid, 27.7 percent nonfood aid equivalent to the import demand, and 
35.8 percent in capital.^ 
Relating to a specific country, Uruguay contracted for $20.6 million 
of Title I P.L. 480 assistance in 1968 (80, p. 117).of which $18.0 
million was food and $2.6 million was nonfood commodities. In order to 
utilize the $18.0 million dollars of food for development investments 
without releasing the food aid on the local market system, a total 
investment of $49.3 million was necessary on the basis of the derived 
demand estimated previously. 
A total investment of $49.3 million, assuming statistics for 
Uruguay are approximately equal to those estimated for the high income 
group, would generate approximately $109 million dollars of additional 
income. . Given a national income of 141.13 billion Pesos in 1967 
2 (52, p. 334) or $705.65 million, an increase of $109 million over three 
Presumably the 35.8 percent above food and import demand could 
also be provided as commodity aid consisting of goods which are similar 
to those produced domestically, but this would reduce the multiplier 
effect through increased leakage. 
2 
The official exchange rate for 1967 was 200 Pesos per dollar 
(52, p. 332). 
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years represents an annual Income of about 5.1 percent. If 70 percent 
of the initial investment was for labor at a wage rate equal to the 
present annual per capita income level, employment is estimated to rise 
by 65,700 man years. Depending on the labor portion of goods and 
services, a maximum increase in employment derived indirectly could 
reach 329,000,^ so that the range on derived employment is estimated 
at 65,700 to 394,700 man years over a three-year period. The development 
investments are estimated to generate $9.9 million of government 
revenue. In contrast to the low income case where government revenue 
reached only about 23 percent of the value of the food aid, revenue 
in the high income case is estimated to reach approximately 55 percent 
of the food contract. This fact alone does not suggest that the return 
on the food contract to high income countries would be expected to be 
two and a half times as high as on contracts with low income countries. 
It must be kept in mind that the $9.9 million of government revenue 
must, comparatively, service an additional 63.5 percent of the investment 
as compared with only an additional 42.4 percent in the low income case. 
Demand for imports as a consequence of the investment would equal 
$13.65 million. Assuming that the $2.6 million of nonfood commodity aid 
contracted under F.l. 480 would satisfy a similar amount of import demand, 
a balance of $11.05 million of foreign exchange or nonfood commodity 
assistance would be needed. Since Uruguay experienced a $22.2 million 
trade surplus in 1968, commercial Imports could be used to satisfy the 
additional demand for imports. 
cased on 131.9 units of demand for goods and services from the Initial 
investment plus 26.9 additional units from reinvested savings and a per 
capita income of $526. 
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General relationships between income level and food aid 
Analysis of the multiplier impact of developmental investments on 
income, adapted to the developing countries through the use of empirical 
estimates for structural parameters, provides a theoretical framework 
for esticating corresponding effects on other economic variables such 
as demand for food, other goods and services, and imports. Of particular 
interest in this study is the derived demand for food which will result 
from a given investment. In countries where food supply is already 
lagging behind demand, investment activities which expand consumer 
income and demand for food are certain to put inflationary pressures on 
food prices. As a counteraction, the importation of P.L. 480 commodities 
which are compatible with the derived demand could offset the increase 
in demand by augmenting domestic supply and commercial imports. 
Assuming that the objective of the recipient country is to increase 
aggregate income through increased investments while simultaneously 
increasing domestic production of food, maximum use of food aid to finance 
investments is specified by the resulting derived demand for the food 
commodities supplied as aid-in-kind. Using empirical estimates for 
low ($75), medium ($250), and high ($450) income countries, derived 
demand for food was calculated at 57.6 percent of the initial investment 
at the low income level, 44.0 percent at the medium Income level, and 
36.5 percent at the high income level. On this basis the maximum amount 
of food aid which would be used to finance development investments in 
the high Income countries would be around one third of the total Investment 
while in low income countries the proportion could exceed 55 percent 
with depressing domestic food prices. 
108 
Table 16. Composition of foreign assistance to maximize use of 
commodity aid in development investments 
Income Food Nonfood Supporting 
group Aid Imports capital 
Low 57.6% 21.9% 20.5% 
Medium 44.0% 25.6% 30.4% 
High 36.5% 27.7% 35.8% 
While the variation in maximum proportion of food aid which could 
be used exceeds 20 percent, the difference under a broader definition 
of commodity aid is smaller- If nonfood items for which an import demand 
is derived are included in the commodity aid package, derived demand 
resulting from development investments reaches 79.5 percent in the low 
income case and 64.2 percent in the high income case. For the labor 
intensive projects analyzed, the foreign assistance agreement which 
would most nearly match resource supply and demand while making maximum 
use of commodity aid would include 60 percent food, 20 percent nonfood 
commodities, and 20 percent supporting capital for the low income 
countries. An agreement for the medium income group would include 
roughly 45 percent food, 25 percent nonfood commodities, and 30 percent 
supporting capital. For the high income group, the agreement would 
include about 35 percent food, 30 percent nonfood commodities, and 35 
percent supporting capital. 
Project Composition, Savings, and Taxation 
as Variants in Demand for Food Aid 
The analysis of the previous section maintained the assumption of 
labor intensive projects (70 percent labor) and constant rates of taxation. 
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savings, and import demands in order to isolate the effects of per 
capita income on demand for food aid. By holding income constant 
and varying the other coefficients one at a time, their impact can 
also be isolated. 
Alternative resource requirement for project investments 
As an alternative to the labor intensive projects which required 
inputs in a 70:20:10 ratio, the impact of a less labor intensive project 
is analyzed. Consider a project which requires 50 percent of the 
input as labor, 35 percent as domestic goods and services, and 15 
percent as imports. The previous assumption of marginal savings, 
taxation, and import demand are maintained at 9, 9, and 8 percent 
respectively. The switch from labor inputs to increased use of domestic 
goods and services and foreign imports resulted in an estimated ten 
round multiplier of about 1.40 for the low income group compared to the 
previous multiplier of 1.48.^ At a marginal propensity to import of 
8 percent, the derived demand for imports is estimated to decline by 
about one half of 1 percent while the total demand for imports would 
increase by roughly 3 percent. Similarly, domestic savings and tax 
revenue from the investment would decline by less than 1 percent when 
compared to the labor intensive project in the earlier case. The 
direct demand for food at wholesale and domestic goods and services 
It can be shown that the decline of 8 percent results exclusively 
from the increase in imports needed to support the initial investment 
rather than from the shift in use of labor to domestic goods and services. 
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are each estimated to decline by about 3 percent with food decreasing 
to 48.5 percent, and goods and services to 55.0 percent.^ 
Table 17. Income multiplier under resource input of 50:35:15 
Income generated by income group 
Round Low Medium High 
1 0.8500 0.8500 0.8500 
2 0.3349 0.4579 0.5063 
3 0.1320 0.2567 0.3016 
4 0.0520 0.1329 0.1797 
5 0.0205 0.0716 0.1070 
6 0.0081 0.0386 0.0637 
7 0.0032 0.0208 0.0379 
8 0.0013 0.0112 0.0226 
9 0.0005 0.0060 0.0135 
10 0.0002 0.0032 0.0080 
Total 1.4027 1.8389 2.0903 
For the medium income group, the shift in resource inputs is 
estimated to reduce the income multiplier from 1.95 to 1.84 for a reduction 
2 
of 10 percent. A reduction of 10 percent in income combined with a 
The aggregate demand for food and other domestic goods and services 
can be calculated directly from the income multiplier. Wholesale food 
demand represents 34.6 percent (i.e., 74 percent x .55 x 85 percent) of 
income and goods and services 39.4 percent (i.e., 74 percent - 34.6 percent). 
^he theoretical change in the multiplier is equal to «a ^on i 
about 10 percent. 
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marginal propensity to demand imports of 8 percent reduces derived 
demand for imports by less than 1 percent. However, the additional import 
demand for the initial investment increases the total import demand by 
a net of roughly 4 percent. Likewise, savings and tax revenue would 
each decrease by just under 1 percent when compared with the 70:20:10 
case. Direct derived demand for wholesale food would decline by only 
about 2 percent while demand for goods and services would decline by 
almost 5.5 percent.^ 
For the high income group, the income multiplier is estimated to 
2 decrease b y  about 12 percent to 2.09 from 2.21. The 12 percent 
reduction in generated income would reduce derived imports by 1 percent 
so net demand for imports would increase by 4 percent when considering 
initial project investment. Savings and tax revenue would each decrease 
by about 1.1 percent. Direct derived demand for wholesale food again 
3 decreases by roughly 2 percent while derived demand for goods and 
services decrease by a little over 7 percent. 
In conclusion, the composition of a development project with respect 
to labor and other domestic inputs has little effect on total impact of 
the project under the parameter assumptions of the two cases. Obviously, 
a project with a higher initial input of labor would have a greater 
immediate effect on employment than one which had a high input of goods 
^he factor for direct calculations of aggregate demand for food 
from total income is equal to 20.1 percent (i.e., 74 percent x .34 x 
80 percent). 
^The devision for the multiplier is 30.4 (i.e., 26 + 14.4). 
3 
The factor for derived food demand is 14.4 (i.e., 74 percent x 
.26 X 75 percent). 
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and services. If it can safely be assumed that the commodity which is 
in surplus is labor and not a stockpile of goods, then projects with 
high labor requirements would still be preferred, not because of a long-
run difference but because of the immediate problem of designing projects 
around available resources. 
The portion of imports required to support the initial investment 
does affect the impact of the investment because of the leakage from the 
system. On a percentage basis, a change in import requirements of 5 
percent reduced the income multiplier by 8 to 12 percent depending on 
the income group and the corresponding demand for food imports. Since 
derived imports, savings, tax revenue, food demand, and other goods 
and service demand are all functions of aggregate income, an increase 
in imports which reduces the potential income also reduces each of 
the other variables by a proportionate amount. For each of the three 
income groups, the reduction in derived demand for imports is less 
than the 5 percent increase in imports for the project so that a net 
increase in imports and demand for foreign exchange would result from 
projects with higher requirements for imported inputs. 
Alternative parameter Aatimates for savings and taxation 
For the purpose of analyzing the impact of various parameter 
estimates on the demand for food aid and related economic variables, 
consider the possibility that 9 percent is too high for an estimate of 
marginal savings or taxation. To standardize comparisons with earlier 
calculations, a project requiring 70 percent of the resource input as 
labor, 20 percent as domestic goods and services, and 10 percent as 
113 
imports is used as the basic analytical unit, but savings is calculated 
using a marginal propensity to save of 7 percent. 
A lower savings or tax rate implies less leakage from the economy 
and consequently a higher income multiplier. A 2 percent decrease im 
savings or tax rate with the parameters of the low income group results 
in a 2.4 to 3.0 percent increase in the total income generated from the 
Table 18. Impact of 100 unit investment with 70:20:10 distribution 
and marginal tax or savings rate of 7 percent 
Income Income Savings Wholesale 
group multiplier or tax food 
Low 1.512 10.6 53.7 
Medium 2.009 14.1 41.5 
High 2.302 16.1 34.1 
project directly. However, because of the decrease in tax or saving 
rate, the net effect on either tax revenue or savings would be a decrease 
of about 2.5 to 3.0 percent. If it is assumed as in the earlier analysis 
that savings from the first year are reinvested the second year, a 
decrease of 2.5 units of savings would reduce total income generated from 
the project by 3.5 units, using a multiplier of 1.4 as before. Therefore, 
although the reduction in savings rate would increase income generated 
directly from the Investment in a development project, the loss of future 
private investment from the savings more than offsets the direct gain. 
^Of the total reduction of savings, 2.5 units occur during the 
first three rounds or first year. 
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The magnitude of the savings coefficient would only be significant 
if the savings were not reinvested. In that case the lower the savings 
rate, the higher the income multiplier. 
The same would be true for tax revenue. For the low income group 
the rate of taxation has little impact on the aggregate multiplier 
as long as the government reinvests the tax revenue. If on the other 
hand the government uses the revenue for external debt servicing or 
other uses which remove it from the economy, a higher tax rate would 
lower the income multiplier by increasing the leakage. 
For the medium income group, a 7 percent savings or tax rate, 
as opposed to a 9 percent tax rate, would increase the direct income 
multiplier by about 6.2 percent to 2.01. Savings on tax revenue would 
fall by 3.4 units so that income from reinvestment would fall by about 
5.5 units. Under the parameters assumed for the medium income group, 
the lower savings or taxation rate would result in a slightly higher 
income multiplier when reinvestment is considered. 
For the high income group, the lower tax or savings rate produces 
a multiplier which is about 8.8 units higher than with the 9 percent 
rate. Total savings on tax revenue would be 3.8 units lower, decreasing 
the income from reinvestment by about 6.5 to 7.0 units. The net effect, 
considering 1 round of reinvestment, would be about a 2 percent increase 
in income generated from the investment. 
In conclusion, if the estimates for savings and taxation are too 
high, the estimates for the income multipliers and other variables would 
be slightly underestimated in the high income case but not significantly 
different in the low or medium income case. The real impact of the 
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savings and tax rate is not in the nominal rate, but the extent to 
which savings and tax revenue are reinvested in the economy. 
A note on marginal import rates 
In the calculation of the direct impact of an investment on income, 
a reduction of the import rate by 2 percent would produce the same 
effect as reducing the savings or tax rate. Consequently, Che income 
multipliers in Table 18 are the same as would result if the import 
rate was lowered from 8 percent to 6 percent. Since import demand for 
consumption excludes future reinvestment, the direct gain would not be 
offset by loss of future investment as with savings or taxes. The lower 
marginal Import rate would decrease derived demand for imports and 
foreign exchange. Imports will be less affected in the high income 
group than the lower ones because the lower import rate produces a 
greater income effect at each income level and imports are a constant 
percent of aggregate income. Consequently a policy to lower marginal 
import rates would have a greater impact on foreign exchange savings 
in the low income group than on either of the higher income groups. 
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CHAPTER IV. INFLUENCE OF DEMAND DIFFERENTIATION 
ON THE IMPACT OF P.L. 480 SHIPMENTS 
The analysis in Chapter III indicated the extent to which P.L. 480 
imports can be utilized to finance development of a recipient economy 
under alternative conditions without having a negative impact on domestic 
food prices and production. Increased investments represent one specific 
technique from a broad class of methods or procedures which can be 
employed to expand demand. In general, expanding demand requires that 
new markets be developed. In the particular case analyzed in the 
previous section, the 'new* market was created by increasing income and 
raising economic demand.^ A second case involves price discrimination 
to increase total demand and consumption. The theoretical basis for 
expanding the demand for food was set forth by Waugh, Burtis, and 
Wolf in their 1936 article analyzing controlled distribution of a crop 
among independent markets. They pointed out that "in most cases, 
maximum net income could be obtained from a distribution aimed definitely 
at maintaining higher net prices in some markets than in others" (110, 
p. 6). In order to increase revenue by lowering the price in a second 
market, it is necessary that the two markets are at least partially 
2 independent. 
^ven where labor for a development project is supplied by workers 
who were previously partially employed, the additional income, employment, 
and consumption represents a total gain if the vacancies are filled by 
other unemployed or underemployed workers (14, pp. 920-922). 
^he only way revenue could increase if the two markets are direct 
substitutes is if price elasticity of demand is greater than unity, implying 
a price decline in the single market situation would have increased total 
revenue. 
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Several methods of market differentiation have been used in the 
U.S. which could be applied to food aid distribution in other countries. 
Supplying the commodities in a slightly different form than normal 
marketings would be one of the easiest to administer (i.e., supplying 
U.S. commodities which are similar but not perfect substitutes for 
domestic products). Product differentiation allows for a lower price 
to be charged without experiencing a major decline in the primary 
market demand. Consumer differentiation can be achieved by issuing 
special purchasing passes which provide for lower prices, increased 
rations, or shopping privileges at special markets (i.e., food stamp 
or coupon distribution to low income consumers). Geographic or 
economic isolation provides for still another possible means of market 
differentiation. 
In any case, if total demand could be expanded by differentiating 
the market, food aid could be supplied to a recipient economy through 
one or more of the differentiating techniques without, or at least with 
a minimum, negative impact on prices. As Westmore et ^ ., pointed out 
in their study analyzing the expansion of demand for farm food products, 
demand expansion seemed to be the logical solution to the simultaneous 
problem of surplus commodities and underconsumption (111, p. 3). Although 
applying the concepts of demand expansion to distribution of food aid is 
a slightly different framework, the objectives are the same as long as 
producer welfare and consumer welfare are a joint concern. Fisher 
suggests in his discussion of the impact of open-market sales and 
donations (31, pp. 863-867) that the negative impact on prices is reduced 
when food aid is distributed without entering the market in competition 
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with domestic supply. Waugh, Burtis, and Wolf concluded that "if the 
system of differentiated prices were such that poorer consumers could 
buy a commodity at lower prices than could richer consumers it appears 
quite possible that there might be a net gain in the sum total of 
satisfactions obtained by consumers from the consumption of the commodity" 
(110, pp. 34-35). Distribution of P.L. 480 commodities at differentiated 
prices may be one such means of improving consumer welfare while minimiz­
ing negative impacts on producers. 
The government controlled distribution system for P.L. 480 imports 
in India, the "fair price shop" system, has established a condition 
of price discrimination in the cereal market based on product differentia­
tion. Pricing cereal at the fair price shops below the open-market 
price has drawn some, but not all, consumers from the open market to 
the fair price market. Independently, this movement from one market to 
the other is not evidence of an increase in aggregate demand. In fact, 
it is evidence that demand in the open market has decreased (shifted to 
the left) since aggregate demand indicates various price-quantity 
relationships, given a specified number of consumers. Removing part of 
the consumers from the open market causes aggregate demand in that market 
to shift toward the origin because aggregation is over a smaller number 
of consumers, not because of any change in individual demand by the 
consumers remaining in the open market. The response of consumers who 
shift from the open market to the fair price market determines the 
magnitude of the net shift (increase) in demand. 
Every unit of cereal purchased from the fair price shop instead of 
the open market represents an increase in real income for consumers equal 
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to the price difference between the open market and the fair price market. 
Consumers allocate the additional income according to marginal preference 
so that from zero to 100 percent of the increase will be spent for food. 
At one limit, none of the increase in real income would be allocated 
for food purchases and fair price sales (in quantity) equal the reduction 
in quantity sold in the open market. Under these conditions open-market 
demand would shift to the left by an amount equal to the distribution of 
food aid, and the total demand would remain unchanged. However, due to 
the shift in supply resulting from the availability of food aid and an 
unchanged demand, trading would occur along the demand curve down to the 
intersection with the new supply curve where the quantity of food 
demanded would be greater than before P.L. 480 imports due to the 
lower prices. 
At the other limit, all of the additional real income would be 
allocated for food purchases in the fair price shops (implying a marginal 
propensity to consume food of 1.0) so that fair price purchases would 
be larger than the reduction in open-market sales by the ratio of open-
market price to fair price. Under these conditions open-market demand 
would shift to the left, but when the demand from the fair price shops 
is added to the open-market demand, the net shift would be to the right. 
Except where the fair price is zero, the demand shift will be less than 
the supply shift and a price adjustment would result in an increase in 
quantity demanded also. 
Consequently, when F.L. 480 commodities are distributed at a con­
cessional price, the distribution produces a real income effect for 
consumers and demand shifts accordingly to marginal allocation of income. 
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For this reason, as indicated in Figure 1 in Chapter 111, it is not 
necessary for prices to be depressed as severely for a new equilibrium 
to be reached as previous writers have indicated. In fact, if P.L. 
480 comnodities are distributed in such a manner that aggregate demand 
shifts by an amount exactly equal to the P.L. 480 imports, the price 
need not be depressed at all for a new equilibrium to exist. 
In an earlier study of the impact of commodity aid, an econometric 
model was developed to measure the Impact of P.L. 480 imports on the 
Indian economy (63, pp. 131-146). An implicit assumption underlying 
the model was that demand for F.L. 480 imports was homogeneous with 
demand for domestic comnodities and that F.L. 480 commodities entered 
the market in the same way as domestic production. Quite on the 
contrary, P.L. 480 commodities enter the market through the fair price 
shops at a fixed price, set below the open market price for domestic 
cereals. There is strong evidence, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, that the fair price system provides for market differentia­
tion, and in turn, expanded demand as a result of the real Income effect 
of the lower prices at the fair price shops. If the theoretical arguments 
presented by Fisher (31, pp. 863-867) and Waugh, Burtls, and Wolf 
(110, pp. 34-35) can be supported ençlrically, it must be concluded that 
previous analytical work which did not consider the real income effect 
on demand, but only a shift in supply, overestimated the negative Impact 
of P.L. 480 Imports on domestic prices and domestic production. For the 
same reason, the contribution of P.L. 480 imports to welfare in the 
t  
recipient country has been underestimated. 
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In the following sections a model Is developed to analyze the impact 
of P.L. 480 Imports on a recipient economy when market differentiation 
is used to distribute the commodities to consumers. The model is 
applied to Indian data and the results compared with previous estimates 
of P.L. 480 Impacts on prices and domestic production. 
A Model for Analyzing Market Differentiation 
A theoretical model 
To incorporate the concept of market differentiation into the 
analytical framework developed by Mann (63, pp. 131-146), it is necessary 
to add an additional equation to the system so that provision is made 
for cereal purchases on both the open market and through the fair price 
shops at concessional prices. Incorporating a second "demand" equation 
and modifying various other equations in the basic Mann model to reflect 
stronger causal relationships and improve their reliability, a model 
is specified by defining several a priori functional relationships which 
are presumed to exist as indicated on the basis of theoretical considera­
tions. The model includes (1) a supply equation, (2) an open-market 
demand equation, (3) a concessional market distribution equation, (4) an 
incmne equation, (5) a commercial import equation, (6) a withdrawal from 
stocks equation, and (7) an excess demand equation. The reduced form 
of the system of seven equations will provide estimates for the quantitative 
Impact of P.L. 480 shipments of cereal which are distributed through a 
concessional market arrangement. 
The quantity of cereal produced during the current year depends on 
production decisions, weather conditions, and available technology during 
122 
the previous growing season. In developing economies, producers' primary 
source of information with respect to market price is prices received 
for the previous crop. Consequently, if the quantity available for 
consumption in period t is a function of production during period t-1, 
and expected price is based on the price in the previous period, supply 
in period t is a function of price in t-2. 
The theoretical supply function is specified as 
< '  hK.2- \ .v  Tc-l)'  '"I 
where 
Q® is per capita quantity of cereal available from domestic 
production for consumption in period t, 
2 is an index of wholesale cereal price (deflated by a 
consumer price index for all commodities) in the period 
prior to production, 
^ is a rainfall index as a proxy for weather conditions 
during the producing season, and 
^ is cereal yield as a proxy for other factors affecting 
production such as adoption of technology. 
Formulating the open-market demand equation from microeconomic theory, 
quantity of cereal demanded is asstmied to be a function of cereal price, 
price of substitute commodities (other food) and income level. The demand 
equation is specified as 
where 
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is per capita quantity of cereal demanded in the open 
market for consumption in period t, 
is wholesale cereal price (deflated by a consumer price 
index) in period t,^ 
F^ is price of noncereal foods (deflated by a consumer price 
index) in period t, and 
is per capita consumer income (deflated by a consumer 
price index) in period t. 
Distribution of P.L. 480 imports through the fair price shops in 
India is a function of economic variables at the minimum level and a 
physical restraint at the upper level because of the fixed price 
offering. At least part of the consumers consider imported cereal an 
inferior commodity and will continue to purchase cereals on the open 
market even when there is a price differential between the open market 
and the concessional market. However, as the two prices diverge, more 
and more consumers are willing to substitute imported cereal for domestic 
cereal. Consequently, the demand for cereals through the fair price 
shops is a function of price at the concessional market, price of cereal 
in the open market as a substitute, and income level of consumers. At 
the upper limit, price adjustment can not serve as a balancing mechanism 
to equate demand with a limited supply because the price is fixed by the 
government and has been held relatively constant. Consequently, the 
upper limit on distribution through the fair price shops is the quantity 
^Strictly speaking the supply equation is formulated in terms of 
wholesale prices and the demand equation in terms of retail prices, but 
with an assumption about stable marketing margins, a demand function can 
be derived in terms of wholesale prices. 
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which the government chooses to release for distribution. Since the 
primary source of commodities for distribution through the fair price 
shops has been F.L. 480 imports, quantity of imports are entered in the 
concessional distribution equation as a proxy for the maximum quantity 
available for distribution. The concessional distribution equation is 
specified as 
where 
is per capita quantity of cereal distributed through the 
concessional market in period t, 
is predetermined cereal price charged In the concessional 
market (deflated by a consumer price index) in period t, 
is per capita quantity of concessional imports of 
cereal under F.L. 480 in period t, and the other variables 
are defined as above. 
In developing countries, the economy is usually predominately agri­
cultural so that production in the agricultural sector has a significant 
impact on aggregate income in the economy. The other dominate sector in 
India is the industrial sector. The third major source of income in 
India has resulted from government expenditure, particularly through the 
involvement of the government in financing development Investments. The 
income equation is specified as 
\ = '4®t' "t- =[) 4-4 
where 
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Is the value of per capita industrial output (deflated by 
a consumer price index), 
is per capita government expenditure (deflated by a 
consumer price index) in period t, and all other 
variables are defined as above. 
Commercial importing of cereal is handled through the government 
of India and is used as a policy instrument to relieve Inflationary 
pressure on food prices when domestic food shortages occur. As such, 
the government imports food to satisfy consumer demand, and commercial 
Imports of cereal are effectively a function of the same factors that 
determine the demand for cereal on the open market. The commercial 
Import equation is specified as 
< = 4.5 
where 
is per capita quantity of commercial Imports of cereal in 
period t, and the other variables are defined as above. 
Withdrawals from government stock provides a residual source of 
cereals to balance other government programs. As the government Increases 
internal procurement of domestic production to support prices, the need 
for withdrawals to control inflation of cereal prices and to satisfy 
other government demand (such as feeding military personnel and 
inhabitants of public institutions) decreases. In the opposite direction, 
as the government increases the availability of cereal for distribution 
through the fair price shops, withdrawals from government stock must 
increase if other sources of supply remain constant. Finally, commercial 
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and concessional imports are alternative sources for satisfying government 
demand for various programs, so that withdrawals from government stock 
are a function of the level of import activities. The withdrawal equation 
is defined as 
where 
is per capita net withdrawals of cereal from government 
stocks in period t, 
is per capita internal procurement of cereal by the 
government in period t, and the other variables are as 
defined above. 
The last equation is an excess demand or market Identity equation 
to close the system by forcing excess demand for cereal to equal zero 
and is specified as 
Qt + Qt - Qfc - "t • ^t " ^t " 4.7 
where the variables are all defined as above. 
The model consists of seven equations and sixteen variables. Since 
the purpose of this model is to evaluate the economic impact of F.L. 480 
imports on prices and domestic supply of cereal, certain variables are 
treated as given or predetermined outside the system. The predetermined 
or exogenous variables include T^ p', P^, C^, G^, P^_2» and 
Q^. The values for these variables are given at a particular point in 
time and are not subject to determination by the econometric model. The 
remaining seven variables, which include Q®, Q^, Q^, P®, Y^, mI^, and W^, 
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are the object of determination within the constraints of the model. 
These seven variables make up the set of jointly determined or endogenous 
variables for which estimates are desired. 
The seven structural equations provide the joint interactions of 
the variables in the system. To provide for independent examination 
and analysis of the jointly determined variables, the structural form is 
solved to obtain the reduced form where each dependent variable is 
uniquely defined as a function of the independent variables and the 
constraints of the system in the derived reduced form. 
Applying Johnston's procedure for determining identification,^ all 
seven equations are overidentified (55, pp. 250-251). Under conditions 
of overidentification, the two stage least squares method of regression 
will provide consistent and unbiased estimates of coefficients of the 
structural form (55, pp. 262-263). With estimates of the coefficients 
for  t h e  e n d o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  0  's) a n d  t h e  p r e d e t e r m i n e d  v a r i a b l e s  ( y ' s ) ,  
the reduced form coefficients can be derived as 
n = ^  r, 4.8 
where 
n is the matrix of reduced form coefficients, 
0 is the matrix of endogenous variable coefficients, and 
r is the matrix of predetermined variable coefficients. 
^The number of predetermined variables not in the equation (R**) 
must be equal or greater than the number of endogenous variables minus 
one included in the equation (G^ ) in order to be Identified. 
128 
An empirical model 
An empirical model was estimated using secondary data from India 
covering the years 1956 to 1967 inclusively. The data indices for 
consumer prices, cereal price, noncereal food price, and consumer price 
were taken from Brief on Indian Agriculture 1969 (91, Table 20). Data 
on midyear population, cereal production,^ and national income were 
taken from Economic Survey 1969-70 (49, pp. 61, 72). The data on net 
2 imports and P.L. 480 ing)orts were taken from Brief on Indian Agriculture 
1970 (92, Tables 15-17). Data on cereal withdrawals from government 
stocks, cereal demand, distribution of cereal throu^ the fair price 
shops, internal procurement of cereal, fair price for wheat, and 
industrial output were taken from Bulletin on Food Statistics (25, pp. 48, 
196, 250, 260). Rainfall and yield data was taken from the Economic 
and Political Weekly (22, p. A-166). Government expenditure data were 
taken from International Financial Statistics (52, p. 164). Units of 
measure used in the model were: kilograms for Q®, Q^, Q^, M°, W^, C^, 
and 2^; rupees for and G^; kilograms per hectare for T^ and indices 
for P^, R^_^, P^, P^, P^ g, and which do not have unit values. 
Two-stage least squares was used to estimate the coefficients of 
the structural equations except Equation 4.1. Since Equation 4.1 contains 
only one endogenous variable, ordinary least-squares was used to estimate 
the associated coefficients. 
Producation was adjusted downward by 12.5 percent to allow for feed, 
seed, and waste in calculating the amount available for consunq)tion (49, 
p. 72). 
eat and rice. 
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Writing each estimated equation with the normalized variable on the 
left-hand side and all other variables on the right-hand side provides 
an overview of the estimated structural model. The supply equation, 
Q® = -13.89343 + 0.09118 T_ , + 0.56808 R , + 0.24424 4.9 
t t-1 t-1 c-z 
has positive signs on all three independent variables indicating thàt 
supply of cereal (Q^) reacts positively to increases in the weather 
variables the proxy for technology (T^ ^ ), and price (P^ g)' 
The estimated price elasticity of supply at the means is 0.156 which 
coQipares with National Council of Applied Economics Research estimates 
of 0.22 for rice, 0.16 for wheat, and 0.16 for barley (51, p. 168). The 
2 
multiple R for the supply equation is 0.82 and the regression is 
significant at the 99 percent level. The open-market demand equation, 
= -10.54661 - 0.553321 P® + 0.72847 + 0.047698 Pj, 4.10 
has signs on all coefficients which agree with economic theory indicating 
that demand for cereal (Q^) is negatively correlated with price of 
cereal (P^) and positively correlated with the price of other food 
(P^) and income The estimated price elasticity of demand is 
-0.39 which is slightly hi^er than the N.C.Â.E.R. estimate of -0.34, but 
well between their estimate of -0.19 for rice and -0.73 for wheat (51, 
1 
An alternative formulation of the open-market demand equation was 
considered which included the price charged at the fair price shops, 
but the regression coefficient was insignificant even at the 50 percent 
level and did not Innove the multiple R^. Consequently, the concessional 
price was: excluded from the final equation. 
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2 
p. 80). The multiple R for the open-market demand equation is 0.89 and 
the regression is significant at the 99 percent level. The concessional 
market distribution equation, 
= 60.91986 + 0.289881 P® - 0.251656 Y. -
^ ^ ^ 4.11 
0.22217 pP + 0.89376 mJ, 
indicates that purchases at the concessional market (Q^) are positively 
correlated" with price of cereal in the open market (P^) and negatively 
correlated with income level (Y^) and price of cereal at the fair price 
shops (P^).^ The relatively large coefficient on supports the argument 
that distribution through the concessional market is highly correlated 
with imports under P.L. 480 contracts and the associated decision to 
make those commodities available for distribution through the fair price 
2 
shops. The multiple R is 0.90 and the regression is significant at 
the 99 percent level. The income equation, 
Y. = 118.91530 + 0.80042 Q® + 0.28386 qJ -
^ t t 4.12 
0.00092 G^, 
Indicates that Income (Y^) is positively correlated with agricultural 
(Q^) and industrial supply (Q^) but negatively correlated with government 
expenditure (G^). In examining the correlation matrix for the variables 
in the model, it was noted that government expenditure was positively 
^An alternative formulation of the concessional distribution equation 
Included price of other food, but the regression coefficient was insignifi­
cant even at the 50 percent level and caused the ratio of regression sum 
of squares to residual sum of squares to decrease. 
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Table 19. Correlation coefficients for government expenditure and 
income 
Government Deflated government 
expenditure expenditure 
Aggregate income .9625 .7633 
Per capita income .9515 .7483 
Deflated per capita income -.5568 -.2228 
correlated with both aggregate income and per capita income, but 
negatively correlated with deflated or real income. This indicates that 
although government expenditure increased money income, sufficient 
inflationary pressure on prices was created to force the consumer 
price index up faster than money income. As a consequence, government 
expenditures had a positive impact on money income, but a negative 
2 impact on real income for the period under study. The multiple R 
is 0.89 and the regression is significant at the 99 percent level. The 
commercial import equation, 
= 27.84666 + 0.09045 P^ - 0.14608 + 0.03172 P' 4.13 
indicates that imports vary inversely with per capita level (Y^) and 
C y 1 o 
directly with cereal prices (P^) and other food (P^). The multiple R 
is 0.77 and the regression is significant at the 99 percent level. 
The stocks equation. 
Alternative forms of the import equation were considered which 
included concessional imports and the ratio of cereal prices to other 
food prices, but regression coefficients for both were insignificant 
even at the 50 percent level. 
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W = -1.52758 + 0.97393 - 0.53062 M° -
*= ' ^ 4.14 
1.62118 - 0.89938 1^, 
indicates that withdrawals from government stock (W^) are directly 
related to distribution through the fair price shops (Q^), and inversely 
related to commercial imports (^), internal procurement (C^) and P.L. 
480 imports The multiple is 0.84 and the regression is 
significant at the 99 percent level. The identity equation, 
+ Q® - Q® - M° - Wt - = 0 4.15 
states that demand on the open market (Q^) plus distribution through 
c s 
the fair price shops (Q^) cannot exceed domestic supply (Q^) plus imports 
(M° and and withdrawals from government stocks (tf^). 
The coefficients from the reduced form of the system of equations, 
Table 20, which are of particular interest to this study, are those 
associated with variable or P.L. 480 inçorts. The coefficients, or 
impact multipliers, from the reduced form model indicate that increasing 
2 
P.L. 480 imports by one kilogram per capita would depress cereal prices 
by 0.1314 units of the price index but Increase demand by 0.0727 
kilograms per capita 0^2and concessional distribution by 0.8557 
^Alternative forms of the withdrawal equation were considered which 
included consumer demand factors such as prices of cereal and other 
food and income levels, but none of the regressions of this nature 
produced ratios of regression to residual sum of squares which exceed 
1.0, and consequently were insignificant. 
2 
In the last year of data used, the population of India was 
estimated at 511.3 million (49, p. 72) so that inq)orts of one kilogram 
per capita involves 511,300 metric tons of cereal. 
Table 20. Estimated reduced form coefficients to measure Impact of P.L. 480 imports on the 
Indian economy, 1956-1967 
Intercept Pg c{ 
Q® -13.8934 0.0912 0.5681 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2442 0.0 
QJ -5.9595 0.0847 0.5275 0.0168 0.0054 -1.5250 0.0727 0.0 0.2268 -0.0043 
Q° 7.2528 -0.0349 -0.2173 0.0162 -0.2250 0.7989 0.8557 -0.0001 -0.0934 0.0391 
133.6264 -0,0569 -0.3547 0.5578 -0.0098 2.7561 -0.1314 -0.0012 -0.1525 0.3815 
107.7947 0.0730 0.4547 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0009 0.1955 0.2839 
M° 24.1866 -0.0158 -0.0985 -0.0368 -0.0009 0.2493 -0.0119 0.0 -0.0424 -0.0070 
56.2758 -0.0256 -0.1593 -0.0038 -0.2189 -0.9754 -0.0597 -0.0001 -0.0685 0.0418 
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kilograms per capita so that 92.84 percent of the increase in P.L. 
480 imports would result in increased consumption. In other words, each 
ton of cereal imported by India has resulted in increased consumption of 
0.93 tons. As an example, the data indicates that P.L. 480 imports for 
1967 (4.055 million metric tons) increased consumption by 3.771 million 
metric tons or about 7.38 kilograms per capita for the year. Associated 
with a one kilogram per capita increase in P.L. 480 imports was a 0.0119 
kilogram decrease in commercial imports and a -0.0597 kilogram 
(n^y) withdrawal from government stocks. Due to the time lag in supply 
response, supply is unaffected in period t. 
In summary, a one unit increase in P.L. 480 imports in India 
between 1956 and 1967 was associated with a decrease of 0.0119 units of 
commercial imports for a net increase in supply of 0.9881 units. The 
increase in supply resulted in an additional 0.0727 units being demanded 
on the open market, an additional 0.8557 units being demanded from the 
fair price shops, and 0.0597 units of accumulation in government buffer 
stocks. The new equilibrium price was reduced by 0.1314 units on a 
price index with a mean of 89.12, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent. 
To measure the price impact in succeeding years, it is necessary 
to use an interim multiplier which, for price in this model, equals 
where p-0, 2, 4, ... because of the two-year lag between P^ and 
P^_2 (63, p. 139). Therefore, the interim multiplier for cereal price 
would be 0.020039 in the second year, -0.003056 in the fourth year, 
and 0.000466 in the sixth year. The first interim multiplier represents 
a change of less than three hundredths of 1 percent using the mean value 
of the price index, and the multiplier values in succeeding years are 
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essentially zero. 
The impact on supply is measured by the interim multiplier 
^ where p=2, 4, ... because of the time lag of price 
impact on production (63, p. 141). Evaluated at p=2 to measure the 
impact of a change in price during the period where F.L. 480 imports 
occur upon production two periods later, the interim multiplier is 
-0.032088. In other words, each ton per capita of cereal which was 
supplied through F.L. 480 to India has depressed domestic production by 
0.032088 tons per capita during the production season two years later. 
Similarly, at p=4, the multiplier would be 0.004893 so that P.L. 480 
imports of one ton of cereal would result in 0.004893 tons per capita 
of increased cereal production. At p=6 the multiplier is again negative 
at -0.000746. In quantity terms at the mean population of India for 
the period under consideration (450,480 million), P.L. 480 imports of 
450,480 metric tons (one kilogram per capita) of cereal are estimated 
to have depressed domestic production by 14,455 metric tons two years 
later, increased production by 2,204 metric tons four years later and 
depressed production by 336 metric tons six years later. 
The net impact on supply is most accurately measured by the sum of 
the interim multipliers over several years. Each kilogram of P.L. 480 
cereal imported is estimated to have depressed production by 0.027841 
kilograms so that for each kilogram per capita (450,480 metric tons) 
production was depressed by 12,600 metric tons over a twelve year period 
with the major impact coming as a result of the first and second price 
change. 
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Table 21. Total effect of P.L. 480 Imports on domestic production 
in India 
Year Interim multiplier Sum of interim multipliers 
2 -0.032088 -0.032088 
4 0.004893 -0.027195 
6 -0.000746 -0.027941 
8 0.000114 -0.027827 
10 -0.000017 -0.027844 
12 0.000003 -0.027841 
Summary 
The model which has been developed and evaluated above is unique 
from previous attempts to evaluate the Impact of F.L. 480 imports on 
the recipient econony in that is explicitly considers the case where 
F.L. 480 imports are distributed to consumers in such a manner that a 
demand shift occurs as well as a shift in total supply.^ As a consequence 
of recognizing the shift in demand as well as supply, the impact of F.L. 
480 on domestic supply is estimated to be less than 9 percent of the 
magnitude estimated by Mann (63, p. 143) when he assumed only a shift 
in supply. In contrast to a reduction in domestic supply of 12,600 
metric tons estimated above, Mann's interim multiplier implies a negative 
impact of 143,200 metric tons on domestic supply over 12 years. 
^or a price elasticity of demand of -0.39, a decrease in price of 
0.1314 implies a change in quantity demanded of 0.07227 kilograms per 
capita if adjustment were along the demand curve as compared to the 
actual increase of 0.9284 kilograms per capita which implies a shift in 
demand. 
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From an application standpoint, the conclusions of the above analysis 
Indicate that the negative impact of P.L. 480 on domestic prices and 
supply can be significantly reduced if the commodities are distributed 
in the recipient economy in a way which creates new demand rather than 
substituting or competing with the existing demand. The analysis 
indicates that distribution through fair price shops in India has 
provided for Increased consumption amounting to 93 percent of the amount 
imported. Since fair price shop distribution is at a lower price than 
the local market price, distribution through these shops has increased 
consumer welfare by increasing consumption and lowering price. At the 
same time the distribution of P.L. 480 commodities has depressed 
domestic prices in the open market by only about two hundredths of 1 
percent. 
P.L. 480 imports of one kilogram per capita have provided an 
additional supply of about 450,000 metric tons from which the domestic 
supply reduction of 12,600 metric tons must be deducted to calculate 
a net short-run Increase in supply of about 437,000 metric tons while 
depressing prices by less than two hundredths of 1 percent. On this 
basis, importing P.L. 480 cereal in India has increased net supply by 
97 percent of each unit imported. 
Alternatives for Expanding Demand 
Through Market Differentiation 
Providing food commodities to consumers at a concessional price, 
below market price. Improves the welfare of the consumer by increasing 
his potential for consuming goods and services. In general, food aid 
has an impact similar to cash welfare payments because it increases 
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consumer income or resource endowment and allows demand for consumer 
goods to increase. With food aid the consumer can still consume all of 
the commodities previously choosen and be able to consume additional 
commodities as well. He probably will wish to increase total food 
consumption less than the amount of food aid by reallocating part of 
his previous food budget to other commodities. The consumer will not 
choose to reallocate so much of his food budget that he reduces his 
total food consumption below previous levels because this suggests that 
he was irrational in allocating his original budget. The reallocation 
of income to purchase other items indicates that the consumer will 
demand more of each commodity, including food, at the same price and 
hence a shift in demand rather than a movement along a given demand 
curve. If the presence of the food aid commodities in the economy 
produce a food price decline, the consumer may also choose to expand his 
food consumption, but in this case the adjustment will be along a given 
demand curve rather than a shift of the demand curve. As a result, 
distribution of food aid may increase the demand for food either through 
a shift in demand or a downward movement along the demand curve. 
Experiences with U.S. programs 
As in the case of surplus disposal legislation which preceded P.L. 
480, concepts and principles can be drawn from operational experiences 
with welfare programs in the U.S. which provide a basis for developing 
distribution programs for food aid in recipient countries. Two basic 
programs, direct distribution and food stamp plans, have been used in the 
U.S. to expand demand of low income groups. As described in Chapter II, 
direct distribution of food to the needy originated under the authorization 
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of Section 32 of the Agricultural Act of 1935. Direct distribution 
was designed to serve two primary objectives: (a) to remove commodities 
from government stocks which had been accumulated by the government 
through price support activities, and (b) to provide food commodities 
to needy families to help improve their level of welfare. 
The original food stamp program began in 1939 with similar objectives 
which included: (a) expansion of effective demand for farm products, 
(b) distribution of food to undernourished families, and (c) utilization 
of the existing marketing channels to distribute food. The food stamp 
plan, as operated in the U.S., has utilized regular retail outlets for 
distributing the food rather than requiring special food lines or 
distribution centers. 
From the standpoint of administrative costs, complete data is not 
available to evaluate the total costs of both programs, but some reasonable 
conclusions can be drawn from the operational knowledge of the two programs. 
In both cases, consumers who are eligible to participate in the programs 
must be identified so there should be no major cost difference in this 
aspect of the programs. In contrast it is likely that purchasing, 
processing, storage, and distribution of food will cost considerably 
more for direct distribution through special centers than the comparative 
costs of printing, distribution, and redemption of stamps for the food 
stamp program which operates through retail distribution stores. Con­
sequently, "marketing costs" per unit of food would be considerably higher 
for direct distribution than a stamp plan (46, p. 2). 
To evaluate the comparative efficiency of the two programs, several 
factors must be considered. To achieve efficient allocation of resources 
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from a consumer's standpoint, the distribution program should allow a 
consiimer to express his personal tastes and preferences given a set of 
market prices. In particular, the last dollar spent on each class of 
goods should provide the same satisfaction to the consumer for all 
classes of goods. 
Relative to cash welfare payments, direct distribution restricts 
consumer freedom. If the food items given to the consumer are items 
which he would otherwise choose to purchase, the direct distribution is 
essentially the same as a cash payment because it frees funds for 
reallocation to other items of the consumer's choice. In contrast 
the food stamp plan establishes levels of expenditure which must be 
made to qualify for the program, usually above preprogram expenditures. 
Food stamps allow for expression of preference in choosing the mix 
of various food commodities which is desired, but do not allow for 
freedom of allocation between food and nonfood classes. 
On the basis of work incentive, the direct distribution program 
provides for no variation in the value of commodities distributed as 
income rises, and consequently has no disincentive effect within the 
range of participation (46, p. 3). At the limit of qualification for 
participation in the distribution program, the disincentive is substantial 
because of the "all or nothing" basis of the program. The food stamp 
program is administered with a steady decline in value of food stamps 
provided as income increases so that the net gain from additional income 
is less than the total gain by the amount of food stamps given up. The 
food stamp plan has a constant disincentive factor for additional work, 
but does not have the abrupt disincentive at the upper limit of 
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participation which is embodied in the direct distribution program. 
Consequently, the two programs have greatest similarity and lack of 
disincentive at low income levels. 
From a balanced nutrition standpoint, the two programs differ 
significantly in potential and actual achievement. Direct distribution 
provides little freedom of choice and puts the burden of balancing 
the diet on consumers ' remaining resources or the administrators of 
the program who determine the mix of food commodities which will be 
distributed. Assuming the recipient has no other resources to 
allocate for consumption, the nutritional considerations rest with 
the program administrators. The potential exists for a balanced diet 
to be provided with the consumer having little opportunity to misallocate 
resources and avoid a diet of nutritional balance unless the recipient 
wastes or sells part of the commodity bundle. In practice, however, 
commodities have often been selected for distribution on the basis of 
their status as surplus stocks rather than their contribution to balancing 
the diet of the recipients. 
On the other hand, the food stamp plan provides the opportunity for 
the recipient to choose among a wide range of food products and achieve 
a balanced diet. The same freedom provides the opportunity for misallocation 
of resources and consumption of a diet far from nutritional balance. The 
extent to which administration of the program allows for determination 
of the commodities which are made available, and the extent to which 
nutritional standards are to be imposed on the recipient, determine the 
rating of the two programs from the standpoint of achieving adequate diets. 
As alternatives to the current welfare programs which involve 
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distribution of food commodities, Hoover and Maddox have suggested three 
types of food stamp programs (46, pp. 7, 34). The three programs include 
(a) a fixed purchase plan, (b) a free stamp program, and (c) a variable 
purchase plan. The fixed purchase plan would provide sufficient free 
stamps to families who are without income to allow for the purchase of 
a nutritionally adequate diet. Families with incones less than 3.33 
times the cost of a minimum diet would receive some free stamps in 
addition to the purchased stamps. To the extent that the minimum 
expenditure on food would be lowered from 40 percent to 30 percent, the 
program would provide for greater freedom of allocation between food 
and nonfood conmodities for families with some income. At the same time 
the stamp plan would provide greater consumer freedom of choice than 
direct distributions. 
The free stamp plan would give enough free stamps to families or 
individuals below a specified poverty line to purchase an adequate diet. 
Individuals or families above the poverty level would receive a smaller 
amount of free stamps on a graduated scale until the amount of stamps 
diminished to zero at some specified higher income level. The free stamp 
plan would again provide for considerable consumer freedom of choice. 
Free stamps could expand demand beyond the quantity which would be 
purchased if cash payments were made, but this becomes a question of 
comparing a gain in individual consumer welfare with a loss in welfare 
for the society as a whole resulting from the misallocation of resources. 
Greater participation would be anticipated under the free stamp plan than 
the fixed purchase plan because no specified private expenditure of 
income is required for participation in the program. 
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The variable purchase plan is similar to the fixed purchase plan 
in that stamps must be purchased for families above a specified poverty 
level. As in the fixed purchase plan, stamps would be given to families 
below the poverty line. Above the poverty line stamps would be available 
at varying rates per dollar of face value depending on the income level 
of the recipient with the scale going from zero to $1.00 as income 
increased. Under this plan, the consumer could choose the amount of 
stamps desired rather than being faced with an all or nothing package. 
As with the preceding plans, the variable purchase plan would allow 
for expression of consumer choice in selecting the desired food bundle, 
but also provide maximum freedom in choice between food and nonfood 
commodities. If stamps are sold rather than given away, the misallocation 
of resources would be minimized. Maximum consumer choice could be 
exercised under the variable purchase program so that the anticipated 
participation would be greater than under a fixed purchase plan but 
less than the free stamp plan. Sale of stamps above a specified poverty 
line would further reduce the cost of the variable purchase plan so that 
a choice between it and the free stamp plan as possible distribution 
plans would rest on the relative weights of participation as opposed 
to cost and efficiency of resource allocation. 
Applications for developing countries 
The two distribution programs which have been utilized in the U.S. 
to provide welfare benefits to low income recipients and expand the 
consumption of food, provide a model for developing differentiated markets 
in developing countries. The essence of supplying food aid is to Increase 
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consumer welfare without having a negative isQ>act on producer welfare 
through depressed prices of agricultural commodities. One method of 
accomplishing both objectives is to achieve sufficient market differentia­
tion so that price discrimination can be practiced in distributing P.L. 
480 imports without replacing existing effective demand. Realistically 
this can only be guaranteed when food is distributed to consumers having 
no income so that there can be no reallocation of income which would have 
been spent on food to purchase other commodities. 
In practice the development of a differentiated market can be 
expected to compete for some of the existing effective demand, so that 
the objective is to satisfy a demand which is supplementary to the 
existing demand. In the U.S. the direct distribution programs have 
basically achieved increased consumption and consumer welfare because 
of the very low income levels of recipients to whom food was supplied. 
The same program applied to higher income recipients could have been much 
more ccmpetltive with the existing demand for food because of income 
reallocation, and consequently a smaller increase in total food 
consumption. 
A similar response with respect to Income levels can be expected 
in the developing countries. Distribution of food to very low Income 
consumers in India, Pakistan, Korea, or other developing countries should 
expand total food consumption by an amount close to the quantity of food 
distributed. If P.L. 480 imports are distributed to consumers, and if 
total consunq>tion of food expands by a similar amount, then imports 
should increase consumer welfare while having little impact on domestic 
prices and supply. As in the U.S., the lower the Income level of the 
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recipients, the less chance there would be for the additional connodltles 
to compete with domestic commodities. 
Direct distribution has had the characteristic in the U.S. and 
would have in a developing country of limiting consumer choice in 
selection of a desired food bundle. This characteristic could be 
capitalized upon in two particular cases. In the case of illiterate 
consumers, supplying food in a fixed bundle lAlch was nutritionally 
balanced:would provide a means to achieve nutritionally adequate diets 
where the ability does not exist to do so by free choice. A second 
situation which would lend Itself to direct distribution is where a 
particular commodity or class of food is in short supply such as high 
protein foods. In this case, even though there was a limitation on 
consumer'choice, there presumably would be little objection to a 
distribution program to supplement existing diets and bring them up a 
level of balanced nutrition. 
With recipients who have a minimal level of income, but need 
additional income to provide an acceptable minimum standard of living, 
the food stamp plans probably offer more potential for expanding food 
consumption in the developing countries while avoiding negative price 
impacts of direct distribution program. First, the stamp plans provide 
for freedom of consumer choice in filling the food basket. Secondly, a 
stamp plan for distribution of P.L. 480 imports througjh the retail stores 
would simultaneously provide for ing»roved consumer welfare and a stimulus 
for developing the marketing distribution system. 
Stamp plans can provide for differentiated product preferences by 
providing various numbers of different classes of stamps to the consumers. 
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If the consumers In the recipient countries visualize P.L. 480 imports 
as inferior to the local commodities, two classes of stamps could be 
used so that one could be redeemed only for the purchase of P.L. 480 
commodities while the other is good for all food commodities. For use 
with illiterate recipients it should be easy to color code the stamps 
and commodities so that color association is all that is necessary to 
distinguish between commodity groups. 
A food stamp plan such as the variable purchase plan discussed 
earlier would not provide a disincentive for the recipients to work and 
thus create a chronic welfare problem. The variable purchase plan would 
also require a minimum amount of government subsidy for operation, and 
make the government costs primarily a function of the extent to which 
it chooses to subsidize recipient income. 
The fair price shop distribution used in India and analyzed in the 
first part of this chapter represents still another means of differentiat­
ing the market. The principle behind the fair price shops and their use 
is that the F.L. 480 imports which are distributed through them are, at 
least in the eyes of some Indian consumers, a different product than the 
domestic cereals sold on the open market. As such, a lower price can 
be charged at the fair price shops for wheat, rice, and other cereals 
without experiencing a complete substitution of concessional purchases 
for open-market purchases. 
Distribution of food through the fair price shops has had some 
negative impact on prices in the open market as the result of part of 
each unit of P.L. 480 cereal (0.1443 units) finding its way into competition 
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with domestic commodities.^ In India, the distribution of P.L. 480 
commodities through the fair price shops is estimated to have resulted 
in a net income in food consumption equal to about 93 percent of the 
concessional imports. Over 85 percent of the P.L. 480 commodities reach 
consumers through the fair price shops without competing with domestic 
commodities. The remaining 8 percent is purchased by consumers who 
replace their open-market demand with purchases from the fair price 
shops, shifting the open-market demand curve co the left. 
The fair price shop method of distribution allows maximum freedom 
of choice for consumers with an income. Pricing commodities below open-
market price provides a welfare aspect to the distribution of P.L. 480 
commodities, but not nearly as much as direct distribution or stamp 
programs. The fair price distribution functions on the basis of an 
effective market demand so that it represents a secondary marketing 
system based on a differentiated product and reduced prices. Because 
the distribution method does not involve an income subsidy as large as 
the other programs discussed, costs of operation would be limited to 
procurement of the P.L. 480 commodities, operation of the fair price 
shops, and a price differential between P.L. 480 contract price and fair 
price shop price. 
Unless the fair price shop system is to be developed as a means of 
increasing employment, it appears that program costs could be reduced 
The amount of P.L. 480 commodities which compete in the open market 
is indicated by the deviation of the value of 11 _ (Table 20) from 
unity. 
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even more If the retail marketing system is utilized to distribute P.L. 
480 commodities under the same price control policies exercised in the 
fair price shop. Allowing the commodities to be distributed on the 
basis of effective demand, at a reduced price, would minimize administra­
tive costs associated with identifying and distributing food or stamps 
to needy families. On the other hand, use of the fair price distribution 
alone would not provide the opportunity to deal with individuals or 
families without sufficient income to purchase an adequate diet even if 
all their income is used to purchase low priced P.L. 480 commodities. 
Summary 
Three major programs or plans have been discussed as possible 
methods of expanding consumption of P.L. 480 commodities while minimizing 
negative impacts of the increase in total supply of cereals on prices 
and production. As Abel and Cochrane have pointed out, attaining sizable 
increases in food consumption through direct distribution or concessional 
pricing is costly and requires justification on nutritional or welfare 
considerations (1, p. 63). For the case of P.L. 480 distributions, the 
welfare considerations must include both consumers and producers. 
Direct distribution provides the greatest administrative control 
over the food bundle provided, but for the same reason, provides the 
least freedom of choice for the consumer. Direct distribution could be 
particularly effective when dealing with illiterate recipients who lack 
the knowledge to select a combination of commodities which will provide 
a nutritionally balanced diet. Administrative costs of the program would 
be relatively high because of the food handling involved and the effort 
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necessary to identify needy recipients and the quantity of food they are 
to receive. 
A variable purchase stamp plan would allow for the welfare aspect 
of subsidizing income while reducing the cost of administration by 
handling stamps instead of food commodities. Secondly, the distribution 
can be designed to utilize the established marketing system and stimulate 
the development of this sector of the economy as a beneficial side 
effect. Costs of a stamp plan could be controlled primarily by the 
amount of income subsidy desired for welfare purposes. 
A fair price distribution program operated in conjunction with the 
retail marketing system would provide the least administrative control 
over the food bundle consumers chose, but allow the consumer maximum 
freedom of choice. Because of the lack of income subsidy, controlled 
price distribution would involve the lowest administrative costs of the 
three programs. 
A combination of a variable purchase stamp program and a controlled 
price distribution program could be utilized to achieve the miniminn cost 
distribution for the bulk of the P.L. 480 commodities and still provide 
for a welfare program which could be operated at various levels at the 
government's option. The combination program would capitalize on the 
market differentiation necessary to minimize the negative Impact on 
domestic prices and production as demonstrated in the previous econometric 
model. 
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CmPIER V. DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND THE IMPACT OF FOOD AID 
The two previous chapters have examined the effect of distributing 
food aid to consumers in recipient countries under alternative conditions 
to Improve consumer welfare while avoiding or minimizing negative Impacts 
on domestic prices and production. This chapter analyzes cases where 
even greater increases in consumer welfare are desired. Recognizing 
that increased gains for consumers will magnify negative Impacts on 
prices and food supply, efficient use of food aid becomes a problem of 
compensating domestic producers for depressed prices and loss of income 
resulting from activities designed to achieve lnq>roved consumer welfare. 
The use of food aid to Improve producer welfare is less direct 
than its use to improve consumer welfare. For producer welfare, 
food aid can be used directly to increase agricultural productivity 
through development projects. It can also be sold and the revenue used 
to Increase availability of factors of production or subsidize producers' 
Income. The impact of food aid on the economy is tied closely to the 
distribution methods used and the characteristics of those particular 
methods. In the following section, factors which determine distribution 
methods and specific intacts associated with those methods will be 
examined. 
Contracting and Distribution of P.L. 480 Commodities 
Under F.L. 480 as amended in 1966, food aid is supplied to developing 
countries under one of three Titles. Title I agreements Involve 
government-to-govemment sales for cash or long-term credit, repayable 
in either local currency or dollars. Title II agreements involve both 
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government-to-govenment and relief organization grants for emergency 
relief and economic development programs. Title III agreements are 
government-to-government trading of food for materials and services. 
Under each Title the ultimate distribution of the commodities to 
consumers provides an opportunity for selective distribution to specific 
classes of consumers characterized by different income levels and 
physical ability to work. The three primary distribution methods 
include grants, wages-in-kind, and open market sales. Although any or 
all of these Titles can be used, certain combinations or sets may be 
preferred for a given situation. In case of Famine relief the U.S. 
has frequently contracted food under Title II agreements which in turn 
allow the recipient country to give the commodities to consumers on 
a grant basis. In contrast, when the recipient country proposes a 
grant program, but the U.S. will not contract Title II commodities, the 
recipient country is forced to assume an immediate liability by 
supplying materials and services under Title III or a long-term liability 
under Title I. If Title I or Title III commodities are supplied to 
consumers on a grant basis by a recipient government, liquidation of 
the liability may be difficult and indirect at best. 
Under certain circumstances the U.S. will supply commodities for 
work projects under any of the three Titles. Work projects may be used 
as emergency relief lAen capable workers are available to supply labor 
in return for wages-in-kind. In such case, the U.S. may contract food 
under Title II to ease famine, provide emergency relief, or promote 
economic development. Work projects do not automatically qualify for 
Title II commodities since they are not necessarily associated with 
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emergency situations set forth in Title II. Work projects are an effective 
way of utilizing a large labor supply which is willing to accept wages-
in-kind. Consequently, it may be necessary to contract for the food 
under Title I or Title III. Title I contracts for long-term credit are 
particularly compatible with work projects since the projects are often 
of a social overhead investment nature and associated with long, indirect 
payoffs. 
Commodities for open market sales may be contracted under all three 
Titles. In cases where short-run emergencies arise, but income levels 
are not a crucial problem. Title II contracts may be used to supply 
commodities which will be distributed through normal market channels. 
However, there has been considerable reluctance on the part of the U.S. 
to contract on this basis since the recipient government generates 
revenue from the sale of the commodities without assuming any significant 
liability. Title I and Title III sales more nearly satisfy the intent 
of F.L. 480 contracting when normal market procedures are used to distribute 
the commodity aid. 
Alternative Distribution Methods 
and Their Characteristic Effects 
Although several alternatives exist for contracting food aid from 
the U.S., the primary intact which it has on the recipient econony 
depends on the distribution methods used* These in turn are closely 
related to the specific consumer group which is reached and the extent 
to which productive resources are activated. Considerable similarity 
exists between the three distribution methods most widely used for F.L. 
480 commodities in recipient countries—grants, wages-in-kind, and open 
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market sales--and those used In the U.S. Grants for emergency relief or 
welfare benefits to low income families are similar to the direct distri­
bution programs used in the U.S. Wages-in-kind programs are similar to 
the stang) plans since both are designed to distribute coimnodities at 
some cost to the consumer. On work projects the recipient is required 
to work in order to receive food or other commodities which is similar 
to a food stamp plan where the recipient is required to pay a percent 
of his income to participate in the program. The value of commodities 
the work project recipient receives determines the extent to which wages-
in-kind tend toward an income subsidy. Open market sales fall into 
the concessional sales groups discussed in Chapter IV. Depending on 
the price charged for the P.L. 480 commodities as compared with the 
price of similar domestic commodities, sales througjh retail markets 
may or may not have a concessional aspect. 
Grants and donations of food commnHifioa 
Distribution of food aid through grant programs has primarily been 
used to supply food to a broad class of consumers -v^ich are incapable 
of supplying labor to earn cash wages or wages - in-kind. The primary 
recipients! are children, pregnant women, senior citizens, and the 
handicapped. As a group, these recipients are normally characterized 
by very low incomes so that their marginal propensity to consume food 
would approach 1.0. As a result of the high preference for additional 
food, grants of food would have little impact upon demand for nonfood 
items. Because the recipient group is physically incapable of supplying 
labor, distribution through grants to this group has no direct impact 
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on domestic supply of agricultural or industrial commodities. In the 
short run food grants shift the total food supply (domestic production 
plus concessional inçorts) to the right by an amount equal to the food 
aid, but since the food is given directly to the consumers, the grants 
also shift demand to the right by a similar amount.^ 
A simplified partial equilibrium model can be developed to evaluate 
the ing)act of supply and demand shifts (42, p. 49) in analyzing the 
aggregate inq>act of various distribution methods on market conditions 
for food. In the model, demand is specified as a function of price (P) 
and a coefficient (b) representing the impact of all other variables 
on demand; e is the price elasticity of demand. 
Qj = bP® 5.1 
Similarly, supply is specified as a function of price and a coefficient 
(c) representing the impact of all other variables on supply; 
Qg = cP® 5.2 
e is the price elasticity of supply. The equilibrium price which will 
equate supply and demand is derived by setting the supply and demand 
F -F 
Pj = b^c ^ 5.3 
The shift in supply results from adding a given quantity of 
imported commodities to the domestic supply. The shift in demand results 
from the distribution of commodities, which have real value for resale 
or replacement of commodities which would otherwise be purchased, to 
consumers. The increase in resource endowment or real income results 
in a shift in the demand curves of consumers receiving the grants. 
Summing over all consumers for the aggregate demand curve, aggregate 
demand shifts also. 
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equations equal and solving for price.^ Substituting Equation 5.3 Into 
either Equation 5.1 or 5.2 provides the equilibrium quantity where 
supply 
5.4a 
or 
= b^®c^"^® 5.4b 
and demand are equal. The impact of a shift in supply and/or demand 
on the equilibrium price and quantity is derived by multiplying Equations 
2 
5.1 and 5.2 by shift factors and recalculating price and quantity. 
Using r as the shift factor for demand and i|r as the shift factor for 
supply, the new equilibrium price is 
Pg = (rb)S(*c)"S, 5.5 
so the relationship between new and old price is 
^o simplify the manipulation of future equations, -§ Is defined 
to equal (e-e) 
^he multiplicative logrlthmlc form of supply and demand functions 
were used for ease of solution in the simplified model. Although food 
aid is additive along the two functions as a constant rather than multi­
plicative as a relative change, the two forms will not differ significantly 
in value around equilibrium. If K is defined as the quantity of food aid 
imported, and $ is defined as 1.0 plus the fraction K divided by the 
eqiulibrium quantity of supply, (cP®)t will not differ significantly from 
cP^ + K for adjustments around equilibrium. At equilibrium cP^ijf will 
equal cP® + K. At prices above equilibrium, cP^t Is slightly greater 
than cP® + K; below equilibrium cP^iJf is slightly less than cP® + K. 
Similar logic applies to the demand function. 
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Pg = 5.6 
The new equilibrium quantity is 
Qg = (b (c*)-5e 5.7a 
or 
Qg = (bT)^® (c*)l-Se 
and the relationship between the new and old quantity is 
or 
Qg = (T^® Qy 5.8b 
For analysis, assume that food aid grants which amount to 5 percent 
of the domestic supply at the previous equilibrium are provided to 
a group of low income consumers with marginal propensity to consume 
food at or near 1.0. With the magnitude of the horizontal shift in 
supply equal to 5 percent, ^  takes a value of 1.05. Assuming that the 
P.L. 480 commodities have a market value equal to the domestic commodities, 
the horizontal shift in the demand curve resulting from a change in 
income is equal to 1.0 plus the marginal propensity to consume food 
times (ijr - 1.0).^ With marginal propensity to consume equal to or near 
^If P.L. 480 commodities are valued below similar domestic products, 
the income effect will be less than the shift in supply so that it would be 
appropriate to modify the definition of the demand shift by multiplying 
(footnote continued on next page) 
5.7b 
5.8a 
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1.0 for this group, 
r = 1.0 + 5.9 
food grants would increase demand by an amount equal to the additional 
supply, and ^  would also be of the magnitude of 1.05. When T is equal 
to there is no change in price because the new supply and demand are 
just equal at the old price. 
Consequently, with very low income consumers receiving food grants, 
the impact of food aid on the econony would be negligible. The 
additional food supply in the market system has little effect because 
the income effect of the grants motivates consumers to increase their 
demand by a similar amount. As a result of an equal shift in supply 
and demand, there would be no price effect to stimulate additional demand 
for domestic food and likewise no price effect to disrupt domestic 
supply. With the strong preference for food, grant recipients would 
not trade away any significant amount of food for nonfood items so there 
would be no effect on demand for output from the industrial sector. With 
no change in prices or domestic supply, there would be no effect on 
income in either the agricultural or industrial sector aside from the 
increase in income realized by the grant recipients. From a welfare 
standpoint, the grants would have an immediate impact by increasing food 
consunq)tion for the recipients, but would have no lasting positive impact 
after the grants were discontinued. Upon termination of the grants, total 
(footnote continued from previous page) t by the ratio of P.L. 480 prices 
to domestic prices, redefining F = 1.0 + MPC (^r - 1.0) (Pp ^  48o/^dom?" 
r is derived from F - 1.0 = MPC (j - 1.0) which implies F = 1.0 + MPC 
(4 - 1.0). 
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supply would shift back to the domestic and commercial import level. The 
loss of income in the form of food grants would likewise shift the 
effective demand back to the levels which existed before the availability 
of the grants. The only lasting effect of the grants would be the 
investment in human capital. Supplying the grants could improve nutri­
tional levels of recipients and potentially contribute to the development 
of a productive resource, labor, which would ultimately contribute to 
increased domestic output. 
The relationship between nutrition and productivity has been cited 
for several countries as a part of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign 
(33, pp. 13-25). Coal miners of the Ruhr district in Germany demonstrated 
increased productivity of up to 13 percent for a 10 percent increase 
in calories. A group of railroad construction workers in the U.S. 
increased output 22 percent for a 10 percent increase in calories. 
Providing rations to South African miners of approximately 4500 calories 
per day increased productivity more than adequately to compensate for 
the additional cost. In Ruanda Urundi one cooked meal per day supplied 
to workers was sufficient to increase productivity by 30 percent. In 
Zanzibar well balanced meals for the workers increased productivity more 
than enough to pay for the added cost even though the meals increased 
labor cost by 50 percent. The availability of liberal diets for rubber 
plantation workers in Viet Nam increased productivity by 50 percent. 
Srivastava cites an Indian study which estimated a 2.27 percent increase 
in worker productivity for a 1.0 percent increase in calorie intake 
(73, p. 97). 
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These examples deal with the productivity of labor as engaged 
directly in the production of goods or services. As such the impact 
of additional food is measured as an increase in labor units or as 
increased productivity of each unit, depending on the way labor is 
measured in the production process. In all of these examples, increased 
productivity of workers already employed was being considered. However, 
in most developing countries with a sizable portion of the total labor 
force imeioployed, food aid is programmed not as a means of expanding 
the output of the work force, but to reach unemployed or underemployed 
laborers^ and when possible to bring them into production in such a 
way as to contribute to development. Although food aid could be used 
to contribute to increased labor productivity, the examples used in 
this study will assume an excess of labor so that eng)hasis is on 
increasing employment opportunities rather than labor productivity. 
It is assumed that labor provided in exchange for food aid is utilized 
in social overhead investment projects to develop resource supply or 
improve resource quality rather than direct engagement in the production 
of goods or services as demanded by the consumer. 
In general, the impact of increased labor productivity can be 
summarized as follows. If labor productivity increased and economic 
distribution of the gain is based on productivity, workers will receive 
higjher incomes. Assuming a positive rate of profit retention or savings 
so that increased expenditure is less than marginal value product, supply 
will shift to the right more than demand, resulting in lower prices. The 
lower price level represents an increase in real income level and 
consumer welfare. At the same time the lower prices would have a negative 
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impact on domestic production in future periods, depending on the supply 
elasticity of producers. 
Although food grants have traditionally been supplied to consumers 
at extremely low income levels, grant programs could be designed to 
reach consumers who already have some minimum level of income, say the 
$75 per year used in the discussion of consumption patterns in Chapter 
III. For this group the marginal propensity to consume food was estimated 
at 0.55. Estimates of price elasticities are conspicuously absent from 
the development literature. The best estimates of reasonable values 
for price elasticities result from piecemeal data in the literature 
combined with known relationships which constitute consumer theory. 
Considerable reliance has been placed on the working assumption that 
the sum of the price elasticity, income elasticity, and cross-price 
elasticity is equal to zero (64, p. 71).^ Mellor argues that at low 
income levels, price elasticity and income elasticity of demand for food 
will be very close in absolute value because, although the cross-price 
elasticity of food demand with nonfood demand will be very small, it is 
unlikely that it will be negative (64, p. 72). Consequently, price 
elasticity will be equal to or greater than income elasticity. 
In two commodity cases, if food and nonfood commodities are not 
substitutes for the low income consumer, the cross-price elasticity 
would be;zero or very close to zero, which implies a price elasticity 
equal in absolute value to the income elasticity. For the very low 
^he mathematical proof, as cited by Mellor, that the income elasticity 
is equal to the sum of the price and cross-price elasticities is provided 
by Wold in H. Wold and L. Jureen (114). 
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income consumer for whom food aid represents the major source of real 
income, the marginal and average propensities to consume food would 
probably approach 1.0, implying an Income elasticity and consequently 
a price elasticity near unity. 
At the other extreme of relatively high income level, Brandow 
estimated the price elasticity of demand for all food at -0.34 for 
the United States for the period 1955-1957 (13, p. 17). However, the 
per capita Income on which Brandow's estimate is based is considerably 
above the high income example used for the discussion of developing 
nations in this study. It is more likely that an adjustment estimate 
of price elasticity appropriate for the consumer with an income of 
$450 should be of the magnitude -0,45 to -0.50. Mellor hypothesizes 
the price elasticity at low Income levels, comparable to the $75 level 
in this study, is -0.85 to -0.90 (64, p. 72). On the basis that price 
elasticities fall and cross-price elasticities increase as income levels 
rise, -0.65 to -0.70 appears to be a reasonable estimate for price 
elasticity of the medium income consumer. 
The second estimate necessary to evaluate the impact of P.L. 480 
grants to consumers with incomes near $75 per capita is the responsiveness 
of producers to price change or price elasticity of supply. A wide range 
of estimates have been put forth in the literature. As an indicator of 
the range, the elasticity has been estimated at -0.33 for gram in India 
(58, p. 485) to 14.17 for com in Thailand (7, p. 325).^ Most of the 
^Hexem, Roger W. Ames, Iowa. Supply elasticity estimates. Private 
communication. 1970. 
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short-run estimates summarized by Hexem fall between 0.02 and 0.62 
for rice (7, pp. 290-293) and at about 0.1 for wheat (29, p. 588). The 
long-run estimates range from 0.06 to 3.12 for rice with the majority 
falling between 0.06 and 0.60 (7, pp. 290-293). Similar estimates for 
wheat fall within a range from 0.14 to 0.22 (58, p. 485). Data from 
the Witt and Eicher study indicate supply elasticity estimates of 1.9 
for wheat in Israel and 1.3 for barley in Colombia (113). U.S. Bawa 
estimates the aggregate price elasticity of supply for agricultural 
products in India at approximately 1.2 (6). Although several estimates 
exceed unit% most of the estimates for general geographic regions are 
below 0.5. Recognizing that greater response is possible, 0.40 will 
be used as an estimate of price elasticity of supply for this analysis. 
Using 0.40 as the supply elasticity and considering the case where 
food grants of P.L. 480 commodities constitute 5 percent of the pre­
program supply, the coefficients of the equilibrium model are i|r = 1.05, 
e = -0.9, and e = 0.40. Assuming marginal propensity to consume food 
is 0,55 for the consumers with annual income of $75 per capita, T has 
a value of 1.0275. From Equation 5.6 the new equilibrium price is 98.34 
percent of the old price, and from Equation 5.8 the new equilibrium 
demand is 104.3 percent of the previous level. Since a quantity equal 
to 5 percent of the previous supply is furnished as food grants from 
P.L. 480 imports, the quantity of domestic agricultural commodities 
demanded falls slightly to about 99.3 percent of the previous level. In 
combination, the decline in price and the slight decline in quantity 
demanded causes the agricultural producers to suffer approximately a 
2.35 percent loss in income. The loss of the agricultural sector 
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represents a gain to the nonagricultural sector in terms of increased 
demand for nonfood commodities. 
Grant programs which provided food to the medium income consumers 
with an annual per capita income of $250 have an even greater effect on 
the market situation than with the lower income consumers. The marginal 
propensity to consume food was estimated at 0.34 for this group, and the 
price elasticity of demand was estimated at -0.70. Using 0.40 as the 
supply elasticity and adding food grants equal to 5 percent of the 
previous equilibrium supply, the coefficients of the model become 
i|t = 1.05, r = 1.017, e = -0.70, and e = 0.40. From Equation 5.6 the 
new equilibrium price decreases 2.84 percent and the quantity demanded 
increases by 3.8 percent. Subtracting out the 5 percent of final 
demand supplied as grants from F.L. 480 commodities, and adjusting for 
the lower price, the revenue effect on domestic producers would result 
in a loss of about 4.01 percent. Again the loss to the agricultural 
sector represents a gain for the nonagricultural sector through increased 
demand for nonfood items. 
Similarly, programming food grants to high income consumers ($450) 
has still a greater impact upon the demand for domestic agricultural 
production and income to the agricultural sector because of the weakening 
preference for food. On the basis of earlier estimates for the high 
income consumers, the coefficients of the model are = 1.05, F = 1.013, 
e = -0.5, and e = 0.40. With these coefficients, prices decline by 3.9 
percent and quantity demanded increases by 3.3 percent, resulting in 
a 1.7 percent decline in domestic production and a revenue loss of 5.53 
percent for agricultural producers. 
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The use of grants to distribute food aid to consumers has a varying 
Impact depending on the Income level of the recipients. In all four 
cases. Income for the agricultural sector suffers a decline except In 
the unique case where consumers have a marginal propensity to consume 
food of 1.0. In the other three cases the lower revenue of the 
agricultural sector implies a decline in welfare level for agricultural 
producers unless out migration occurs at a rate which is equal to or 
greater than the rate of decline in total income to the agriculture 
sector. Consumer welfare, on the other hand, is increased as a result 
of the food aid grants. Consumers who receive food directly realize 
higher levels of welfare through the income effect of the grants. At 
the same time consumers who do not receive the grants realize an 
increase in their welfare through lower food prices. In aggregate, 
consumers are able to consume more food for less money, and consequently 
can expand nonfood consumption as well. 
The welfare impact of distributing P.L. 480 imports as food grants 
is almost exclusively short run. The increase in supply and the shift 
in demand are direct functions of the availability of the food grants. 
As soon as the grants are interrupted, supply and demand will revert to 
the previous levels and the improved welfare position will be lost. 
Three exceptions are notable as long-run effects of the food grants. 
First, people in both developed and developing countries have a strong 
tendency to resist backward movement. If the grants continue for an 
extended period of time before interruption, it is possible that the 
higher consumption level and adjusted patterns will have a permanent 
effect on the tastes and preferences of the individual consumers so that 
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their demand schedule for food, nonfood, or both may experience a 
permanent shift. Secondly, if the food used for grants is initially 
secured under a grant agreement to meet an emergency supply deficit, 
it may substitute for commercial imports which the government would 
otherwise be forced to purchase. Such emergency imports could result 
in diversion of scarce foreign exchange from investments to promote 
development and have the long-run effect of slowing developmental 
progress. Depending on the allocation of the added government invest­
ment for development, output from either the agricultural sector or 
the industrial sector may be increased during the period of food aid 
availability, so that after termination of food aid, supply may not 
return to its original position. Third, providing food grants may have 
an impact on labor productivity through improved consumption levels, and 
in turn on level of income received. The increases in income and 
productivity may have a lasting effect of shifting both the demand and 
supply curves to the right of their original position. 
Work projects which utilize food aid as wages-in-kind 
Unlike distribution of food aid through grant programs, distribution 
through work projects implies a more restricted group of recipients. 
Work projects basically limit recipients to the same individuals who 
would be available to earn regular wages if such employment opportunities 
existed. Although it is possible for work projects to be competitive 
with other job opportunities, this should not be the case unless wage-in-
kind rates are set above competitive wage rates. The shift of previously 
employed workers to work projects would be inefficient because of the 
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transitional unemployment which it would create and the effect of locating 
•permanent' ençloyees in 'temporary* employment provided by work projects. 
Establishing wage-in-kind rates below competitive wage rates would offer 
a greater attraction for unemployed and underemployed workers to take 
advantage of the opportunities available through the work projects than 
for those who are employed. 
Wage-in-kind payments have essentially the same impact on consumption 
patterns and domestic production that grants do, with one major exception. 
In both cases distribution of food aid commodities represents a shift 
in the aggregate food supply of the recipient country, and a shift in 
demand depending on the marginal preference to consume food from 
incremental income. The intersection of the two new schedules determines 
the new price and quantity relationship which will exist after the 
shift. The difference occurs in the additional shift in the supply curve 
which is directly related to the use of the labor provided for the 
project. 
The amount of permanent or long-run shift in supply which is 
achieved depends on nature of work projects which are financed with food 
aid. The three broad classes include direct production, short-run 
overhead, and long-run overhead. The direct production involves labor 
utilization to provide goods and services for immediate consumption. 
Using food aid to finance direct production would have the greatest impact 
on short-run supply but the least impact on long-run supply. 
Short-run overhead investments might include construction of dams 
and irrigation canals, clearing land for cultivation, building a 
fertilizer plant, or similar projects which are relatively short-run in 
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nature and would have a direct effect upon production in the immediate 
future. Long-run overhead investments might include construction of 
modern transportation systems, building schools, training teachers, 
construction of improved housing, and similar projects which affect the 
welfare of the people but have a much longer and Indirect impact on 
productivity of human resources and ultimately the supply of goods and 
services which are produced. 
The impact on productivity also is a function of the allocation of 
work projects between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector. 
It is possible to allocate a major portion of the investment to the 
agricultural sector so agricultural production would be directly affected. 
On the other hand, all of the work projects might be allocated to the 
industrial sector so that agricultural output was unaffected. 
Consequently, the impact of P.L. 480 commodities on agricultural 
supply, when used to finance work projects, depends on the allocation of 
the projects between sectors, the relation between nutrition and 
productivity, and the rate at which the projects mature. 
To analyze the Impact of feed sid used as wages-in-kind on work 
projects under alternative assumptions about productivity, several 
different allocations of Investment and rates of return are considered. 
Primarily, unemployed laborers would be expected to respond to 
opportunities offered by work projects, and they would be characterized 
by low levels of income. 
As in the exang)les where P.L. 480 commodities were distributed as 
grants, adding food aid to the system would shift the total supply 
schedule to the right. Use of the food as wage-in-klnd increases real 
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Income of recipients and shifts the aggregate demand function to the 
right, also. With a marginal propensity to consume food of less than 
1.0, the demand curve would shift to the rigjht by some amount less than 
the supply shift. Since food aid supplied as wages-in-kind is relatively 
difficult to exchange on the market for other commodities, most of it 
will be consumed directly by the recipient with any marginal allocation 
of income for nonfood commodities coming at the expense of domestic 
agricultural production. Any decline in demand for domestic agricultural 
commodities will, of course, have a negative impact on prices and 
ultimately on production. Although a decline in agricultural prices 
would shift the terms of trade in favor of food for consumers and 
stimulate an increase in quantity demanded, price elasticities of less 
than 1.0 exclude the possibilities of maintaining preprogram income 
levels for agricultural producers. 
In the first case a situation is considered where all projects are 
in agriculture and represent social overhead investment which increases 
the productivity of all resources proportionately. Examples of work 
projects which have been used to develop factors of production in 
agriculture include land clearing and drainage in Colombia, forest 
development in Japan, and electric power development in Pakistan and 
Brazil. Development of factor productivity stimulates a shift in domestic 
supply of agricultural commodities. The shift in supply causes a depression 
of consumer prices which in turn increases the quantity demanded. Annual 
increases in supply resulting from the work projects are considered at 
2, ^  and 10 percent. With a 2 percent supply increase, a 5 percent food 
aid contract, and recipients in the $75 income class, the variables for 
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the equilibrium model are ijr = 1.07, F = 1.0275,^ e = -0.90, and c = 0.40. 
The impact of food aid used in this manner drives prices down by about 
3.08 percent and Increases total quantity of food demanded by 5.7 percent. 
Since 5.0 percent of the increase is supplied from food aid, only 0.7 
percent comes from domestic production, resulting in a decrease in 
income for agricultural producers of about 1.0 percent. If the supply 
increase experienced from the work projects drawing labor from the 
group with annual per capita income around $75 is 5 percent instead of 
2 percentj the impact is even greater. Prices are driven down by 
approximately 5.1 percent and the net effect on domestic supply is an 
increase of 2.7 percent; income to domestic producers falls by about 
2.5 percent. Likewise, if the supply response of the same class of work 
projects is 10 percent, the resulting price decline is about 8.3 
percent. With a net domestic supply increase of 6.1 percent, the 
resulting income loss for domestic producers is about 2.7 percent. 
For ease of comparison, the alternative impacts of drawing labor 
from consumer groups with $75, $250, and $450 per capita annual incomes 
and allocating all or only half of the labor to overhead projects in 
agriculture with projected increases in domestic productivity of 2, 5, 
and 10 percent are summarized in Table 22. The impact on price, 
domestic supply, and income to agricultural producers are listed by 
percentage in the table. Scanning across the table, the negative 
impact on domestic prices increases as a result of the corresponding 
^Although the shift in production is greater than in the grant case, 
the increase in domestic production does not result in increase in 
consumer income as does the food aid. Therefore, values for F will be 
the same as before. 
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shifts in supply without associated shifts in demand. As a result of 
corresponding price and domestic supply changes, income to agricultural 
producers decreases as productivity of the work projects increases. 
Consistent with theoretical supply and demand relationships, the 
allocation of only half of the work projects to the agricultural sector 
would have less negative impact on income to agricultural producers 
than allocation of all the projects to agriculture. The smaller the 
work proejct force in agriculture, the smaller the impact on domestic 
supply, and consequently the smaller the impact on agricultural prices 
and income. 
In summary, the use of P.L. 480 commodities to finance work projects 
is estimated to have a negative impact on income to agricultural producers 
ranging from 2.4 to 9.9 percent depending on the location and productivity 
of projects. Domestic supply increases in all cases where 100 percent 
of the work projects are in agriculture except where labor comes from 
the high income group and the work project only shifts supply upward 
by 2.0 percent. For all of the other cases the quantity of domestic 
commodities supplied increases so that if prices were supported for the 
producer, agricultural income would be maintained or increased. The 
decline in agricultural income represents a net gain to consimers as 
the result of lower prices and increased supply of food, and a transfer 
to nonagricultural sectors if the gain in real income is reallocated 
to nonfood conmodities. 
To this point, the source of the labor for work projects has only 
been considered by income level. If all labor comes from agriculture, 
agricultural income increases by the additional value of food aid. 
Table 22. Impact of work projects on agricultural prices, supply, and income 
50% of projects in ag. 100% of projects in ag. 
Income level Impact Expected supply increase Expected supply increase 
of labor force variable 2(1)% 5(2 1/2)% 10(5)% 2% 5% 10% 
Price -2.4 -3.4 -5.1 -3.1 -5.1 -8.3 
$75 Supply 0.0 1.0 2.7 0.7 2.7 6.1 
Income -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 -2.4 -2.5 -2.7 
Price -3.7 -4.9 -6.9 -4.5 -6.9 -10.6 
$250 Supply -0.2 0.4 1.9 0.0 1.9 5.0 
Income -3.9 -4.5 -5.1 -4.5 -5.1 -6.1 
Price -4.9 -6 .4 -8.7 -5.9 -8.7 -13.1 
$450 Supply -1.1 -0.3 1.0 -0.6 1.0 3.7 
Income -6.0 -6.7 -7.8 -6.5 -7.8 -9.9 
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The additional income from the work projects offsets the income loss 
in all cases where work projects draw labor from the low income group 
and most cases where labor is supplied by the medium income group 
(see Table 22). Consequently, using food aid for work projects in 
agriculture by hiring labor from the agricultural sector will increase 
agricultural output, lower food prices, increase total income to the 
agricultural sector (taking into consideration the value of wages-in-
kind), and increase income to the nonagriculture sector. Programming 
food aid in this manner would improve welfare on a pareto optimal^ 
basis because welfare would be increased for both agricultural producers 
and consumers. If labor for the work projects is drawn from the non-
agriculture sector, the program does not improve welfare on a pareto 
optimal basis so does not necessarily have a net positive effect. 
Transfer of income from agriculture to nonagriculture has no effect 
on balance, but the additional food aid has a positive effect on 
consumers outside of agriculture. Determining the net impact in this 
case involves comparing a gain for one group in the economy with a loss 
for another group. Although aggregate measures of welfare indicate 
a gain, it is difficult if not impossible to measure real net gains 
because of the need to make Interpersonal utility comparisons. 
Open-market sales to augment domestic supply 
Distributing food aid through open-market sales at competitive 
Movement toward a pareto optimum position requires that you make 
at least one individual better off without anyone else being made worse 
off. 
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market price affects the supply side of the food market exclusively. 
Introducing food into the market shifts the aggregate supply to the 
right in the same manner that grants and wages do. However, with open-
market sales there is no associated shift in demand resulting from an 
increase in consumer income level. Open-market sales also take income 
out of the private sector and transfer it to the public sector. The 
extent of the food aid impact on prices determines whether the income 
transfer will result in a loss for both the agricultural and industrial 
sector or just for the agricultural sector. The other aspect of open-
market sales concerns the use which the government makes of the 
revenue that is collected from the food sales. It is entirely possible 
for the government to use the food revenue to finance overhead investment 
projects identical to those financed with wages-in-kind. If so used, 
the revenue will presumably produce the same types of shifts that 
result from wage-in-kind financing. On the other hand, the government 
is free to use the revenue to finance any other type of government 
activities. In theory, it is possible for the government to use the 
revenue to relieve taxes paid by the public and actually achieve an 
income effect which will equal grants or wages-in-kind. In practice, 
it would be difficult to reach low income consumers in this way since 
they are usually only marginally affected by taxes if at all. Another 
reason this approach is not widely used is that the U.S. attempts to 
remain involved in the disposition of the funds which are generated from 
sales. Allowing the revenue to be used as tax relief quickly incorporates 
the funds into the internal budgeting of the recipient country and removes 
it from U.S. influence. The most common contracting arrangement involves 
174 
the designation of the funds for specific development projects even before 
the food Is granted in an attempt to insure that the food will make a con­
tribution to development and not just lead to expanded consumption. 
Realistically the same types of projects which are approved for wage-in-kind 
financing should be equally productive with regular financing since no 
assumption was made about wage-in-kind impacts which were unique to that 
type of program. 
Sales on the open market will of necessity reach consumers who have 
an income and are operating in the market system. With this method it 
becomes more difficult to regulate the composition of the recipient 
group than with the grants and work projects, but techniques such as 
food stamp plans or other types of regulatory authorization can be used 
to influence the characteristics of the recipients. Another control 
technique is to distribute the food aid through government regulated 
shops such as the fair price shops in India but at competitive market 
price. Distribution through a government shop system would enable a 
relatively close control on recipient groups so that income stratification 
of recipients is also possible with the open-market system. 
For analysis of the open-market system, three income groups will be 
considered in combination with two levels of reinvestment in agriculture 
and three levels of return on projects. For this analysis it will be 
assumed that the government does not relieve taxes and consequently does not 
provide any direct income effect on consumers. On this basis a food aid 
contract amounting to 5 percent of present supply combined with reinvestment 
in projects using labor from the $75 class and resulting in a 2 percent 
shift in supply would cause a 4.8 percent decline in prices and a 
175 
corresponding 0.2 percent decline in domestic supply* The resultant loss 
of income for the agricultural producers would be about 5 percent. 
Comparatively, financing projects in the same way, but drawing labor 
from the $250 class, would increase the price decline to 6.0 percent and 
the supply reduction to 0.6 percent for about a 6.5 percent income loss 
for agricultural producers. Use of labor from the $450 class would cause 
an even greater decline of about 7.2 percent for prices and 1.2 percent 
for supply so that income would fall by 8.4 percent. Scanning down the 
other columns of Table 23, similarities are found with the wage-in-kind 
projects. The higher the income level of the group which supplies the 
labor, the greater the negative impact on prices, supply, and income 
for the agricultural sector. Similarly, scanning across the table, the 
price impact increases as investment in agricultural projects increases 
and as productivity of a project increases. Although a declining price 
level results in a movement down the domestic supply curve, the investment 
in overhead projects results in an upward shift of the supply curve so 
that domestic supply decreases less with investments in more productive 
projects. If the projects are productive enough, supply may even 
be increased. 
Distribution of food through open-market sales results in similar, 
but stronger, effects on the agricultural sector than distribution through 
work projects. In both types of distribution the price of food is driven 
down and domestic supply forced below preprogram levels in most cases. 
In the open-market sales case, the income loss exceeds 5 percent in all 
cases sp that even if all work projects utilized labor from the agricultural 
sector, the total income to the sector would be lower than preprogram 
Table 23. Impact of sales on agricultural prices, supply, and income 
50% of projects in ag. 100% of projects in ag. 
Income level Impact Expected supply increase Expected supply increase 
of labor force variable 2(1)% 5(2%)% 10(5)% 2% 5% 10% 
Price -4.4 -5.4 -7.1 -4.8 -7.1 -10.2 
$75 Supply -0.9 0.1 1.9 -0.2 1.8 5.3 
Income -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 -5.0 -5.4 -5.4 
Price -5.2 -6.4 -8.3 -6.0 -8.3 -11.9 
$250 Supply -1.2 -0.3 1.3 -0.6 1.3 4.3 
Income -6.3 -6.6 -7.1 -6.5 -7.1 -8.1 
Price -6.3 -7.7 -10.0 -7.2 -10.0 -14.4 
$450 Supply -1.7 -0.9 0.4 -1.2 0.4 3.1 
Income -7.9 -8.5 -9.7 -8.4 -9.7 -11.8 
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levels. Regardless of who received the extra Income from the projects, 
it is consumers who realize improved welfare through lower food prices, 
and the nonagriculture sector which increases its total sales. 
Impact on Third Country Trade 
Another aspect of the impact of food aid is the effect on commercial 
ing)orts of food. Through the previous discussion it has been implied 
that total food supply comes from domestic sources except for food aid 
and consequently any decline in prices and income falls directly on 
domestic producers. This Implies that there is not a food deficit 
in the country. On the contrary, most developing countries have serious 
food deficits and are forced to use both commercial and concessional 
imports to meet demand so that part of the income does not go to 
domestic producers at all, but to foreign exporters. If the country 
is currently importing food, an increase in domestic supply has a quite 
different meaning than discussed earlier. Instead of increases in supply 
forcing prices down, commercial food imports can be replaced by domestic 
production. Domestic producers benefit by an increased share of the 
total market. In this case the benefit goes to producers, and consumers 
are left in the same position, a pareto optimal outcome. Actually, a 
reduction of imports could be planned to lag expansion of domestic 
production with some price decline. Consumers could then gain some 
benefits from the shift. 
The relative positions of domestic supply and demand are critical 
in determining how agricultural producers will be affected. Supply 
expansion can have a positive effect on agricultural income and the 
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foreign exchange position of a developing country until all effective 
domestic demand and opportunities for commercial exports are satisfied. 
At that point expanded production will reduce income to agriculture. 
If food imports are reduced at a rate slower than domestic supply (net 
above demand expansion) increases, it may also be possible to achieve 
net gains for consumers as well as producers. 
F.L. 480 and the guidelines set forth by F.Â.O. for programming 
surplus commodities require that all possible caution be exercised to 
protect third country trade. The third country restriction is not 
consistent with optimum development planning strategy, since most 
developing nations have large budget and foreign exchange allocations 
for food imports and stand to gain in both the short and long run by 
reducing commercial imports. If supply, including commercial and 
concessional imports, expands so that it exceeds demand at the current 
price level, commercial imports could be reduced and bring about a savings 
of foreign exchange which could be used to expand development programs. 
If short-run benefits for consumers are not the main focus of a 
development program, close government regulation of imports could be 
used to maintain food prices at precontract levels so that the additional 
food supply would not lower prices and increase quantity of food demanded. 
Maintaining food prices at their preprogram level while conducting 
a development program designed to increase consumer income would also 
help to stimulate more demand for nonfood items and support for the 
industrial sector than if the terms of trade were allowed to shift in 
favor of agriculture. 
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The commercial trade restriction was developed to protect third 
country exports. The impact of not protecting commercial exports depends 
on the third country which is involved. Where the third country is a 
developed nation, the consequence of reducing commercial imports may not 
be totally undesirable, at least in a global welfare sense. Estimates 
as low as 10 to 15 percent return on U.S. expenditure for food aid 
programs (71) suggest that a very high percent of the funds allocated 
to finance F.l. 480 programs actually become U.S. grants for development 
or welfare programs. In this view, other developed nations could contri­
bute to the world development effort by sacrificing a portion of their 
commercial exports. From a practical standpoint it may make it even 
easier for other nations to participate since it may be considerably 
easier and politically more expedient for them to direct funds into 
domestic agriculture subsidy programs than foreign aid programs. 
However, the problem is considerably more serious if the exporting 
nation is also a developing nation, and the agricultural exports are a 
major source of foreign exchange. Most of the developing nations have 
a comparative advantage in agriculture and look to this sector for its 
primary source of foreign exchange to be used to finance its own develop­
ment program. Allowing U.S. commodities to compete with the commodities 
of other developing countries through concessional sales contracts raises 
serious question about the morality as well as the economic logic of 
such arrangements. The seriousness of this restriction on contracting 
depends on the nature of the exporting nations involved. 
An analysis of optimum trade patterns completed by Framingham (37) 
and a later extension of that study (17, pp. 32-34) provide one basis 
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for several conclusions about the impact of P.L. 480 shipments on third 
country trade. The only developing nation^ which was projected to be a 
net exporter of wheat by 1975 was Ethiopia. Developed nations including 
Mexico, Southern South America, the European Common Market, Russia, and 
Australia supplied the remaining wheat exports. In a minimum cost 
export model, all of Ethiopia's wheat exports were delivered to nearby 
Sudan. Based on this analysis, P.L. 480 shipments of wheat are not 
harmful to developing nations unless shipments are made to Sudan. 
Extending the analysis to 1985, India was projected to join Ethiopia 
as a developing country exporter, and other 1975 exporters continued to 
produce surpluses. As with Ethiopia in 1975, India in the 1985 model 
had a distinct location advantage over the higher Income nations. 
India's surpluses were delivered to neighboring Pakistan In totality 
and still represented only one-eight of Pakistan's import demand. The 
remaining seven-eights was supplied by Australia. If shipments of P.L. 
480 wheat were made to Pakistan and utilized on a diversionary basis, 
Australia's exports would be reduced. The-conclusion is that concessional 
sales of wheat, even if diversionary (replacing commercial trade), would 
cause little or no harm to third country trade of the developing nations 
but would be felt by the developed nations. 
The rice situation was almost completely reversed. Most of the 
rice exporting nations are in the developing group. If P.L. 480 shipments 
of rice are diversionary, they have a significant negative impact on 
trade of developing nations. The most obvious conclusion is that rice 
Nations with annual per capita income of less than $300 were defined 
as developing nations. 
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should seldom be supplied under F.L. 480 contracting, and when it is, 
extreme caution should be used to meet the additionality condition. 
In the interest of other developing nations it would be most helpful if 
the additionality condition was met in the strictest sense, that of 
maintaining ^normal* proportion of previous trade levels and not just 
maintaining past absolute levels so that they would share in any expansion 
of demand for food imports. 
With other food grains, the situation is less clear. Projections 
for 1973 indicate eleven developing nation exporters with only Cambodia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand supplying over 100,000 metric tons. The bulk 
of Cambodia and Thailand grain was delivered to India with the remainder 
going to the Philippines and Taiwan. The Indonesian exports were also 
absorbed by India. The United States and Canada were the leading developed 
nation exporters, but again were at a locational disadvantage to compete 
with the developing nation exporters. If the U.S. protected its own 
commercial exports in P.L. 480 contracts, shipments of other food grains 
to developing nations would throw the third country impact directly on 
Canada when dealing with countries other than India, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines. In those three countries caution is required to insure 
that all food inputs result in additional consumption and are not 
diversionary. As pointed out in the analysis in Chapters III and IV, it 
is possible to use food aid in demand expansion programs and thus 
satisfy the additionality clause. With particular reference to the 
econometric model for India, P.L. 480 imports were found to have reduced 
commercial imports only slightly. With a minimum effort to protect 
commercial trade, expanded demand would allow for expanded third 
182 
country trade, as well as expanded U.S. commercial exports, to develop 
from the use of P.L. 480 commodities in the developing countries. 
Use of Food Aid to Subsidize Production 
The main emphasis of this chapter has been to evaluate the impact 
of distributing P.L. 480 commodities in the recipient country when no 
effort is made to expand demand directly. Without demand expansion to 
absorb the additional supply of food commcklities, prices, and income to 
agricultural producers are depressed unless commercial exports are 
decreased. Any reduction in expenditure for food represents a welfare 
gain for consumers, but a loss of producers. In developing countries 
where food prices have become inflated as a result of lagging supply, 
it may be desirable to lower food prices to improve consumer welfare. 
Assuming that producer welfare is equally important, lowering food 
prices for the benefit of consumers raises two questions. How can 
producers be compensated for resulting loss in welfare; how can 
domestic production be maintained if supply is price responsive? 
The two broad classes of subsidies which would allow consumer 
prices to fall and still maintain net farm income levels are (a) income 
supports and (b) subsidized factor costs. Compensation systems to 
protect producers from income losses when retail prices decline must 
include incentives so that farmers or cultivators will respond. Evidence 
of positive economic responsiveness of farmers in developing nations 
is found in the Witt and Eicher study of the impact of commodity aid 
(113). For instance, the estimated supply elasticity was 0.91 for milk 
and 1.05 for eggs in Israel, 1.9 for cotton and 1.8 for sesame in Colombia. 
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A different situation was found by Goerlng and Witt in a study of Colombia 
(40). Although the price of wheat went up by 35.3 percent, production 
changed by less than one-tenth of one percent. Similar responses were 
experienced with corn, potatoes, and beans when price Increases ranged 
from 34 to 54 percent. On the surface, lack of response to price 
changes of this magnitude suggested that farmers did not respond to 
price incentives. Placed in context, however, the production changes 
are entirely consistent. During the period under consideration, 1954-
1955 to 1959-1960, the index of general farm prices rose by 80 percent. 
Price increases for wheat, com, potatoes, and beans were all well under 
the average increase. Cotton, barley, and sesame all had price increases 
20 to 70 percent above the general level. The response of Colombian 
farmers indicates that they not only responded to absolute price changes, 
but relative price changes as well. 
The studies of agricultural productivity in various developing 
countries show that cultivators respond to profit incentives. Hendrix 
supports this view with his statement that "HYV (high yielding varieties) 
further reinforce the thesis that farmers in less developed countries 
act in a rational economic manner, maximizing their output and incomes 
within limits of their knowledge, resources, and opportunities..." 
(44, p. 8). Later in the same paper Hendrix points out that "... we 
note a sharp upturn in farmers' use of fertilizer in 1965-1966 following 
a sharp upturn in food grain prices..." (44, p. 88). The responsiveness 
of farmers to price change suggests that they are aware of profit 
maximization at least in practice and opens the door for compensation or 
subsidy programs which operate on the cost side as well as the revenue side. 
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Prodiict price and Income supports 
Two major considerations form the basis for providing price supports 
or income subsidies to producers. One objective is the maintenance of 
production to provide a minimum level of commodities for consumers at a 
given price or within a given range. The other objective is maintenance 
of income and welfare levels of producers. The relative weights which 
are attached to each of these objectives determine the program which 
will accomplish the objectives at least cost. 
If income level of producers is less important than quantity of 
production, compensation for producers can be disregarded for selected 
comoodities, specifically those which have a low price elasticity such 
as cereals in India. With low price elasticity of supply,commodities 
could be imported under F.L. 480 and sold on the open market, with only 
small reductions in domestic supply. With no conq>ensation to the 
producers, such a program would require limited financing depending on 
the level of concessional price charged to the recipient country 
relative to the market price which could be obtained in the country, 
and the quantity of imports necessary to make up for reductions in supply 
resulting from lower prices. Inserting food at a concessional price 
and marketing it through regular market outlets would only augment 
supply in the short run, would not promote increased productions within 
the recipient country, and would depress income levels in the agricultural 
sector. 
Policy makers in the recipient countries presumably are most interested 
in positive sum gains so that producers and consumers are made as well or 
better off. Likewise, they are interested in expanding domestic production 
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to provide for impozt substitution. Therefore, food aid programs which 
will be most useful to policy makers in the recipient countries are those 
which maintain both supply and income of producers without increasing 
consumer prices. Maintaining prices for producers but allowing them to 
fall for consumers, provides a net gain for both, but requires a price 
subsidy at the farm. P.L. 480 imports offer the potential for accomplish­
ing both objectives. P.L. 480 imports shift short-run supply (domestic 
production plus imports) to the right, and if producers are guaranteed 
a constant price, domestic supply is unaffected so that a net increase 
occurs in short-run supply. If food aid is sold on the open market at 
a competitive price, demand remains constant and a new equilibrium is 
established where the original demand curve interesects the new aggregate 
supply curve (domestic supply plus concessional imports). With a price 
elasticity of demand of -0.9 as estimated for consumers with annual 
per capita incomes of $75, a 1 percent change in quantity supplied implies 
a price decline of 1.1 percent. At this rate sale of P.L. 480 commodities 
on the open market does not generate sufficient revenue to compensate 
producers for their loss of income. Additional resources must be devoted 
to a compensation program for producers if their welfare position is to 
be maintained. 
Low income consumers having annual per capita incomes of $75 represent 
the least loss for producers or the situation where least compensation 
would be necessary. As the price elasticity of demand for cereals 
decreases with higher income levels, the potential loss to producers is 
even greater. For consumers with a demand elasticity of -0.7, a 1 percent 
increase: in supply produces a 1.4 percent decline in price. With an 
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elasticity of -0.5, a 2.0 percent decline in prices Is necessary to 
reach the new equilibrium. In conclusion, sale of food aid commodities 
on the open market to expand supply and depress prices will achieve 
improved consumer welfare, but even if all of the revenue from sale of 
food aid commodities is distributed to producers, the additional revenue 
will not compensate them for the loss of Income. Use of the open market 
system of distribution is not adequate to achieve a positive sum gain 
for consumers and producers at the same time with price elasticity of 
demand less than unity. Using the information from the analysis in 
the previous chapter, positive sum gains could be achieved through the 
sale of food aid comnoditles if the marketing procedure results in a 
demand expansion. A shift in the demand curve would minimize the price 
decline necessary to clear the market and reduce the loss to domestic 
producers. The amount of shift In demand necessary to simultaneously 
depress prices for consumer benefit and maintain gross revenue for 
producers, assuming that revenue from sale of F.L. 480 commodities can 
be transferred to producers, depends on the relative size of supply and 
demand elasticities and the proportion of total supply which the food 
aid represents. 
Revenue before the imports (R^) is equal to times Revenue 
after importing and selling P.L. 480 commodities (R^) is equal to F^ 
times Qy From Equations 5.6 and 5.8, the change in revenue 
Rg - ?! 5.9 
is zero if §(l+e) equal to 1.0, Therefore, revenue will be 
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unchanged if 
r .  5.10 
For the low income case where e = -0.9 and e = 0.4, P.L. 480 imports 
equal to 5 percent of domestic supply would require a shift in demand 
of 0.35 percent or about one-third of 1 percent to maintain producer 
revenue. For the medium income case where e = -0.7 and e = 0.4, a 
5 percent increase in supply through sale of F.L. 480 commodities would 
require a shift in demand of 1.04 percent to maintain revenue from food 
purchases. For the high income case with e - -0.5 and e = 0.4, demand 
would need to shift to the right by 1.72 percent to maintain constant 
revenue from food sales. 
Alternative compensation plans for producers could guarantee a 
specific price or a specific income. Without involving government 
purchases and storage which have resulted in costly programs for the 
U.S. government with respect to its own price support programs, a 
price support program could be used where commodities are sold on the 
open market and the government provides payments equal to the difference 
between price received and price guaranteed. Similarly the government 
could do the same thing with income, ignoring prices. Of the two 
alternatives, the price support plan has several advantages. From a 
political feasibility or social acceptance standpoint, payments attached 
to units of production probably have better acceptance and less criticism 
as a *give way' or 'donation' program than an income subsidy plan. From 
the production standpoint, the income subsidy plan provides no incentive 
to increase production for marketing purposes ; price supports do provide 
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a production Incentive. Although any increase in domestic production 
increases the cost of the support program, it would achieve twin objectives 
of development by providing more food at lower prices to consumers while 
expanding domestic production for the benefit of producers. Cost of 
a price support program could be reduced by putting quotas on quantities 
which qualified for price support and either graduating the support 
downward above that level or eliminating it all together for surpluses 
produced over 'usual' or average production. With a system of price 
supports for production, producers would be encouraged to expand 
production as much as possible with the opportunity to raise their 
income level above that received before P.L. 480 ccnnmodities were imported 
and distributed in competition with domestic production. 
Another means of subsidizing agricultural income is to use part of 
the food aid Imports to provide wages for work projects in rural areas. 
Desal concluded In this study of the Ahmednagar District In India that 
"...the estimated surplus labor was of the magnitude of 16.5 percent 
of the total working forces in agriculture" (24, pp. 154-155). If this 
surplus labor could be drawn out of agriculture on a part-time basis to 
work on projects and to be paid in food, the food aid commodities would 
free a share of the farmers ' own production for sale instead of personal 
consumption and thus Increase his real Income even if prices fell 
slightly. If work projects are designed to provide improved or expanded 
supplies of resources for agricultural production, the supply of 
agricultural commodities would be expanded in the long run as well as 
the short run. 
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In summary, the number of ways in which food aid can be used to 
support prices or subsidize income for producers is relatively limited. 
Either commodities can be sold and the revenue used to subsidize production, 
or conmodities can be supplied directly to producers as wages on the 
assumption that this will release domestic commodities which would have 
been consumed by the producer. When P.L. 480 commodities are sold on 
the open- market without special provision of expanding demand (shifting 
demand to the right), the increase in supply will depress prices and 
total revenue unless price elasticity of demand is greater than unity. 
Therefore, the sale of P.L. 480 commodities cannot generate sufficient 
revenue to compensate producers for their loss even if administrative 
costs are ignored and all revenue from P.L. 480 sales is passed on to 
producers. By distributing commodities through differentiated markets 
so that demand is expanded, price decline can be minimized and sufficient 
revenue provided to compensate producers. A price subsidy plan or a 
work project plan would stimulate production for the long run while an 
income subsidy plan would lack a production Incentive and might even 
result in a disincentive to production. 
Subsidization to reduce factor prices and increase resource availability 
Attempts to Increase farmers ' net revenue do not need to concentrate 
on supporting product price or subsidizing Income. A second approach 
Involves efforts which will reduce unit production costs and provide for 
a larger profit margin even with constant prices for output. Profit 
margins can be increased even under declining output prices provided that 
costs are declining at a faster rate. The two broad approaches to reducing 
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unit cost include lowering factor prices when facing a fixed vector of 
technical coefficients or increasing productivity of resources with a 
fixed vector of prices. 
Use of food aid is applicable in both cases. In the same manner 
that P.L. 480 commodities could be supplied to farmers as wages-in-kind 
for employment on work projects, food commodities could be distributed 
with various factors of production such as seed, fertilizer, chemicals, 
and equipment. If a given quantity of food was distributed with each 
unit of seed or fertilizer purchased, the real price would be reduced 
by the amount of savings on food cost or the value of domestic production 
freed for marketing rather than personal consumption by the producer. 
To avoid forcing retail distributors of seed and fertilizer into 
becoming food retailers also, stamps or coupons could be distributed 
with the seed and fertilizer which were redeemable at a food distribution 
center. In addition to distributing stamps as a welfare program for 
consumers as discussed in Chapter IV, food stamps could be used as a 
subsidy to lower real production costs for farmers as well. 
In a similar way food aid could be used to subsidize factor prices 
by distributing food or food stamps to seed or fertilizer dealers so 
that they in turn could lower prices and maintain real income. This 
approach parallels subsidizing prices of food for the farmer so that 
prices to the consumers could be lowered and improve their welfare. Food 
grants or revenue from food sales could be used to compensate the dealer 
for the difference between prices received and some predetermined price 
level for factors directly affecting agricultural production. 
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Subsidizing prices of production factors provides the opportunity 
for influencing the factor mix used in production by differentiating the 
rates of subsidization. Â shift in the relative price of two factors 
implies a shift in the rate of use in order to maximize profits. To 
the extent that agricultural producers maximize profits, factor price 
subsidies which change the price ratio will encourage a change in factor 
use. Subsidization of factors incorporating new technology at higher 
rates than traditional factors will promote the adoption of new 
technology. For example, seed for new 'miracle* varieties could be 
subsidized while traditional seed was not, or at least at a higher rate 
than traditional seed stock. The same approach could be used with new 
and more effective fertilizers and chemicals. Subsidizing new technology 
which increases yields does not compete with labor in the productive 
process so that a process of capital intensification is initiated which 
displaces labor and causes further underutilization of the abundant 
labor force. On the contrary, new technology which increases yield 
creates additional demand for labor in harvesting, processing, and 
distributing additional output. 
A second approach to expanding supply and producers ' net income 
involves expanding the supply of resources or factors available to 
producers. This approach may also lower factor prices and production 
costs in a competitive system. Attempts to expand resource supply lend 
themselves to the investment projects discussed in Chapter III and the 
work projects discussed earlier in this chapter. Expanding the supply 
of production factors may require major overhead investments which 
individual producers are unable to finance. A development project might 
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involve the construction of a dam to create an irrigation reservoir and 
canals to distribute water. As discussed in Chapter III, food aid 
could be utilized to finance a portion of the project without having a 
negative intact on prices and domestic supply. On the other side, the 
investment would have a long-run inqpact on development by increasing the 
availability of water for irrigation and presumably lowering unit cost 
through expanded production. 
Land clearing and preparation for cultivation, construction of 
fertilizer plants, expanding the supply of inçroved seed, demonstration 
plots to encourage adoption of new technology, development of marketing 
and storage facilities, and improvement of farm to market transportation 
are all examples of projects lAich could be incorporated in a development 
plan to improve the quality of available resources, increase the avail­
ability of limited resources, or lower the cost of resources for 
producers. All of the projects consist of a major labor component 
which could be financed with food aid as wages-in-kind or sales with 
revenue used to pay wages. In addition, food aid could be used to 
satisfy demand generated by the Income multiplier impact of development 
Investment. In all of these examples food aid could be utilized to 
promote production by expanding resource use through increased supply 
and lover prices which in turn result in higher net incomes to producers. 
One possible exception to the above analysis should be noted. In 
a number of developing countries the supply of capital inputs are avail­
able only in limited quantities. If an open-market policy has been followed 
so that rationing is achieved through relatively high prices rather than 
other forms of physical rationing, the above analysis will apply. If 
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on the other hand price has been fixed at a lower level which would 
create excess demand without external controls, and the distribution 
of the limited input is achieved through a systematic rationing scheme, 
the general analysis presented above is not directly applicable. 
Rationing, other than with inflated prices, of an input short of 
the level demanded for profit maximization relegates that resource to 
the status of a fixed rather than a variable resource and sets the 
demand for it at the maximum amount available. With capital inputs 
limited at a level short of profit maximization, the producer effectively 
experiences a release of capital from procurement of capital inputs 
which enables him to allocate the additional capital for labor procurement 
in order to increase profit by driving down marginal productivity and 
consequently marginal value product of labor toward the price of labor. 
Profit increases with the addition of labor until the ratio of marginal 
value product of labor to price of labor is driven to unity or until a 
limit on labor supply is also reached. 
With systematic rationing of resources, manipulation of the resource 
prices will not stimulate a change in production since prices are not 
the determinate of distribution, at least within a moderate range. 
Neither will limited manipulation of the product price have an effect 
on output since resources are already being used to the limit of 
availability. Raising resource prices or lowering output price would 
in fact lower profits but not affect output within a limited range. 
Since increased labor use in the rationing example inçlies a less 
efficient productive process, as indicated by the lower return on 
capital, efficiency could be improved by increasing the availability of 
194 
capital inputs to ease the rationing restrictions and more nearly equate 
marginal productivity ratios to price ratios for the inputs. Increasing 
the supply of rationed inputs, to a level where supply and demand come 
into equilibrium, is one way of increasing productive efficiency and 
possibly output as well. 
Once input prices are established in a free market, the potential 
exists for stimulating production through input prices. Subsidies, 
rebates, and tax credits are just a few alternatives for lowering the 
price of inputs. In terms of overall development, unequal rates of 
price reduction can be used to stimulate a shift in use from one 
resource to another. Ultimately lowering input prices has the effect 
of lowering cost of production so that budget restraints for an 
individual producer are less restrictive. 
Summary of Alternative Distribution Methods 
The long-run impact of all three distribution methods depends upon 
the effectiveness with which the food is programmed to cause a permanent 
shift in production. In the case of grants, the only chance for increased 
production comes from the lasting nutritional effect which the food 
might have on the recipients. It is unlikely that improving adult diets 
for a short period has much lasting effect on productivity, but other 
situations such as providing improved diets to pregnant or nursing 
mothers in order to improve nutrition of the children might have a 
lasting effect. "...There is strong evidence to show that some of 
the effects of malnutrition may persist through adult life" (33, p. 12). 
Likewise, studies have shown that adequate diets for school children 
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significantly increases their ability to leam. Providing grants for 
school feeding could have a lasting effect on the productivity of the 
labor force by contributing to a higher level of education and training. 
In all cases, the permanent effects of grants on productivity are long 
run in nature and do not play a role in the immediate impact on supply. 
The permanent effect of food used to finance overhead investment, 
whether directly through wages-in-kind or indirectly through open-market 
sales to raise revenue for investment, is the impact which the investments 
have on production coefficients and the quality of resources available 
for production. This determines the extent to which supply will shift 
to the right and maintain a level of higher output even after food aid 
is discontinued. 
The positive correlation between product price and output offers a 
potential for stimulating output and improving producer welfare. Hendrix 
indicates the significance of product prices in stimulating production 
and development in India with his statement that "...concessional 
import sources blinded 601 leaders to the slow growth of agriculture and 
to the need for...price signals as a basic essential of sustained 
agricultural progress" (44, p. 9). However, increases in product prices 
have a direct effect on consumer welfare. Agricultural prices have a 
unique significance because of the high percent which food represents in 
total consumption. If development is to improve consumer welfare, 
increasing the price of food as an isolated policy to expand supply 
conflicts directly. Of course, it is possible to subsidize producer 
prices to stimulate production lAlle maintaining reasonably low prices 
for consumers and consumer welfare. 
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Another means of improving consumer welfare is through changes in 
the technical coefficients of production. Such changes are heavily 
dependent on the introduction of new technology. In the developing 
countries, modern technology may not be available in general, and 
certainly is not to a majority of the producers. At early stages of 
development, individuals and private institutions are often unwilling 
or incapable of carrying on research which leads to new technology. 
Many of the developing nations can short cut the process by importing 
technology from countries with similar conditions which have already 
taken large steps in the area of research and new technology. The 
new wheat varieties from Msxico and rice varieties from the Philippines 
are good exaiiq>les of agricultural technology which can be adapted to 
many of the developing countries. In general, industrial technology 
is even easier to import than agricultural technology because attention 
does not have to be given to geographic or climatic conditions in most 
cases. 
After generating technology, it is essential to get the information 
to the producers. Dissemination of the technology can be handled 
through a 'one shot' approach or can be used to build an extension 
system which is capable of continuously transmitting new information 
to producers. One of the most effective extension techniques for 
agriculture in the developing countries has been the use of decentralized 
test plots where results can actually be observed by the producers under 
local conditions. Ultimately, shifts in the technical coefficients of 
production result in a slow process of freeing both capital and labor 
from agriculture so that it can be utilized in Industrial development. 
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Decision makers in the industrial firms would be expected to possess a 
higher level of education so that less basic techniques of disseminating 
technology would be effective. 
Still other means of promoting production exist which are more 
indirect. Many of the indirect approaches serve to reduce the cost of 
producing and moving the product from producer to consumer. A few of 
the obvious include providing expanded and reliable credit, improved 
transportation networks and storage facilities, modernized marketing 
systems and facilities, research facilities, and technical education 
programs. 
Each aspect of promoting domestic production under a policy of 
lowering consumer prices and maintaining producer welfare involves 
overhead investments or direct financing. Food aid embodies the 
potential to substitute for part or all of the capital input. Distribu­
tion of food aid commodities for consumption by producers can free 
domestic commodities for sale and increase real income level of producers. 
Sale of food aid commodities generates revenue which can be used to 
support product prices or subsidize factor costs. The use of food aid 
commodities to provide part or all of wages for work projects increases 
real income to consumers, but can also develop resources which increase 
technical coefficients in the production process and lowers per unit cost 
of production. Similarly, overhead investments in labor to develop 
storage, transportation, and marketing facilities can lower the cost of 
marketing domestic products so that a larger portion of the retail price 
can be realized by the farmer, or retail prices can be lowered for 
consumers without lowering the wholesale price to producers. Food aid 
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commodities can also be utilized to subsidize and promote production 
for the benefit of producers. However, the distribution methods used 
and the ultimate use of the food commodities are more critical in providing 
for long-term benefits to producers than in providing for consumer 
benefits. Stagnant or declining prices of comnoditles in the developing 
countries can imply Improved consumer welfare as development occurs, 
and do not necessarily imply a worsening of the producer position provided 
that generation and adoption of new technology has been effective in 
expanding resource productivity, thereby lowering the cost structure to 
compensate for any decline in product price. Consequently, consumer 
welfare and producer welfare are not necessarily in direct conflict. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND POLICY 
GUIDELINES FOR PROGRAMMING FOOD AID 
There are four basic aspects of programming commodity aid. They 
Include 
1. the terms under which a donor provides commodities to a 
recipient, 
2. the consumer groups to which commodities are distributed 
in the recipient country, 
3. the method and terms by which commodities are distributed to 
consumers in a recipient country, and 
4. the allocation of resource or revenue proceeds from 'sale' 
of these commodities by the recipient country. 
The terms under which donors provide food aid are closely linked to 
their own objectives which may Include surplus disposal, emergency 
relief, expansion of commercial exports, or economic development of 
recipient countries. The relative weights on each of these objectives 
influence the contractual terms, varying from grants and loans with 
lenient conditions for payments to short-term, hard currency sales and 
strict conditions for payments. Achievement of Internal objectives of 
recipient countries is affected by which consumer groups ultimately 
receive, the food aid. Consumers in low income groups have limited Income 
to allocate among alternative consumer goods so that grants or highly 
subsidized sales are the only way to have a significant impact on their 
welfare. On the other side, higher income consumers have Income to 
allocate along alternative commodities so that increasing the aggregate 
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food supply and thereby depressing food prices can raise total welfare 
of this income group. 
The method of distribution determines which group will or will not 
participate directly in food aid programs. Group differentiation provides 
the key to capitalizing on certain characteristics of consumer behavior 
and allows those characteristics to be stressed which will promote 
effective use of food aid to achieve specified objectives. The terms 
of distribution determine the amount of welfare or income subsidy 
incorporated in food aid. The allocation of labor provided in exchange 
for wages-in-kind or revenue from open-market sales determines the 
major long-run impact of food aid. Projects on which labor can be used 
range from production of consumer goods to construction of housing 
developments or other welfare projects. The revenue can be used for 
similar projects or can be used to meet other types of government 
expenditure. The manner in which recipient governments allocate resources, 
not only food aid and other foreign assistance but domestic resources 
as well, and commit them to development activities determines the impact 
of food aid both in the short and long run. "Indeed, so important is 
the role of government as an agency in mobilizing, organizing and 
directing the use of development resources in less-developed countries 
that no program of financial and technical assistance...is likely to 
succeed without also a strong commitment to the objective of agricultural 
progress by less-developed countries themselves or without a government 
strong enough and stable enough to do what needs to be done" (44, p. 9). 
Hendrix points out that governmentsof developing countries have a 
crucial and influencial role to play in the development process. In the 
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earlier discussion of food aid distribution, it has been pointed out 
that the government of a recipient country has numerous alternatives for 
utilizing food aid. Not all of these alternatives are economically 
consistent with development strategy. The manner in which a recipient 
government molds the four basic aspects of commodity aid into a 
compatible plan and corrdinates it with other development efforts of 
the country will determine the prevailing impact of P.L. 480 or similar 
commodity aid programs. 
Summary of Principles 
Associated with Food Aid Utilization 
The following sections summarize the many aspects of food aid 
which are discussed in earlier chapters. The objective is to link 
together these different aspects and relate their meaning to economic 
development in recipient countries. Finally a set of guide lines are 
set out at the end of the chapter on the use of food aid in the overall 
process of development. 
Repayment terms and net value of aid 
Unless food aid is provided to recipient countries as a grant or 
donation, there is some positive cost associated with its procurement. 
Extended credit terms reduce the immediate obligation, but increase the 
future obligation by the amount of an interest factor. Continuous 
contracting of food aid not only obligates a country to a future liability, 
but can actually move the country into a position of greater annual debt 
obligation than the annual amount of aid received. 
Consider an agreement to receive a constant amount of food aid (X) 
each year on crédit terms with repayment beginning at the start of the 
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second year. If the principal payment is a fixed amount per year over 
a period of N years, the amount of principal payment (P) due in year 
n can be written as a function n and N. 
Pn = X^^^ for n 3 N + 1 6.1 
The interest payment (I) can be written as a function of the interest 
rate (r) and the sum of the interest on the balance of the loan for 
each previous year 
(-¥) I  = r  2  X ( l  -  — Z T '  )  f o r  n  ^  N  +  1  6 . 2  
^ k=2 
using k as an accounting variable. In any given period the total 
payment (C) on the debt retirement is equal to the sum of Equations 
6.1 and 6.2. 
c. = % C îâf' ) + r Jî, : (i - " < a + 1 6.3 
Since this repayment schedule provides for the loan from period 
one to be liquidated in period N + 1, both the principal and interest 
payment reach a maximum when n equals N + 1. Substituting in Equation 
6.1, the TnflvtTTnini principal payment is equal to the magnitude of the 
annual food aid contract. 
' % ((*"») ' ' % ( N ) = = «-4 
Likewise the maximum value for the interest payment is obtained by 
substituting N + 1 for n in the summation and solving Equation 6.2 
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6.5 k=2 
Given that z and n are positive values, I is greater than zero so 
max ° 
that the value of payment due is greater than the magnitude of the 
aid received in that period. The point at which the payment exceeds 
the new contract is defined where the total payment is equal to X. 
Rewriting Equation 6.3 and setting it equal to X, provides a quadratic 
equation for the point where payments equal value of the new contract. 
"n = % + r (X) . X 6.6a 
C. = ^ ir + r = 1.0 6.6b 
Solving for n in Equation 6.7 
-m^ + 2Nm + 3m + 2n - 2Nr - 2N - 2r - 2 = 0 6.7 
by using the general quadratic equation formula. 
-
4ac 
n ^ 6.8 
payments from the recipient country exceed the concessional imports at 
-(2Nrf3r+2) + 7 (2Nr+3r+2)^ - 4(-r)(-2»r-2N-2r-2) 
n = 2M • 
For the case where repayment is over a 20 year period at 4 percent interest, 
payments equal the value of the aid between 13 and 14 years. From that 
204 
point on the net value of the aid Is negative and payments exceed new 
aid received. In Figures 6-8 three repayment schedules (10, 20, and 
30 years) are compared using interest rates from zero to 10 percent. 
The grid bases for Figures 6-8 represent combinations of time (0 to 
36 years) and interest rates (0 to 10 percent). The vertical distance 
from each time and interest combination to the surface of the 
three-dimensional figure indicates the net contribution of aid to 
the recipient's resources. If the distance is greater than the distance 
from the base to the zero point on the vertical axis, the contribution 
is positive; if it is less, the contribution is negative. The time 
period until the net aid becomes negative and the maximum value of 
payments vary according to the length of the repayment period and the 
interest rate. As the length of the repayment schedule increases, the 
maximum value of payments increase as total interest costs rise. 
Likewise, higher interest rates are positively correlated with higher 
payments. Using an example of 4 percent interest on a continuous flow 
of aid over a 20 year period, annual payments to retire the long-term 
loan equal the annual aid received in about 13.3 years. 
The fact that all three repayment schedules result in negative aid 
at some point in the future emphasizes the fact that concessional 
contracts must be negotiated so as to avoid a negative impact on the 
recipient country. Agreements which provide commodity aid on a grant 
or donation basis avoid the problem of negative aid. The lack of repayment 
commitment allows a perpetual flow of grants or donations to maintain a 
net aid value equal to gross aid value. Sales or barter agreements also 
avoid the problem of negative aid since the effective aid value is always 
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Figure 6. Effect of aid flow duration and Interest rates on recipient's 
net resource position after loan servicing (10 year repayment 
schedule) 
zero. However, long-term loan agreements result in a net aid value from 
gross aid value down, depending on interest rate and period over which 
repayment is scheduled. 
The trend toward concessional sales contracts for long-term credit 
and the eventual net negative effect of repayment plans emphasizes the 
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A 
Figure 7. Effect of aid flow duration and interest rates on recipient's 
net resource position after loan servicing (20 year repayment 
schedule) 
importance of "investing" food aid in recipient countries so that it 
will result in an increase in productivity and make a positive contribution 
to development. At minimum, the food aid must increase productivity at 
a rate greater than the interest on the contract if the food aid is to 
make a long-run positive financial contribution to the rmclplPHt ctconoiny. 
207 
Figure 8. Effect of aid flow duration and interest rates on recipient's net 
resource position after loan servicing (30 year repayment schedule) 
The conditions under which food aid can be used as an "investment" depends 
on numerous interrelated aspects of consumer behavior, distribution, and 
production response. The need for meeting these conditions puts a moral and 
economic responsibility on a donor to provide food aid only on a basis which 
will not be detrimental to the recipient economy. 
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Evolution of P.L. 480 objectives 
During the early stages of P.L. 480 programs, food was provided on 
concessional contracts only from the list of commodities designated as 
surplus in the U.S. At the same time, P.L. 480 originally included a 
number of implicit as well as explicit provisions for "protection" of 
U.S. commercial agricultural exports. Together these restrictions 
emphasized an atmosphere of dumping or surplus disposal which surrounded 
passage of P.L. 480. Operational experience in programming food aid 
and the decline in U.S. surplus stocks, allied with increasing international 
interest in development, have resulted in a major shift toward programming 
food for development purposes. U.S. involvement in concessional sales 
has amounted to about a billion dollars a year with less than 20 percent 
going for emergency relief and donations. The remaining 80 percent 
has been sold on various sales contracts, most of which incorporate long-
term credit. 
Development and the contribution of food aid 
There are several basic objectives or goals for use of food aid if 
it is to be an effective instrument in promoting development. Among 
these goals are a relative equilibrium between supply and demand which 
produces a certain degree of price stability, increased employment 
through expanded investments, and higher levels of gross national product 
and per capita income. Food aid can effectively serve to meet all these 
goals simultaneously. Of primary consideration is the lagging agricultural 
supply in most developing economies where a large portion of consumer 
income is spent on food. By "investing" food aid in activities to expand 
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food production, food aid can promote production to satisfy excess 
demand. Expanding production In labor Intensive production processes 
such as developing agriculture provides an expanded demand for labor, 
increasing employment and consequently increasing levels of personal 
income. The "investment" of food aid to promote food production can 
vary from underwriting research and development activities to providing 
resources and overhead Investment in new institutions such as credit, 
transportation, and marketing. Thus, food aid offers one tool for 
attacking the "vicious cycle of poverty." One major asset of food 
aid as a source of "investment" is the contractual provision for long-
term credit which is consistent with the extended payoff periods of 
development investments. 
In most developing countries, the economy is dominated by agricul­
ture because the largest proportion of the population is in that sector. 
- Development within agriculture can make a major contribution toward meeting 
minimum food requirements for the society. A developing agriculture can 
release labor and provide raw materials for use in industrial development. 
Once food supply surpasses domestic demand, agriculture can supply 
commodities for export and foreign exchange earnings, àlso, because 
of its relative size, agriculture provides a major proportion of demand 
for industrial output. 
On the opposite side, lagging development in the agricultural sector 
contributes to higher food prices and lower real income levels for 
consumers, thus reducing the amount available to spend on other commodities. 
If food production lags sufficiently, it may become necessary to divert 
scarce foreign exchange into food imports. Finally, low productivity 
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traps labor within agriculture and reduces the possibility of furthering 
industrial development. 
Economic development basically requires two elements—a sufficient 
and productive labor force and an accumulating supply of capital. Due 
to the nature of the savings function, capital accumulation in low 
income countries is very difficult. With low income levels, most 
consumers contribute little to savings and investment during early 
stages of development. 
Inflation also has an impact on development as well as consumer 
welfare. In general, inflation tends to shift income from fixed income 
recipients to those controlling productive resources. The shift may 
actually contribute to higher aggregate savings and investment, but the 
investment may be Inefficient if made primarily for speculation purposes 
to avoid future inflation. The use of food aid to finance selected 
overhead investments may create an atmosphere which is conducive to 
private Investment in high priority areas. 
Food aid provides a unique potential for supporting economic develop­
ment activities in recipient countries. Because a large share of consumer 
expenditure in developing countries is for food, and because growth of 
food supply tends to lag growth of food demand in these countries, the 
food market can be a major source of inflation. Providing food aid to 
the developing countries offers a temporary means of restraining price 
by increasing the supply of commodities. If distributed in return for 
services or revenue, food aid can finance development investments which 
will increase domestic production and combat inflation on a permanent 
basis. Food aid can also be used to expand domestic production and 
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provide inçort substitutes which result in foreign exchange earnings. 
The increased availability of foreign exchange can further aid economic 
development by allowing for in^ortatlon of critical material and equipment 
to support domestic investments. 
Consumer responsiveness and intersectorial linkages 
With P.l. 480 contracts amounting to nearly a billion dollars a 
year, and estimates of the amount which will be consumed directly or 
indirectly as foodstuffs ranging as high as 95 percent (113, p. 42), 
consumer response patterns become a central focal point for evaluating 
the impact which food aid will have on consumer welfare. More specifically, 
the response of consumers to increased availability of food holds the key 
to the impact which food aid shipments will have on the rest of the 
economy. The two major variables which influence consumption patterns 
are Income and price levels. Engel's Law indicates that as Income 
increases, the percent of the budget which will be spent on food declines, 
resulting in an increased proportion being spent on nonfood items. From 
the breakdown of countries by income level for which P.L. 480 contracts 
were authorized in 1968, three annual per capita Income levels were 
selected to represent low ($75), medium ($250), and high ($450) Income 
situations. Ihrougjh a combination of economic principles, elasticity 
estimates from various empirical studies, and international data 
relating to average consumption estimates, consumer response patterns 
were developed which might be anticipated in developing countries. 
Associated with response patterns are numerous Inplications for 
effective food aid utilization and development. 
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Summarizing the consumerzesponse patterns, low income consumers 
($75) have a strong preference for food which results in an average 
propensity to consume food of approximately 0.69, a marginal propensity 
to consume of approximately 0.55, and a corresponding income elasticity 
of demand for food of 0.80. The initial impact of supplying food aid 
to the low income consumer directly as food or indirectly as wages is an 
increased income level, resulting in an increase in the demand for food 
of about 55 percent of the incremental income and demand for nonfood 
of about 45 percent of the incremental income. When food is distributed 
directly, roughly half of it will be traded away in the market system 
to obtain nonfood commodities, or part of the previous food demand will 
be foregone. Assuming that all of the previous food supply was domestically 
produced or that previous levels of imports are maintained, the additional 
45 percent of commodity aid represents direct competition with domestic 
production and has a strong implications as a price depressing force. 
At the medium income level ($250) consumer preference for food is 
not as strong. Average propensity to consume food was estimated at 0.47, 
marginal propensity to consume at 0.34, and a corresponding elasticity 
of food demand of 0.73. At the medium income level, incremental income 
resulting from food aid would generate a marginal demand for food of 
only 34 percent of the aid while marginal demand for nonfood would be 
66 percent. As in the low income case, the 66 percent which is traded 
directly or substituted for nonfood, creates direct competition for 
domestic production. The magnitude of food aid for which demand would 
not be created increases by about 50 percent from the low income case to 
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the medium income case, and thus represents a greater price depressing 
force than in the low income case. 
At the high income level ($450), consumer preference for additional 
food is relatively weak. On the average 39 percent of the budget is 
allocated to food but only 26 percent of marginal income is spent on 
food for a corresponding income elasticity of 0.66. At the high 
income level each dollar of food aid which represented incremental 
income would generate demand for 26 cents of food and 74 cents of nonfood. 
Consequently, for each dollar of food aid, 74 percent would reflect on 
the market as competition for domestic production. 
At each of the three income levels some portion of the food aid 
replaces demand for domestic food and consequently causes a depressing 
effect on prices. The lower prices cause lower incomes for producers 
and will reduce domestic supply of food if producers are responsive to 
market prices. Food aid would increase consumer welfare and the demand 
for nonfood items, but would do so at the expense of the domestic 
agricultural producers. The higher the income level of consumers, the 
greater the increase in demand for nonfood items and consequently the 
greater the negative impact on agricultural production. 
A change in the price structure triggers a second consumer reponse 
which would affect food demand. The second response in the reaction to 
a shift in terms of trade. As the price of food falls relative to other 
commodities, the quantity demanded will increase. As with the income 
effect, there appears to be a strong correlation between price responsive­
ness and income level just as there is between response to income changes 
and income level. 
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For the low income consumer case, price elasticity of demand for 
food was estimated at -0.90. If food prices fall by 1 percent, quantity 
of food demanded will increase by .9 of 1 percent. The increase in 
demand associated with a price decline could absorb the extra food 
supply resulting from the food aid, but cannot create an adjustment 
which will clear the market and also maintain revenue for domestic 
producers. A price decline of any magnitude implies a fall in total 
expenditure on food as long as the price elasticity has an absolute 
value of less than 1.0. 
Price elasticity for the medium income consumer was estimated at 
-0.70 so that a price decline would result in less absorption of the 
extra food than with the low income case. Prices would have to fall 
more to clear the market than in the previous case, and the loss of 
revenue to the domestic producers would increase if food aid were 
supplied to consumers in the medium income group. The loss of revenue 
to agricultural producers implies an increase in revenue for the 
industrial producers. 
Progressing to the high income case, price elasticity of demand for 
food was estimated at -0.50 so that even less support for agricultural 
producers would be generated. Domestic prices would have to fall 
further than in either of the previous cases in order to clear the 
market, and the agricultural producers would suffer the income loss. 
The high income consumers would generate the least demand for food if 
incremental income was supplied through the distribution of food aid, 
and they would also respond the least to a decline in prices which would 
result from the expanded supply. Consequently, the higher the income 
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level, the greater the surplus of food that would be created by supplying 
aid in the form of food, or the greater the price decline necessary to 
clear the market. In either case, reduced production or a price decline, 
the agricultural producers suffer a greater negative impact as the income 
level of the consumers who receive the food aid increases. 
Financing development investments with commodity aid 
The response of consumers to increased income ties closely to the 
substitutability of food aid for other forms of capital to finance 
investments for development. Essentially food aid can substitute for 
capital on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to the amount of demand for 
food which will be generated by development investments. Beyond this 
point supplying additional food aid will create a market surplus which 
will have a depressing effect on prices, lowering the value of the food 
aid directly as well as indirectly through the negative impact on 
producer welfare. 
Although the actual magnitude of derived demand for food resulting 
from an investment can only be calculated as an ex post response, an ex 
ante estimate can be made based on knowledge of the composition of the 
investment and the characteristics of the consumers who will become 
recipients of income generated from the investment. Of the total income 
created by a given investment, leakages for savings, imports and taxes 
reduce the amount available as disposable income for consumers. In 
allocating disposable income, consumer preferences determine the demand 
which will be generated for alternative commodities. 
Theoretically food aid should be a near perfect substitute for capital 
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on a project which was composed entirely of labor inputs and eng)loyed 
previously unemployed personnel without an income. In this case the 
total cost of the project would be for labor and the ençloyees would 
have marginal propensities to consume which approach unity so that 
little or none of the income would be saved. From the previously 
derived estimates, consumers with very low incomes would allocate all 
or nearly all of their disposable income for food purchases. Assuming 
that the food supplied as aid to finance the investment was a relatively 
close substitute for domestic commodities in the diet, food aid could 
be substituted for capital on an equal basis for the entire amount 
of the investment. Furthermore, providing wages in the form of food 
would prevent inflationary pressures on food prices if wages were paid 
in cash and the total food supply was not expanded accordingly. 
On a practical basis, development projects will not consist only 
of labor inputs, and labor will not be supplied totally by employees 
without any income so that wages will represent only a portion of the 
total investment and food purchases will only be a portion of total 
consumer expenditure. The proportion which derived food demand represents 
of the total investment sets the limit on the amount of food which 
can substitute directly for capital in financing development. Due 
to the inverse relationship between income level and marginal propensity 
to consume food, projects which draw labor from low-income groups can 
utilize a higher proportion of the investment as food without a negative 
impact on domestic prices than projects which draw labor from higher 
income groups, ceteris paribus. If a broader concept of commodity aid 
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than just food Is considered, the differences between income groups are 
not as distinct because the marginal propensity to consume all goods 
varies less between income groups than the marginal propensity to 
consume food. Consequently, the lover the per capita real income in a 
developing country, the larger the development effort which can be 
financed with food or commodity aid per unit of supporting capital. 
HpTTiflTid to Utilize food aid 
With the exception of disaster or other emergency situations, an 
effective demand for food aid commodities will exist in a recipient 
country only if the food aid displaces commercial exports from donor 
countries or third country competitors, it displaces domestic production, 
or demand expands. Various international organizations have developed 
a set of principles emphasizing the importance of protecting third 
country trade when making concessional sales. P.L. 480 requires that 
concessional sales be made only when in addition to conmnerical exports. 
Protection and expansion of domestic agricultural supply is a primary 
objective of many developing countries. If the Interests of all three 
of these groups are considered, only one source of effective demand for 
food aid! remains, and that is expanded demand for food in the recipient 
country. 
One source of demand expansion is development investments. Investments 
in development projects financed with food aid have an element of derived 
or expanded demand for food which results from increased income generated 
from the Investment. Other alternatives for expanding demand Include 
direct income and price subsidies. In the U.S. demand expansion has been 
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accomplished through income subsidies in the form of direct distribution 
of commodities and food stamp programs. India has used fair price shops 
where lower prices are charged for P.L. 480 imports than for similar 
domestic commodities on the open market. Analysis of the twelve years 
of data from India indicates that the fair price shop system has been 
sufficiently effective in expanding demand so that any negative impact 
on domestic production has been minimal. 
It appears that distribution of P.L. 480 connnodities at prices below 
dcxnestically produced commodities is also an effective way to expand 
demand in developing countries. If commodity aid is sold through 
retail outlets at reduced prices, the additional sales will serve as a 
stimulus to develop the marketing system while simultaneously improving 
consumer welfare. By combining a food stamp program with a fair price 
distribution program, the government could develop a mechanism for 
providing additional welfare benefits to selected groups. 
Demand expansion provides the means for using food aid to provide 
welfare benefits to consumers without having a negative impact on 
producers by depressing prices and revenue. At the same time, if food 
aid isqjorts satisfy increased demand, producers in the donor countries 
and other exporting countries can maintain their commercial exports. 
Impact of alternative distribution methods on consumption and production 
Variation in consumer reponse with respect to price and income 
changes suggest that distribution to selected groups of consumers can 
produce significantly different effects on the economy. In addition to 
the demand effect, and the associated impact of price changes on supply. 
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specific distributional methods have a direct effect on the amount of 
"Investment" achieved through programming food aid and the direct Impact 
which the additional Investment will have on supply. 
Under present F.L. 480 provisions, the U.S. Is supplying food 
commodities under three basic plans—cash or credit sales, donations, 
and barter agreements. The recipient countries are in turn distributing 
food under three basic plans—grants, wages-in-kind, and sales. In 
practice, the method of distribution in a recipient country is usually 
tied to the alternative plans through which food Is made available by 
the U.S. However, there is no technical or legal reason why the method 
of supplying and distributing food must be tied together. As such, the 
effective policy variable in food aid programming is the method of 
distribution used in the recipient country. 
Grants or donations of food have traditionally been used for 
individuals who are unable to work such as children, pregnant women, 
and handicapped adults. Also grants and donations have been used exten­
sively to meet food shortages in times of disaster or emergency. 
Utilized for these purposes, grants and donations represent a temporary 
Increase in domestic supply which is offset by an Increase in demand 
of similar magnitude since the previously mentioned groups will have a 
high marginal propensity to consume food. If in fact their marginal 
propensity to consume food approaches 1.0, the food aid commodities will 
be added to present consumption, and the market price will be unaffected. 
The additional real Income, represented by the food aid, will make a 
positive contribution to consumer welfare. Since grants are Independent 
of any attempt to increase production, the main permanent effect is the 
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long-run Investment in human capital and any corresponding increase in 
production at a future time. 
A number of studies indicate a positive correlation between 
nutrition levels and productivity. A 10 percent increase in calories 
supplied to workers with inadequate diets has produced from 10 to 20 
percent increases in output. However, these are measures of increases 
in productivity when diets were improved for workers engaged directly 
in the production of goods and services. Still another aspect of pro­
ductivity overshadows the direct increase in labor productivity in the 
developing countries. In most developing countries, the problem of 
reducing unemployment is more pressing than increasing labor productivity. 
The examples in this study concentrate on cases with an assumed labor 
surplus so that emphasis is on increasing employment opportunities 
and providing social overhead investment to develop resource availability 
and quality for long-run increases in productivity of all factors. The 
case of direct increases in labor productivity becomes a special case 
of those which are discussed. An increase in labor productivity would 
cause an even greater shift in supply than is discussed in the separate 
cases and cause an even greater price depression and negative impact on 
domestic production than is presented. 
Although food grants have most commonly been made to very low 
income consumers, who are generally unemployed or definitely underemployed, 
grant programs could also be used to distribute food to consumers at 
other income levels. It is evident from Chapter V that each higher income 
level results in a greater negative impact on prices and consequently 
supply as marginal propensity to consume diverges from 1.0. As a result. 
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the lower the grant recipients' income level, the smaller the negative 
impact on agricultural income. With the exception of the lasting effect 
of investment in human capital, the impact of grants on welfare is 
almost exclusively short run. As soon as the grants are terminated, 
supply and demand revert to their original levels so that further welfare 
gains are lost. Three possible exceptions should be noted which might 
result in long-run impacts. First, if grants are continued for an 
extended period, they may have an impact on consumer tastes and 
preference so that movement back to previous levels will be vigorously 
resisted. Second, if food for grants is contracted under emergency 
conditions, it probably replaces commercial imports which the recipient 
country would otherwise be forced to purchase as an alternative to the 
food aid by diverting foreign exchange from development programs. If 
so, termination of the food aid will have supply and demand at higher 
levels than if foreign exchange had been diverted from development 
programs. Third, the impact on labor productivity may increase income, 
demand, and supply so that a lasting shift will result. 
Distribution of food through work projects results in an impact very 
similar to grants. Food causes a temporary supply shift and, likewise, 
a temporary demand shift through the income effect. However, wages-in-
kind produce an additional supply shift as a result of the work output 
which the food aid finances. Work which is of the overhead investment 
type results in an additional supply impact which is permanent in nature. 
The additional supply response shifts the supply curve further to the 
right than with the grant distribution so that market clearing prices 
would be lower than under the grant distribution. With price 
222 
elasticities of demand for food less than 1.0, the lower prices Imply 
lower Income to agricultural producers even if supply increases. As 
with the grant distribution, the negative impact on producer welfare is 
correlated with income level of the food aid recipients since the higher 
income consumers generate less demand for food from marginal income than 
lower income consumers. Consumers, on the other hand, enjoy an increase 
in level of welfare through the incremental income as an increase in 
money income and through the lower food prices as an Increase in real 
Income. 
The impact of food sales is limited to the supply side of the food 
market. Placing food aid on the market effectively shifts supply to the 
right without affecting demand. This movement alone would result in 
reduced food prices and a negative impact on domestic food production. 
The total effect depends on how the government uses the revenue which it 
received from the food sales. If the government chooses to use it for 
social overhead investments in capital improvements to increase agricul­
tural production, the same long-run supply effect could presumably be 
achieved as with work projects. The capital investment would result 
in an additional supply shift without an associated demand shift so that 
equilibrium food prices would be lower than with work projects. Invest­
ment in labor intensive overhead such as that supplied through work 
projects would produce the same supply and demand shifts as with the 
work project distribution. With the same supply and demand structure as 
with the work project distribution, the income and welfare implications 
would also be the same. 
The permanent effect of food aid is related to the "investment" 
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which is achieved. With grants the investment is in terms of human 
capital. With work projects and sales, the investment may be in terms 
of human capital, but can also be in terms of increased productivity 
through resource development and refinement. The permanent effect in 
all three cases is the impact which the "investment" has on production 
coefficients and the quality of resources which are available. These 
factors determine the permanent shift in supply and the higher level of 
output which can be maintained after food aid is discontinued. 
Trade restrictions and food aid 
The impact which food aid has on a recipient economy is closely 
tied to the amount of commercial food imports and the rigidity with 
which they are protected. If the recipient country is willing to reduce 
imports to balance the market instead of forcing an adjustment in prices, 
the income and welfare of domestic producers could be protected at the 
same time that foreign exchange savings are generated. If greater 
production is the primary objective, with welfare gains for the producer 
rather than consumer, prices could be maintained by reducing commercial 
imports by an amount equal to the food aid imports and supply expansion 
could be achieved through overhead investment. If consumer welfare is 
of primary in^ortance, maintaining commercial imports will effectively 
lower prices and raise real income levels. Reduction of conmercial 
imports by an amount less than the food aid would lower prices slightly 
and increase consumer welfare, and would reduce the negative impact on 
producers at the same time. The question of whether consumers, producers 
or both are to benefit from the food aid imports determines the extent 
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to which commercial Imports need to be adjusted when they are providing 
part of the "normal" supply. 
The seriousness of reducing commercial imports depends upon the 
status of the exporting countries affected. With the return on U.S. 
investment in foreign development being estimated as low as 10 to 15 
percent, a large portion of the investment becomes a grant for development. 
From a global welfare standpoint, reducing third country Imports from 
developed countries may cause other developed countries to contribute 
to the development effort. On the basis of optimal distribution 
patterns derived earlier, rice is the only major commodity which is 
exported from a developing country in any significant volume. Reducing 
imports from one of the developing nations most likely is saving foreign 
exchange for one developing country at the expense of another, and 
cutting off the exporting countries' only source of foreign exchange 
earnings. A few developing countries export wheat or feed grains, but 
most of them supply nearby neighbors so that they have a distinct loca-
tional advantage over competition from developed nations. The few cases 
where imports are contracted from developing nations could be protected 
by only reducing imports from developed nations. The developing nations 
which are most likely to be affected are Canada and Australia. The 
U.S. would likely be affected also if commercial exports are not 
specifically protected as a part of the P.L. 480 contract. 
Stimulatine agricultural production 
Most of the developing countries have, and are projected to continue 
to have, food deficits in one or more of the major cereal grains. With 
population expansion increasing at 2 to 3 percent per year, attention 
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is focused directly on expanding food production if any progress is 
expected in closing the food gap. Food deficits are compounded if 
economic development results in increased income levels which are then 
translated into demand for food and other commodities. 
Various studies of aggregate production response indicate that 
producers in the developing countries are responsive to price changes 
so that any price depression will have a negative impact on supply. 
Consequently, if food aid is allowed to depress domestic prices, it can 
further aggravate the food deficit through a negative impact on 
production. 
Normative supply functions derived under constrained maximization 
indicate a positive relationship between output and product prices; 
likewise; a positive relationship exists between output and technical 
coefficients. Normative supply functions also indicate a negative 
relationship between output and factor prices. These relationships 
provide a basis for stimulating production or avoiding negative impacts 
on output. The use of food aid for overhead investments can be 
effective in increasing the magnitude of technical coefficients as 
well as the supply of resources. Increases in resource supplies imply 
a price decline which would further stimulate resource use and output. 
Food aid offers an opportunity to underwrite labor costs for the develop­
ment and dissemination of new production technology as well as resource 
development, likewise, investments in transportation, market facilities, 
and storage can utilize food aid and provide a positive impact on 
permanent supply. 
226 
Policy Guidelines 
The utilization of food aid to promote economic development must be 
closely related to (a) the objectives of donor country, (b) methods by 
which the food is supplied, (c) distributional techniques used to 
allocate food aid among consumers, (d) income level of the recipient 
consumers, (e) magnitude of uneng)loyment, (f) extent of food deficit, 
(g) responsiveness of producers to price changes, (h) concern for 
protection of "normal" commercial trade, and (i) the segment of society 
which is to realize developmental gains. Many of these objectives are 
similar for all developing countries and indicate that a limited set of 
policies might be applicable to the group as a whole with minor 
modifications for specific differences. Such policy iiiq>lications are 
direct outgrowths of the economic principles which relate to consumption, 
production, and development. 
Source of comipn«Hfy «id 
The apparent conflict between the protection of third country trade 
and the development of the recipient country suggests that a unique 
arrangement is necessary to allow the recipient country to reduce 
commercial imports when possible. Such an arrangement might include a 
consortium of developed countries which would cooperate in supplying the 
food aid and internally negotiate the adjustment in commercial exports 
on a proportional basis. Such an arrangement should reduce "the 
accusations from other major exporting countries that United States 
surplus disposal is cutting into their established, commercial markets" 
(23, p. 1490). Cost minimizing distribution models indicate that the 
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U.S., Canada, and Australia are the three major surplus countries which 
should cooperate to alleviate competition. Separate consortiums might 
be set up for a specific recipient country if countries other than the 
main three were actually involved in supplying commercial shipments 
to the recipient country. The consortium arrangement would prevent 
one surplus country from "dumping" commodities at the expense of other 
surplus countries. Likewise, the consortium arrangement would involve 
more than just one country in the effort and costs of assisting developing 
countries. 
Methods of supplying commodity aid 
The basis on which a consortium supplies food to developing countries 
under concessional agreements should be determined by the role it wishes 
to play in the development process. In terms of direct return to the 
consortium, commodities could be sold for hard currency or barter agreement 
since these two provisions most nearly approach a commercial sale. Host 
of the developing countries seek concessional sales, however, because 
they are; financially unable to make settlement immediately, and certainly 
not without diverting finances from other needed investments. In the 
interest of promoting development, the next closest thing to commercial 
sales would be hard currency contracts with extended loan agreements. 
Extended loans allow the recipient to "invest" the food and retire the 
loans from the return on the investment in development. From the earlier 
figures representing repayment schedules, the shortest possible repayment 
period the recipient country could manage and the lowest possible interest 
rate the consortium would allow minimizes the accumulative value of the 
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liability of a recipient coimtry. By maintaining hard currency agreements 
for the concessional contracts, the consortium should be less concerned 
about substitution of food aid for commercial sales since food aid would 
presumably only result in a longer payoff period than commercial sales. 
Project versus program aid 
Program versus project aid may well be one of the longest standing 
controversies in the administration of foreign assistance. The problem 
is one of dealing with specific definable projects versus integrated 
programs which may incorporate numerous projects plus overhead investment 
to promote interaction. Project aid lends itself to greater influence 
on behalf of the donor than program aid in general. Since "many 
governments in underdeveloped countries are not sufficiently strong, 
or sufficiently responsible, to effectively administer the development 
plans and projects" (20, p. 893), a consortium mig^t prefer to tie food 
aid to project agreements. This should be particularly so when dealing 
with a recipient country with a politically unstable government which 
would be prone to make short-run as opposed to long-run investments, or 
with countries which lack the technical manpower to properly analyze 
long-term investment needs for development. The project approach would 
allow the donors to exert considerably more influence in the development 
process by establishing project priorities for which financing would be 
made available, designing and planning implementation of projects and 
selecting the sectors and proportion of the aid to be allocated to each. 
Tying aid to projects would encourage the recipient country to develop 
a greater quantity and better quality of projects for assistance 
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considerations. Specific identification of financed projects would 
provide better opportunities for donor countries to publicize their 
contribution to development. Extended involvement of the donors in 
analysis of alternative projects and monitoring of their progress would 
increase access to precise information on recipients' development. 
Possible shortcomings of project as opposed to program aid are the 
reduction in leverage over the total development program and inter-
government conflicts over supervision of specific projects. In cases 
where the amount of aid is large compared to the recipient governments 
total investment in development and projects are numerous, project aid 
may compare favorably with program aid in terms of total influence. 
Consequently, project aid provides the donor with close control of 
specific aspects of the development plan and potential leverage over the 
general plan through negotiation for future contracts. 
Distribution and allocation 
For countries without a serious food deficit, grants of food aid to 
low income consumers would be economically consistent with humanitarian 
objectives since the utility of an increase in real income would be very 
high and the demand for food which was generated from the incremental 
income would most nearly exhaust the extra food supply and minimize the 
negative effect on prices and production. However, when there is a 
food shortage in the country so that commercial imports are necessary to 
supplement domestic supply, the distribution of food aid among consumer 
groups creates a conflict. Supplying food to unemployed or grossly 
underemployed Individuals will increase their level of welfare through 
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Increased real income, but will generate a sizable increase in demand 
for food at the same time. Consequently, supplying food to very low 
income consumers results in the least impact on reducing a food deficit 
or creating a demand for industrial coomodities to stimulate that sector. 
Supplying food aid to consumers with high income levels will generate 
the least food demand and the most demand for industrial commodities. 
With marginal propensities to consume food significantly less than 1.0, 
a large portion of the food aid will be traded away or substituted for 
nonfood commodities. The extra food will allow a cut back in commercial 
imports and free scarce foreign exchange to be used to support the 
development process. 
Distribution of food through work projects which result in a 
permanent impact on supply will be even more effective than grants in 
reducing the food deficit. Therefore, work projects would be more 
effective in reducing demand for comnercial food imports than grants. 
Work projects are also conçatible with the project approach to contracting 
food aid and would be found the most desirable by the donors in most 
cases. . 
Open-market sales could be used to distribute the additional food 
and work projects financed out of the currency which is generated for 
government use, but this comes much closer to the program approach to 
aid. When the earnings are generated directly to the government 
from sales, it is difficult to isolate the income as distinct from other 
government revenue. 
Sales might be particularly appropriate where both food and capital 
are needed for a project. Part of the food could be sold on the market 
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to generate capital which could be used in turn to purchase the capital 
goods needed to supplement the food used as wages-in-kind on work 
projects. For this special case, a combination of the two methods of 
distribution would be complementary. 
On the basis of decreasing marginal utility and the urgency of 
reducing unemployment in most developing countries, drawing labor from 
the unemployed or low income groups for work projects is recommended 
over an attempt to achieve slightly higher import savings by employing 
workers from the higher Income groups. 
Work projects 
The range of work projects designed to promote production is extensive. 
A few examples from Colombia include land clearing, drainage work, and 
construction of fertilizer plants, access roads, warehouse facilities, 
and agricultural processing or manufacturing facilities. Examples from 
Japan include financing of a resettlement or colonization fund, forest 
development, and construction of factories and markets. Food has been 
used to finance education, research, and electric power facilities in 
Pakistan. Electric power development, railroad and highway maintenance, 
and resettlement projects have made use of food aid in Brazil. 
Some projects have much faster payoff than others. For example, 
land clearing projects can almost finance themselves after a few weeks. 
The sale of timber from the clearing process provides income to finance 
continued operation. Within one year the land can be put into use so 
the regular production is forthcoming by the end of the next cropping 
season. Other projects such as research and education may have a longer 
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payoff period so that returns are not immediately generated. 
Selection of projects should be based on highest marginal returns 
as related to the total development effort. Achievement of the highest 
returns requires identification of the physical and institutional 
bottlenecks which are obstructing development, and the integrated 
planning of resource use to alleviate these constrictions. 
Long-term commitments 
In many cases food aid allows the recipient country to reallocate 
its internal investment program and commit additional resource to 
development. However, most development projects require several years 
for completion and the total program is perpetual. It is difficult for 
the recipient country to determine the extent to which it will be able 
to maintain financial support for development unless the commitment for 
food aid Is over an extended period of time. With a definite commitment, 
the recipient country can devote a larger effort to development with 
reasonable confidence of being able to carry the projects or program 
to completion. Consequently, It is essential for recipient country 
planning to have long-run commitments on assistance rather than year-to-
year agreements. 
Specific projects or plans 
Contracts for food aid should be exclusively tied or related to 
projects or specific plans in a larger program except in the case of 
famine or emergency relief. Due to the liability for repayment which 
the recipient accepts, except when provided grants or donations, it Is 
appropriate to encourage the use of the food in such a manner that an 
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investment effect will be achieved and the food will not result only in 
expanded consumption while leaving the country with an increased debt. 
Associating food contracts with specific projects or plans encourages 
more precise planning and awareness of alternatives. It also discourages 
requests for assistance when an economic basis does not exist for its 
use. 
Development commitment versus surplus disposal 
Traditionally, F.L. 480 contracts have continued to be labeled as 
surplus disposal throughout the decade and a half of operation. As 
such, provision for commodities to be supplied under concessional 
contract agreements has been basically a function of chance. Given the 
geographic and cultural differences between the developed and developing 
nations, the commodities which are in surplus in the developed nations 
are not always the ones which are in shortage in the developing nations. 
Consistent with the need in recipient countries of programming food for 
long-term commltments, obligating support for extended periods actually 
changes the program from a surplus disposal program to a development 
program. The extended obligation should be accepted as a claim on 
donors' domestic production which suggests a possibility for a shift in 
production to those commodities most compatible with the deficits in 
the recipient countries. Acceptance of the P.L. 480 commitments as 
demand for developmental commodities rather than surplus conmodities 
should change the attitude of the donors, recipients, and competing 
third countries. The development of a responsible attitude on the part 
of the donor should be conducive to more effective contracting of 
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commodity aid on a need basis rather than a surplus availability basis. 
Financing and costs 
Financial arrangements associated with commodity aid should be 
based on maximizing the developmental impact rather than return to the 
donor if the main objective of food aid is to promote development rather 
than serve as surplus disposal. The earlier discussion of alternative 
repayment schedules and interest rates Indicates a wide variation in the 
long-run impact of commodity aid on the recipient economy. Financing 
which is favorable to the recipient is consistent with the development 
philosophy which suggests supplying commodities on a need basis and 
under long-term commitments. 
With or without a consortium arrangement for supplying food aid, 
the donors should emphasize the gain to the competing exporting countries 
of having commodities supplied under concessional contracts as opposed 
to releasing the surpluses on the world market. Schultz estimates that 
the release of U.S. surpluses, alone, on the world market would have 
lowered prices sufficiently to lower the total revenue for all sales 
(71, p. 1022). If Schultz's estimate was correct, supplying food aid 
as concessional sales was only competitive with total commercial sales 
and not with revenue from those sales. From the standpoint of the U.S., 
Schultz estimated that half the cost of commodities which are supplied 
under F.L. 480 should actually be charged to U.S. agricultural programs 
and not to the value of the food supplied (71, pp. 1023-1024). In 
combination, the income foregone by either the U.S. or competing 
exporters appears to be very low with respect to food aid contracting. 
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Marginal prolects for program expansion 
The current provisions of F.L. 480 stipulate that food aid should 
be programmed for projects which are in addition to those which the 
recipient country is capable of financing. In effect this requires an 
examination of the recipient country's development plan and identification 
of additional productive projects which have not already been specified 
for financing. The theory behind this method of selecting projects for 
financing is to expand the development plan of the recipient country. 
In practice, projects which are already in the plan may be better 
adapted to the use of food as a substitute for capital than a marginal 
project. In such cases it would increase the substitutability of 
food aid by tying the food intensive project to a marginal project. 
Food aid could be used to finance a project which would utilize a high 
proportion of food, and capital it frees could be used to finance a 
marginal project. Combining two projects as a unit would satisfy the 
theory of expanding the total development effort while achieving 
practical efficiency. 
Food as a policy instrument 
Asia final note, the essence of using food aid as a policy instrument 
was aptly captured by Cochrane when he described it as a policy bridge 
which buys time for adjustment in both donor and recipient countries 
(20, p. 896). The sale of surplus food on concessional terms seizes 
to alleviate problems associated with surplus supplies of food in the 
donor country, but fails to treat the cause of the basic problem. 
Likewise, using food aid to satisfy a food deficit in a recipient country 
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fulfills the short-run deficit but not future deficits. However, as 
a means to achieving various objectives, food aid can make positive 
contributions to long-run adjustment. Grant or donation programs most 
nearly accomplish welfare objectives, while work projects most nearly 
accomplish development objectives. Sales fall into either group 
depending on the price charged for commodities and the use made of 
revenue. The value of food aid as a policy Instrument is determined by 
its contribution to real per capita income through welfare programs 
to is^rove human capital,or development programs to expand domestic 
production. 
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CHAPTER VII. FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS 
The reliability of the foregoing analysis rests heavily upon estimates 
of various response coefficients such as price and income elasticity of 
demand, price elasticity of supply, return to development investments, 
and marginal tax and savings rates. The most extensive work has been 
done in the area of estimating income elasticity of demand, and several 
international studies are now available as cited in Chapter III. Supply 
response in developing countries has been studies primarily on a single 
commodity—single country basis, but as cited in Chapter V several 
estimates are now available for all of the major food grains. Price 
elasticity of demand estimates are available on a more limited basis. 
Studies of marginal tax and savings rates have not been published 
extensively, but most of the basic data should be available as secondary 
series for processing. 
Although the qualitative conclusion probably would not be changed, 
additional studies to refine or improve previous estimates of response 
coefficients would contribute to more precise quantitative estimates of 
the impact of food aid. As pointed out in the previous analysis, 
consumer response is crucial in estimating the quantity of food demand 
which will exist at a given point in time, and is a significant variable 
in estimating the impact of a specific quantity of food aid. For 
similar reasons producer response in the developing countries determines 
the domestic supply position and is also a significant variable in 
determining need for food aid. Detailed studies of selected recipient 
countries or regions within countries, and consumer goods within the 
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countries would provide estimates for specific countries as well as 
neighboring countries with similar economic and geographic conditions. 
Although price elasticity estimates with respect to demand for 
domestic products are useful and necessary, similar estimates for food 
aid imports are also necessary. Analysis of alternative transfer methods 
to expand demand, such as analyzed in Chapter IV, is based on differentia­
tion of market demand. It is quite conceivable that demand for food aid 
imports represents response coefficients quite different from demand for 
domestic commodities. Parallel studies to evaluate price, income and 
crossprice elasticities for both domestic and concessional import 
commodities would provide better estimates of demand response to P.L. 
480 imports. 
For evaluation of the long-run impact of P.L. 480 on the recipient 
econony, it is necessary to evaluate both the price and investment impact 
on supply. Evaluation of specific development investments to determine 
rate and duration of return would provide more precise estimates of 
the supply impact of investment alternatives. Since work projects are 
one of the most direct ways for using food aid to finance investment, 
an extensive review or work projects should be conducted to expand the 
scope of potential projects, determine alternative resource combinations 
which have prevailed, identify success and failure factors inherent in 
specific types of projects, and evaluate the benefit-cost relations of 
work projects. 
A number of other studies could be undertaken which deal with 
perceived need for food aid. One study involves the replacement of 
effective demand estimates with nutritional demand estimates based on 
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alternative population projections and incorporating them in an interna­
tional distribution model. The model could be formulated either to 
consider only nutritional demand or to account for the difference between 
effective and nutritional demand as potential demand for F.L. 480 exports 
from the U.S. 
A similar study could be formulated as a linear programming problem 
to evaluate the least cost means of raising diet levels in the developing 
countries to a minimum recommended nutritional level. It may be 
determined that the least cost means of improving diet levels is to 
combine selected U.S. surpluses with local foods in the recipient 
country. If so, identification of these particular commodities 
would provide administrators with improved insight into nutritional 
impact that specific commodities would have on recipients. Again, if 
tied to an international distribution model, the model could be used 
to estimate demand for F.L. 480 exports from the U.S. 
A major problem in the developing countries is timing of availability 
of commodities to coincide with demand. This is equally important with 
F.L. 480 imports since storage and transportation facilities in many 
of the developing countries are limited so that poorly timed deliveries 
put a burden on handling facilities or cause short-run price fluctuations 
because of food shortages. Using the framework of an international 
transportation model, the availability of surplus commodities by time 
periods at regional ports in the U.S. could be integrated with F.L. 480 
contract commitments in an optimization model which would provide an 
export schedule to minimize delivery cost and delays. 
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Numerous other food aid studies can be defined to analyze the 
relationship to U.S. foreign policy, social and humanitarian issues, 
health and nutrition Issues, and program operation (112, pp. V-X). 
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